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CONTRACT OVERVIEW
This document reports final progress in the second phase of a 24-month, three-phase study
for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Johnson Space Center (JSC).
The study focuses on extravehicular activity (EVA) systems requirements definition for three
advanced space missions: in geosynchronous orbit (Phase I), at a lunar base (Phase II), and in
Mars surface exploration (Phase III). The Phase I study was conducted from May 1987
through January 1988; the Phase II effort began in February 1988 and was completed in
September 1988, after which the third phase will commence.
The technical team collaborating on this study comprises experts from Essex Corporation,
Lovelace Scientific Resources, Incorporated, and CAMUS, Incorporated. Essex, represented
by Nicholas Shields, Jr., and Dr. Valerie Neal, has primary responsibility for human factors,
hardware design, and interface requirements, as well as production of the study documents.
Lovelace, whose team led by Arthur Schulze includes Apollo astronaut Dr. Harrison Schmitt,
is responsible for biomedical requirements and incorporation of lunar experience into the
study. Skylab astronauts Dr. Gerald Cart and Dr. William Pogu¢, the CAMUS members of the
study team, are responsible for crew systems requirements.
In our deliberations, wc have been guided not only by the outline specified in the contract
but also by our team members' first-hand experience on the moon, in low-Earth orbit, and
on the ground in all aspects of the space program. Their insight has been both practical and
imaginative. Proposed requirements have been discussed and analyzed by the entire team to
ensure that all relevant perspectives are considered. We have put all suggestions to the test
of experience in order to validate the systems design requirements presented in this study.
xii
wAPPROACH TO DERIVING REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT EVA AT LUNAR BASE
At the outset of Phase II, the team received direction from JSC to focus our study on remote-
from-main-base extravehicular activity on the moon. Considerable attention is already being
given to lunar base construction scenarios with associated EVA to prepare the surface, erect
the habitat, deploy the power system, and establish other necessary facilities. Our conscnsus
was that it would be useful and instructive to assess remote EVA forays at some distance
from thc comforts and shelter of the main base. We have, therefore, assumed the existence
of an established main base and have not concerned ourselves with construction-phase EVA
scenarios.
Our team consulted with the JSC technical team for this study to select a set of candidate
scenarios for our reference mission. We also jointly agreed to a set of assumptions that
focused our options; for example, we assume an EVA suit pressure of 8.3 psi, lunar rover
mobility rather than "flight," and a minimum base complement of four crewmembers. These
initial assumptions are presented in Chapter 1.
Led by our astronaut team members, we then developed six remote EVA scenarios in
considerable detail. These nominal and contingency scenarios are presented in Chapter 2.
Input for the scenario development was derived from creative thinking by the team,
reviewing the literature of lunar base studies, and assessing the statement of work in light
of actual experience. The experience database we consulted includes Apollo and Skylab crew
debriefing transcripts, Apollo lunar EVA videotapes, Apollo environmental and biomedical
data, and our astronaut team members' own recollections.
In addition to these historical records, we also reviewed the advanced planning studies for
future Space Station and lunar base operations to see where technology appears to be headed,
what we can reasonably expect to be available, and what is probably beyond the scope of
near-term EVA systems. At the request of the contract monitor, we have matched some of
our assumptions to Space Station era technologies and considered how these may be adapted
or superseded for lunar base EVA. Within our report, we identify such technology issues and
present the rationale for solutions other than the Space Station's. Our study is compatible
with NASA's current man-systems standards and EVA design guidelines.
Our technical approach blends pragmatism and imagination. We have looked at practical
problems and concerns in each of the scenarios, and we have raised the relevant human
factors, biomedical, and hardware design issues. In some cases, we suggest novel solutions
rather than the usual ones to illuminate design tradeoffs. All of our discussion is set in the
context of the unique lunar environment, a dusty, harshly lighted terrain sometimes subject
to lethal radiation and other hazards--an inhospitable place where humans soon intend to
set up industry and housekeeping.
xiii
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1.0 Introduction
Men have walked and worked, eaten and slept, driven around and explored, felt elated and
tired, joked and complained on the moon. Already, we have made it a temporary workplace
and home, proving the feasibility of eventual lunar settlement.
In the late 1960's, in response to our nation's commitment to send a man to the moon and
safely return him, 12 men pioneered the way. For various reasons, their missions did not lead
to immediate settlement. Now, two decades after the Apollo program, we are making plans
to return to the lunar surface, this time to stay. NASA's tentative plans for a lunar settlement
call for the start of activities around the turn of the century and for establishment of the first
operational settlement around the year 2010.
As we plan for the establishment of a self-sustaining base on the moon, we must look both to
past experience and present technology to determine what resources the colonists will need to
carry on day-to-day life there. In particular, we must look at their probable "outdoor"
activities to determine what kinds of support technologies they will require.
This study examines the unique lunar environment, biomedical considerations, appropriate
hardware design criteria, hardware and interface requirements, and key technical issues for
advanced lunar extravehicular activity (EVA). The reference mission for this study is derived
from six probable EVA scenarios --three nominal operations and three contingency situations
that represent a spectrum of workloads from heavy duty manual labor to concentrated mental
effort and a variety of environmental, technological, and biological emergencies.
This study does not address EVA during the establishment of the main base nor does it address
routine proximity EVA. Rather, it focuses on remote EVAs --excursions to other worksites
or scientific stations several kilometers away, forays that may preclude a quick walk or drive
back home in the event of emergency. Just as the pioneers of the American West set up base
camps and then set out on exploratory expeditions, just as camps are the hubs for remote
mining and timber operations, just as scientists in the Antarctic go "out into the field" to
conduct their research, so the lunar colonists will roam away from the main base to do their
work.
Ranging far afield from the shelter and resources of the main base raises many technical and
philosophical issues pertinent to the EVA systems design requirements for life support systems,
transport vehicles, tools, crew health and well-being, communications, and protection. This
study presents those issues, considers the relationship of human needs and hardware design,
considers how humans and their technology will function in the lunar environment, and
recommends further study of certain issues as planning progresses toward a return to the
moon.
It is important to recognize, even at this early stage of analyzing advanced lunar EVA
requirements, that the operational environment of such EVAs will be very different than that
during the Apollo program. The routine nature of day to day, week to week activities at a
nearly autonomous lunar base will inevitably lead to generalized plans for each EVA,
consistent with the constraints imposed by safety and consumables. Some special activities will
require detailed plans and timelines and others will incorporate standard timelines for normal
complex tasks, but activities such as mining, drilling and sampling, and exploration will
depend more on the experience and judgment of the EVA crew than on timelines and
checklists. Thus, in general, we should set aside the Apollo concepts of minutely detailed and
rehearsed timelines for each EVA.
To focus this study, the sponsors and authors agreed to make several assumptions about the
lunar base and probable technology in use there. These assumptions were made not to bias the
study toward any particular hardware design solutions but to narrow the field of variables to
a manageable set. Table 1-1 reflects this consensus.
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m In the course of discussing these assumptions, we readily identified several areas for design
requirement trade-off .analysis. These trade-offs, listed in Table 1-2, are mentioned in the
following scenario discussions and at appropriate places in the report.
Table 1-2. Trade-Offs
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Several environmental issues that cannot be ignored drive all considerations of lunar EVA
system design requirements. These are listed in Table 1-3.
Table 1-3. Environmental Issues
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12.0 Lunar EVA Mission Requirements Survey/Task Definition
2.1 LUNAR EVA TASK DEFINITION
EVA tasks near an operational lunar base encompass a range of activities that differ in some
ways from those required to operate a remote base on Earth. The major differences are
associated with a hard vacuum, extreme monthly temperature variations, solar radiation
storms, ubiquitous permeating abrasive dust, total absence of water, and a highly reducing soil
environment. These conditions dictate environmental control and life support systems, with
suits configured to allow the successful completion of tasks with a productive workload and
a high degree of safety.
The mission scenarios presented in section 2,2 describe lunar EVA tasks in considerable detail.
Defined tasks reflect a blend of operational needs, human capabilities, and environmental
constraints. The questions to be asked are, "What needs to be done?" "What do the crew need
to do the job?" "Can the crew do each task?" and (if not) "Why can't they do it?"
At the EVA site, the crew engage in a variety of activities appropriate to the task at hand.
Typical generic tasks are listed in Table 2-1; more detailed applications are presented in the
timelines, Tables 2-2 through 2-7,
Table 2-1. Generic EVA Tasks
Activate; deactivai¢: ":-i: :":". ... _ :i_.::i i i .:::..
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Calibrate " :" .... :i:.....': .
Check and confirm " - ..... "":. >.. •
" . Clean :,...._......:.. .... . :-..... ,:.
" Collect ..... .... 'i:
............... Communicate ...... . :. :i"":_! > -::>: '" :: ':
Connect and disconnect, electrical
Connect and disconnect, mechanical -.
Define " '"-: ::":/ : :.:!_!..:C_7:.</I.I-_.>i., .
Inspect (VisUai): :"<'"-_ " ......i:<::.i::..:, -
Label and encode " • -i:. """
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v2.2 LUNAR EVA REFERENCE MISSION SCENARIOS
Six EVA scenarios form the basis of the reference mission for this study. Three scenarios
explore representative nominal operations, the everyday work of drilling and sampling,
mining, and attending to science stations. Three other scenarios explore potential
contingencies that cause the crew to interrupt their EVA work and take shelter or rescue
action: solar flare, suit failure, and sickness.
These six scenarios were developed to demonstrate a spectrum of workload from heavy duty
to light duty, a variable balance of manual and mental effort, and different types of
environmental, technological, and biological emergencies. Other candidate scenarios were
identified and discussed (agricultural operations, oxygen production plant operations, and
vehicle breakdown) but were not specified in this report because many of the associated tasks
are already included in the six chosen scenarios.
The drilling/sampling scenario represents the most repetitive physical effort and the most
urgent physiological demands. The EVA crew are manually setting up large and small
equipment, changing drill bits, stringing together drill stems, extracting and bagging soil and
rock samples, transferring equipment and samples, and moving about on foot. These
operations require good balance, both upper and lower body mobility, manual exertion and
dexterity, and clear near vision and mental concentration for visual inspection, computer
encoding of an automated drill, and decision making. A fairly flexible EVA suit and gloves
are desirable to allow bending, reaching, handling, climbing, and maintenance of balance at
each of the worksites and over uneven terrain.
The mining scenario imposes the greatest system workload but, because it is amenable to
automation and mechanization, it represents a medium level of physical effort as the crew
set up, activate, and supervise the system. The crew may orient and align and start the
equipment, but the hard work is done by the machine. Less suit flexibility and mobility are
required for this workload, but greater protection from the environment is necessary. At the
mine site, dust contamination and flying debris are potential hazards. A protective shield may
be desirable here to isolate the EVA crew from these hazards.
The science scenario generally represents the lightest physical effort, the most precise manual
and mental activity, and the most demanding visual tasks. This workload includes inspection,
observation, procedures verification, calibration, data collection, reporting, and rudimentary
workbench activity for servicing, maintenance, or data analysis at solar and astronomical
observatories, biological and materials science research sites, geoscience analysis stations, and
seismic stations. The equipment handled is more fragile and the crew's actions more delicate
than in the other work scenarios. A flexible suit and gloves permitting fine dexterity are
extremely important to enhance the capability and efficiency of the crew.
The contingency scenarios explore conditions that put the EVA crew at risk. The most extreme
case is a solar flare emergency. Depending on solar particle acceleration, the crew have less
than 30 minutes (Bufkin, 1988) to 1 hour (McCormick, 1987) to reach or construct a safe haven
that not only protects them from the onslaught of radiation but also sustains them for a
minimum of 36 hours until the hazard abates. Responses to this environmental emergency
require ready access to adequate shelter with sufficient breathing air, food, and water for the
duration of their confinement, plus safety margins in case a rescue operation is required.
Suit failure may be either a recoverable contingency (slow leak) or a catastrophic emergency
(rupture or shutdown). When the life support technology fails, the crew must restore suit
integrity or move to shelter. Response to this technological emergency requires ready repair
capability, auxiliary life support systems, and transportation. Should the suit depressurize,
immediate access to a sustaining environment is critical.
Sickness on duty is worse than a nuisance when one is enclosed in an EVA suit and perhaps
hours away from the base. Besides causing general discomfort and debility, nausea and
it-.
diarrhea are major waste management and contamination problems. Response to these
biological emergencies requires a capacity for clean-up and treatment and access to
transportation.
The following narratives briefly raise the critical issues and design requirements suggested
by these reference mission scenarios. Detailed scenario tlmelines are presented in companion
tables. Specific issues and requirements are discussed more thoroughly elsewhere in the report.
Scenario definition requires assumptions for the pressurization of the lunar base habitat, EVA
suit, and work sites. It has been assumed that pressure regimes enabling zero pre-breathe EVAs
will be maintained. Facilities such as a mine, however, may operate non-pressurized, or an
agricultural site may operate at a different pressure and with a higher level of carbon dioxide
mixture than the main base habitat. Other important considerations in specifying pressure and
breathing air composition are physiology, oxygen toxicity, equipment cooling, and
flammability. These issues are addressed in section 3.2.3, Suit Operational Pressure Level.
NASA's baseline EVA period is 8 hours, which includes donning and doffing the pressure
suit and transit to and from a remote worksite. This "overhead" activity leaves only 4 to 6
hours of productive work time. Such a short EVA period for routine, remote operations at a
lunar base may not be cost-effective.
Present planning for advanced EVA seems to be constrained by logistics rather than human
performance considerations. Apollo experience indicates that a longer EVA work period is
feasible. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, the scenarios assume that 8 hours are
available for EVA work, that suit donning and doffing require an additional hour at each end
of the EVA work period, and that suit cleaning, life support system recharge, and similar
"overhead" tasks are not included in the EVA period. For increased crew productivity and
effectiveness, these "housekeeping _ functions might be performed by dedicated suit technicians
at the lunar base rather than the EVA crew. Similarly, consumables for the "overhead"
activities of travel and preparation could be supplied from the rover rather than the LEMU
to preserve EVA provisions for use during the actual work period. The rationale for extended
duration EVA to permit 8 hours of productive labor is presented in sections 2.4.3 (Lunar EVA
Workday Length) and 2.4.4 (Lunar EVA Duration Optimization). The 8-hour work period
timelines assume a less fatiguing suit than the Apollo EMU and include brief rest breaks as
necessary.
Before departure, the EVA expedition party will have reviewed the plans for remote-from-
base operations. Their training and familiarization were conducted within the base training
facility, and equipment configuration and supplies were readied. The equipment for any
remote expedition includes all of the provisions to support a specific mission objective, such
as mining, as well as a complete set of equipment to support general mission activities and
emergency situations. For transport of large equipment and supplies, it may be necessary to
use a trailer or cart.
The EVA crew depart the main base with a fully equipped rover and supply carrier. At
prescribed distances or time intervals, the crew set out communication beacons or antennas
to establish a communications link with the main base. These markers also can be used as
triangulation sources and as rescue aids if a rescue party must be dispatched. Periodic
communications checks between the rover and the base verify the continuity of the
communications link. Backup communication is direct to Earth with relay to base. Following
a preplanned navigation route of the surface or previously installed markers, the EVA
expedition proceeds to the first site of interest.
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2.2.1 Drilling and Sampling Operatlons
At this site, samples will be taken to determine the feasibility of future mining operations.
As the rover is guided into the area, considerable attention is focused on the exact location
of the site to be drilled and the relative location of the rover. With the similarity of terrain,
colors, and boulders, there is some probability of error in having a single system determine the
precise location of the desired sampling site and getting the rover to just that location. Guided
by orbital communications satellites, onboard locators, electronic maps, or main base direction,
the crew should be able to verify the exact location of the rover with respect to the sample
site, but they should not have to make that determination alone. Once the desired location has
been verified, the tasks of drilling samples can begin.
With the rover at the correct site, the crew deactivate any power systems not required for the
current operation while at the same time applying power to the drilling and sampling systems.
This power switching leaves essential services on board the rover. Adjusting the external
power sources and calibrating them is the responsibility of one crewmember, while the second
(or other) begins unstowing the sampling equipment and systems. The small equipment and
tools needed to support the sampling system are laid out on the rover workbench, and the
larger equipment is set up at the drilling site. With precise location, the rover and the drill
site should be right next to each other, making the rover a convenient work support center.
The EVA crew make the necessary connections to the mechanical and electrical subsystems
of the drill, check that all interfaces are correct and secure, and perform a test. Any special
equipment calibration, such as drilling speeds or depth gauges, is performed; when all
subsystems have been verified, the crew activate the sample drill. For deep drilling, the rover
should support the drill fixture, leaving the crew free to make adjustments to the equipment
and saving them from expending great effort to stabilize and drive the sample drill into the
lunar surface. For even shallow drilling, the sampler should be supported in a fixture that
frees the crew from heavy manual labor,
During the drilling operation depicted in Figure 2-1, the crew monitor the drill status and
progress, change drill bits as required, and add drill rods to the equipment if it is a deep bore.
This involves extracting the drill from time to time for equipment changeout as well as for
sample collection. The operations of drilling, extraction, and sample collection are automated
and supported from the rover, The EVA crew encode the parameters to the drill computer to
manage these functions.
During sample extraction, the crew manage the coding of the samples for future analyses, or
they can take them to the onboard sample analyzer for on-site analysis. The requirement for
on-site analysis is not certain unless there are specialized crews responsible for locating
promising sites and other crews and mining system vehicles responsible for extracting the
minerals. In this case, on-site analysis would allow rich sites to be marked immediately for
future mining, saving the time required for samples return and analysis and reducing location
error probabilities.
If samples are collected for later analysis, they are bagged, labeled, and stowed in a collector
bag or bale. When the bale is full of labeled samples, it can be stored on the lunar surface for
future pick up if the expedition plan calls for visiting several sites on the outbound leg; these
bales would be collected later on the inbound leg of the expedition.
When the correct quantity of samples has been gathered from one drill hole, the crew command
drill extraction; as the drill rods come up, the crew can disconnect them and stow them on the
work bench. The bit is checked and replaced if necessary. A visual inspection of the
equipment is performed before traversing and setting up for the next drilling at the site. The
equipment is stowed by the crew if traverse to the second location is a significant distance.
Most of the mechanical and physical tasks are assigned to the rover systems and subsystems,
to reduce crew fatigue, while the cognitive tasks and the fine manipulation and adjustments
are left to the human crew. As always, contingency training must reflect the fact that if a
mechanical support system fails to operate properly, then the EVA crew has to fix or take over
the operations of the mechanical system. However, the EVA systems to support lunar
operations should concentrate on enhancing the manipulative and visual capabilities of the
crew to take full advantage of their strengths in these areas.
The sample collectionand returnscenarioisbased on experiencesduring the Apollo missions.
We can relyon theseexpcrlenccsto plan clearlyfeasibleactivities.New opportunities,such
as mining lunar material,offer us the chance to greatlyexpand on Apollo experiences. The
probabilitiesof successfor mining activitieswillhave to bc derived in partfrom our surface
mining experienceson Earth.
Rccluircments derived from the drillingand sampling scenarioinclude:
Automation of repetitive tasks (e.g., drillings, assembly of drill rods and bits, sample
analysis)
Multiple location aids for precise navigation and site selection
) Rover-supported drill fixture
• Rover-mounted workbench
• Onboard sample analysis
• Portable (LEMU-mounted or tripod-mounted) remote control and display workstation
• Crew safcty guards/protective barriers against dust and hazardous operations
• Extended-duration EVA.
L_
Figure2-1. Drilling and Sampling Operations
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L Table 2-2, Drilling and Sampling Operations
..-.y
TIMELINE
Hrs/Min
TASKS
-4:00
-1:30
-0:30
0:00
0:10
0:20
0:25
0:30
I:00
1:30
2:00
2:05
2:10
Support crew loads and configure rovers
Define schedule for drilling and sample operations
Don suit
Egress habitat
Check equipment required for drilling and sampling operations
Activate rover
Disconnect rover from recharge power
Activate rover power systems
Test and adjust power systems
Activate rover navigation systems
Test and adjust navigation systems
Activate rover communications systems
Test and adjust communications systems
Activate rover control systems
Test and adjust control system
Test and adjust drive system
Initialize rover navigation systems
Position rover for drilling systems attachment
Secure drilling systems to rover
Connect mechanical interfaces
Connect electrical interfaces
Verify integrity of drill
Adjust bit components
Adjust rod components
Adjust rod joints
Test and adjust gear box
Adjust sample retrieval system
Test and adjust drill motor
Test and adjust drill mechanical components while in operation
Test and adjust sample retrieval system while in operation
Replace appropriate modules and components
Test and adjust sample analysis system
Test and adjust interface between sample analysis system and sample
retrieval system
Adjust calibration of instruments
Adjust ilmenite quantity measuring system
Adjust total gas quantity measuring system
Adjust particle size/frequency measuring system
Test and adjust operation of preserved sample selector train
Adjust selector system
Adjust bagging system
Adjust baler
Replace appropriate modules and components
Transport loaded rover to drilling and sampling initial point
Adjust rover for automatic operations
Position rover at initial point
Encode drilling, sampling, and navigation parameters into rover computer
Initiate drill and sample operations
Activate automatic drilling, sampling, and navigation mode
Adjust automatic operation
Confirm drill and sample operations
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5:35
5:45
6:15
6:45
7:25
7:30
7:40
7:50
8:00
8:00+
Adjust rover traverse line as required
Position rover if obstacles are encountered
Position drill as required
Position and re-initialize auto-mode if drill encounters large boulder
Adjust sample analysis calibrations
Encode map position of large boulders
Encode boulder fields and other obstacles to mining
Encode locations of sample bales
Terminate rover drill and sample operations
Deactivate automatic drilling, sampling, and navigation mode
Confirm closure of automatic navigation system
Confirm calibration of sample analysis instruments
Gather sample bales
Traverse to bale positions
Place bales onto rover cargo bed or trailer
Transport loaded rover to base
Terminate shift operations
Unload and store sample bales
Position rover at drill storage site
Disconnect drill from rover
Disconnect electrical interfaces
Disconnect mechanical interfaces
Clean and inspect drill and sampling components
Communicate information on drill status
Position rover at recharge site
Clean and inspect rover components
Inspect power systems
Clean and inspect drive systems
Inspect navigation systems
Clean and inspect control systems
Inspect communication systems
Communicate information in rover status
Deactivate rover
Deactivate rover navigation systems
Deactivate rover control systems
Deactivate rover power systems
Connect rover to recharge power supply
Store equipment, tapes, etc., at base as required
Clean rover surfaces as required
Ingress habitat
Doff suit
Support crew performs suit and rover maintenance
--No 11
L£
2.2.2 Surface Mining Operations
Mining of critical energy and life sustaining resources will be essential for the long-term
economic survival of the settlement. Although aluminum, magnesium, and chromium are
abundant, it is the oxygen-containing and fusion-fuel-containing ores that will be most
important. Proposals call for regolith to be mined for ilmcnite to produce oxygen and for
helium-3 to produce fusion fuel for export to Earth. By currently envisioned processes,
reducing ilmenite to obtain oxygen will require a continuous hydrogen source that could be
provided as a by-product of helium-3 production.
Mining the regolith for minerals for export from the moon or to support lunar base operations
will require larger and more complex equipment than that involved in the drilling and
sampling operations. Because mining is inherently dirty work and the mechanical stresses of
extracting and transferring large quantities of mined material are great, the miner will have
to be a major system rather than a component attached to, and operated from, the rover. The
rover should not have to be designed to accommodate either the stresses or the dust protection
from mining and still provide good service as a support platform and transport vehicle for
crews. As shown in Figures 2-2 and 2-3, the miner be should an independent system, possibly
incorporating some rover subsystems, that is brought to the site and activated or is assembled
there and then activated.
The regolith miner has been installed at, or transported to, a site that earlier was geologically
studied, sampled, and found to be relatively rich in the desired material. The EVA crew
orient and position the miner before initiating the extraction of material. This involves
verifying the location of the miner, moving it into final position, and stabilizing it using the
miner's mobility. The crew perform checkout and verification of the miner's systems and
subsystems, make any mechanical or electrical connections, encode the operating computer and,
as in the case of drilling, perform the cognitive, visual, and manipulative tasks.
Since the miner is a major subsystem that is monitored by the EVA crew, it should be possible
to use the mining platform as a utilities and consumables source for support of the EVA crew.
This is in keeping with the philosophy of reducing the amount of equipment which the crew
are required to carry around and relying more appropriately on the major systems for crew
support. In this case, the crew would connect their LEMUs to the miner consumable stores, the
electrical power source, the communications subsystem, and the gas and water supply. The
crew could then move about the miner, attached to it by umbilicals, and perform all
preparations and set-up activities without exhausting their portable life support and power
supplies. The crew would disconnect from the supply either at the end of the shift or prior
to the actual mining operations, depending on safety considerations and operating protocols.
In order to move about the mining site and perform the operations, the EVA crew must have
the advantages of mobility and flexibility afforded by a dexterous suit. However, this is not
necessarily the most desirable type of protection for mining operations. As large amounts of
material are moved in mining operations, there will be considerable dust in the immediate
area. The disturbed regolith is a source of surface contamination for equipment and personnel
in the vicinity. Small blocks and stones may be kicked up by the mining equipment, which in
the reduced gravity could be propelled considerable distances. To protect sensitive equipment,
personnel, and their life support equipment in and around the mining site, it will be necessary
either to restrict access to the area during operations, develop a harder suit for protection
against the dust and ejecta, or provide a protective enclosure from which ¢rewmembers may
observe or control operations. The protective enclosure, as shown in Figure 2-2, would not
provide life support or a pressurized environment but would serve to isolate the crew from the
local dust and debris produced during regolith mining. The cab of the rover or the miner
might also provide this protection.
The majority of the physical work is assigned to the miner system, while the EVA crew are
responsible for fine tuning the system and monitoring its progress. This division of labor
corresponds to the relative advantages of humans and machines.
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Requirements derived from the surface mining scenario include:
Independent miner system
Automated miner system
Look-ahead radar
* Use of explosives for boulder removal
Additional protective shielding against debris (supplied by rover, suit, or protective
enclosure)
Extended duration EVA.
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Figure2-2. Protective Enclosure for Surface Min!n 8 Operations
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Table 2-3. Surface Mining Operations
TIMELINE TASKS
Hrs/Min
-4:00
-1:30
-0:30
0:00
0:10
0:20
0:25
0:55
1:00
1:05
Support crew loads and configure rover
Define schedule for shift activity
Don suit
Egress habitat
Check equipment required for shift activities
Activate rover
Disconnect rover from recharge power
Activate rover power system
Activate rover communication systems
Activate rover control systems
Activate rover navigation system
Initialize rover navigation system
Transport loaded rover to mining locations
Deactivate rover
Position equipment on regolith miner
Activate regolith miner start-up power system
Activate regolith miner communications system
Ingress regolith miner
Test and adjust communication system
Place communications in operational configuration
Activate regolith miner control computer
Test and adjust control computer
Place control computer in operational program
Activate system and system test and adjustment routine
Activate regolith miner primary power systems
Test and adjust power system
Place primary power system in operational configuration
Activate regolith miner drive system
Test and adjust drive system
Place drive system in operational configuration
Activate regolith digging system
Test and adjust regolith digging system
Place digging system in operational configuration
Activate look-ahead radar
Test and adjust look-ahead radar
Place look-ahead radar in operational configuration
Activate concentrate off-loading system
Test and adjust concentrate off-loading system
Place concentrate off-loading system on stand-by
Activate secondary concentrator
Test and adjust secondary concentrator
Place secondary concentrator in stand-by
Activate primary concentrator
Test and adjust primary concentrator
Place primary concentrator in stand-by
Activate coarse reject off-loading system
Test and adjust coarse rejects off-loading system
Place coarse rejects off-loading system in stand-by
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1:35
1:45
1:50
2:00
Activate grade analysis system
Test and adjust grade analysis system
Place grade analysis systems in stand-by
Implement required maintenance procedures
Connect lunar extravehicular mobility unit (LEMU) to miner consumables
Connect LEMU communications system to miner communications system
Confirm communications
Connect electrical system to miner power supply
Connect LEMU gas system to miner gas supply
Connect LEMU water system to miner water supply
Position regolith digging system at mining face
Activate regolith miner
Observe systems come on-line in proper sequence
Observe regolith miner systems performance
Detect changes in systems performance
Adjust system elements as required
Observe performances of regolith digging systems at mining face
Detect changes in systems performance and regolith lithology
Adjust mining schedule as required
Observe grade analysis system data
Detect adverse change in regolith grade
Adjust mining schedule as required
Observe look-ahead radar data
Detect out-sized regolith boulders
Adjust mining schedules as required
Communicate information to base as required
Remove large boulders (see detailed timeline)
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0:10
0:40
1:10
1:40
2:00
2:30
3:00
3:15
3:30
3:35
LARGE BOULDER REMOVAL
Configure rover for boulder removal
Attach large borehole drill bit, rods, and casing to rover
Attach and test acoustical profiling system
Stow boulder removal explosive system
Connect all power corrections
Transport loaded rover to detected location of boulder
Determine size and shape of boulder
Visually (or with drill) verify indication of boulder
Obtain and analyze acoustical profile
Plan removal procedures
Position shot holes for desired boulder trajectory
Drill and case shot hole(s)
Deploy boulder removal explosives
Gather explosives
Confirm initiator safety pins in place
Place explosive canisters in shot hole(s)
Pull safety pins on initiators
Transport rover to monitoring locations or protective
enclosure
Detonate explosives
Transport rover to boulder location (former)
Verify removal successful
Transport rover to next boulder location or to base
6:00
6:25
6:35
6:40
6:45
6:50
6:55
7:25
7:30
Communicate information on shift activity
Activate high data rate communications system
Compute data as required
Encode data as required
Transmit data
Communicate shift information to next shift
Compute shift data
Display shift data as required
Plot shift data as required
Define changes in mining schedule as required
Confirm shift change
Disconnect LEMU from miner consumables
Disconnect LEMU water system from miner water supply
Disconnect LEMU gas system from miner gas supply
Disconnect LEMU electrical system from miner power supply
Disconnect LEMU communications from miner communications
Confirm communications
Gather equipment, tapes, etc., for return to base
Egress regolith miner
Position equipment, tapes, etc., on rover
Activate rover
Transport loaded rover to base
Deactivate rover
Deactivate rover navigation system
Deactivate rover control system
Deactivate rover power system
Connect rover to recharge power supply
Store equipment, tapes, etc., at base as required
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7:40
7:50
8:00
8:00+
Clean rover surfaces as required
Clean rover thermal protection surfaces
Clean rover camera lens surfaces
Ingress habitat
Doff suit
Support crew performs suit and rover maintenance
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2.2.3 EVA Science Activities
If hand and arm fatigue are eliminated, the ]ightest physical workload is the setup,
calibration, and operation of science packages and experiments for research in geology,
astronomy, biology, and other disciplines. However, the workload for installation of
observatories and large antennas is physically strenuous. The precision and dexterity
requirements, along with the visual and mental tasks associated with scientific data collection,
may well be more demanding than in any of the other scenarios. The use of visual aids for
analysis, the use of small tools and the crewmembers' gloved hands for precise operations, and
the exercise of precise control required for scientific operations will illuminate EVA
requirements which might not be evident in other scenarios.
The EVA crew go through the training and review required of any remote operation, and the
required scientific equipment and tools are loaded into/onto the rover. Special packaging and
stowage may be required for some of the equipment. Various equipment packages are
available for research in different disciplines. With the rover loaded and checked out, the
expedition crew leave the main base and proceed to the first scientific station or location.
Again, as in the other scenarios, the rover is required to serve as more than a transport vehicle
to support the mission_ It must also serve as a source of consumables, a scientific workbench,
a maintenance works-tation, a data collection and storage point, and possibly a sample
characterization laboratory for some missions.
The expedition follows the preplanned route to the first science station using distributed
communication markers or lunar orbit communications and navigation satellites. The crew
then verify the exact location of the science site and their position relative to the desired
site.
For seismic investigations the crew perform a visual inspection of the equipment package,
unstow and deploy the equipment, and transport it to the prescribed location. The active
seismic explosive package is set up and activated, the locations noted, and with all of the
packages in place the crew notify base that the first experiment has been readied. The
requirement for crew safety means that the active seismic data collection takes place only
when the crew are at a safe location. The charges are detonated by remote radio command
having a finite temporal and physical window for activation. Crew safety is ensured by
having the charges inactive before this window opens and after it closes. This precedent was
set in the Apollo seismic experiments.
Having set up and activated the timers for active seismic experiments, the crew stow
miscellaneous equipment and proceed to the next science station. There, they replace an
existing deep regolith thermal and seismic sensor with an updated module. The EVA crew
locate the site of the old sensor package, using careful visual inspection or the assistance of
locator aids; they move the rover to this position and unstow the deep drilling rig used to
bore the hole for the science package. This task requires manual assembly of bits and drill
stems and places a considerable demand on the manual dexterity of the crew during assembly
and feeding of the drill string.
These tasks have been accomplished on prior missions; however, if they remain in the category
of manual tasks, mission planners will need to attend to finger, forearm, and hand fatigue that
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develops within an hour. This fatigue arises from working against the pressure in theglove
for all finger motion and from repeating operations. Because the assembly and insertion of
drill stems requires repetitive manual alignment, screwing, and manual positioning of the
string in the bore hole, these tasks are prime candidates for automation to reduce crew
workload and the potential for finger, hand, and arm muscle cramps and fatigue. The crew
could monitor and adjust the automated process of building drill stems while the physical
work would be accomplished by machines.
The crew set up the drilling rig on the rover and encode the drill computer for rate of bore
and depth. While the drill is operating, the crew monitor the progress and make adjustments
as necessary. These activities require careful visual analysis and inspection on the part of the
crew, and some local area lighting may be required, especially for night operations. At the
appropriate depth, the drill is extracted, the crew install the science pack on the drill stringer,
and they insert the package into the bore hole. The crew verify that the package is at the
correct depth and release it in the bore hole, withdrawing the stringer and any science cables
that may be required for calibration, equipment verification, or data collection. The crew
verify the correct operation of the equipment package, make the necessary connections to the
data recording and transmission devices to be left at the site, and then break down the drilling
jigs and equipment.
When they repackage and stow the equipment on the rover, the crew communicate to the base
that they have completed this task and are ready to proceed to the next site. The base will
verify the remote crew's location and the route to the next site. The crew activate the
onboard stereo cameras and the active navigation system and proceed to the next science site,
where they perform maintenance and repair on scientific packages.
Upkeep and maintenance of science packages is necessary for the accurate collection of remote
science data. For this reason, the rover is equipped with a workbench capability to permit the
crew to conduct on-site repair, maintenance, and upgrade, at least to the lunar replacement
unit(LURU) level, as depicted in Figures 2-4 and 2-5. The crew navigate to the science site,
locate the package in need of repair, retrieve the science package, transfer it to the
maintenance workstation, and activate the diagnostic and the repair and maintenance
programs on the workbench computer. Following the program guide, the crew remove and
replace old or failed components with new or updated ones using tools at the workbench.
These types of procedures require the greatest dexterity, precision and cleanliness; if the suit
technology limits the degree of precision that can be exercised in the field or if the unit
contains hazardous materials that prevent on-site repair, then it may be necessary to return
the unit to the main base for refurbishment. As this will result in a loss of data between
remote missions, it is desirable to accommodate repair at the LURU level "in the field." If the
rover is large enough to support shirt-sleeve operations, the science package could be passed
in through an airlock and repaired in this environment or in a glove box.
The issue of completely modular change-out in the natural environment versus LURU
servicing at a glove box should be subject to analyses and trade studies. The glove box is a
potential solution to the dust problem for servicing in the field. However, a crewmember
would have to use the gloves in the glove box while wearing the LEMU gloves as well, and
manipulative performance may be too restricted to perform servicing and repair in situ.
After replacing the failed LURU, the crew verify the correct operation of the unit and return
it to service. The crew stow the maintenance and repair equipment and the maintenance
workstation. Then they proceed to the next science station or return to the main base.
2O
Requirements derived from the EVA science activities scenario include:
• Rover-mounted drill fixture
• Rover-mounted workbench
• Rover-mounted or portable glove box
Use of explosives for seismic experiments
• Extended duration EVA.
• 7 ¸
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F.!gure 2-4. Portable Glove Box and Servicing Workbench for Science Activities
Pernmnent Remote Science Workstation
• . "4-LURU Access
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TeJescopinlt Umbllicai Tenders
Overhead Crew Umbilicals
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Utilities and Life Support Control Panel
Closed Cab Section
Workbench StowaEe Area
Access Door
Utilities Feed Lines and Return
PORTABLE MAINTENANCE AND SERVICING WORKBENCH
CLOSED CAB PRESSURIZED ROVER
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ROVERMOUNTED MOBILE WORK STATION
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Table 2-4. EVA Science Activities
= •
TIMELINE ' TASKS
Hrs/Min
-4:00
-1:30
-0:30
0:00
0:10
Support crew loads and configure rover
Gather science station equipment from storage location at base
Disconnect storage interfaces
Transport to rover
Connect rover storage interfaces
Gather science station replacement modular from storage location
Disconnect storage interfaces
Transport to rover
Connect rover storage interfaces
Gather biological equipment from storage location
Disconnect storage interfaces
Transport to rover
Connect rover storage interfaces
Connect electrical interfaces as required
Gather active seismic equipment from storage location
Confirm safety pins in place
Disconnect storage interfaces
Transport to rover
Connect rover storage interfaces
Gather active gravimetry equipment from storage location
Disconnect storage interfaces
Transport to rover
Connect to rover storage interfaces
Connect electrical interfaces
Activate and observe system self-test
Adjust calibration as required
Gather active radar equipment from storage location
Disconnect storage interfaces
Transport to rover
Connect rover storage interfaces
Connect cooling interfaces
Connect electrical interfaces
Activate and observe system self-test
Adjust calibration as required
Gather active regolith analyses equipment from storage location
Disconnect storage interfaces
Transport to rover
Connect rover storage interfaces
Connect electrical interfaces
Activate and observe system self-test
Adjust calibration as required
Gather deep-drilling equipment from storage location
Position rover for deep drilling system attachment
Disconnect storage interfaces
Connect rover storage interfaces
Connect electrical interfaces
Connect cooling interfaces
Confirm proper system performances
Define procedures and schedules for science operations
Don suit
Egress habitat
Disconnect rover from recharge station
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0:15
0:20
1:30
2:00
2:30
3:00
3:30
4:00
Disconnect electrical interfaces
Disconnect oxygen interfaces
Disconnect water interfaces
Activate rover
Activate and adjust rover power system
Activate rover computer system
Activate and adjust rover communication system
Adjust rover control system
Activate and adjust rover drive system
Activate and adjust navigation system
Display rover computer self-test data
Display active EVA crewmember riding position
Drive rover to first science stop
Confirm initialization of navigation system
Activate stereo camera system
Verify active geophysical data recording
Operate rover along preplanned route
Correlate observation with active geophysical data
Inspect targets of opportunity as appropriate
Display active geophysical data as appropriate
Display active regolith analysis data as appropriate
Correlate active data sources with observations
Rover arrives at first science stop
Inspect science objectives
Deploy active seismic explosive package
Drive rover to second science stop
Confirm initialization of navigation system
Activate stereo camera system
Verify active geophysical data recording
Operate rover along preplanned route
Correlate observations with active geophysical data
Inspect targets of opportunity as appropriate
Display active geophysical data as appropriate
Display active regolith analysis data as appropriate
Correlate active data sources with observations
Rover arrives at second science stop
Inspect science objectives
Deploy active seismic explosives package
Drive rover to third science stop
Confirm initialization of navigation system
Activate stereo camera system
Verify active geophysical data recording
Operate rover along preplanned route
Correlate observations with active geophysical data
Inspect targets of opportunity as appropriate
Display active geophysical data as appropriate
Display active regolith analysis data as appropriate
Correlate active data sources with observations
Rover arrives at third science stop
Inspect science objectives
Deploy active seismic explosive package
Drive rover to science station
Confirm initialization of navigation system
Activate stereo camera system
Verify active geophysical data recording
Operate rover along preplanned route
Correlate observations with active geophysical data
Inspect targets of opportunity as appropriate
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4:30
4:35
4:45
5:00
5:30
6:00
6:40
7:10
7:50
8:00
8:00+
Display active geophysical data as appropriate
Display active regolith analysis data as appropriate
Correlate active data sources with observations
Rover arrives at science station
Position rover at deep-drilling site
Deactivate active gravimetry equipment
Deactivate active radar equipment
Deactivate active regolith analyzer
Activate deep-drilling system
Test deep-drill protective system
Activate drill
Verify automatic drill stem feed
Replace science station modules as required
Adjust and align science station modules as required
Deploy science station upgrade equipment
Deploy active seismic geophase array
Terminate deep drilling system operations
Activate drill stem recovery system
Verify automatic storage of drill stem
Cap drill stem as required
Deactivate deep drill system
Drive rover to base
Activate active gravimetry equipment
Activate active radar equipment
Activate active regolith analyzer
Confirm initialization of navigation system
Activate stereo camera system
Verify active geophysical data recording
Operate rover along preplanned route
Correlate observations with active geophysical data
Inspect targets of opportunity as appropriate
Display active geophysical data as appropriate
Display active regolith analysis data as appropriate
Correlate active data sources with observations
Rover arrives at base
Position rover at deep-drill storage site
Replace deep-drilling system in storage station
Disconnect rover interface
Connect storage interface
Replace active regolith analyzer in storage location
Replace active radar equipment in storage location
Replace active gravimetry equipment in storage location
Replace geological equipment in storage location
Connect to rover recharge station
Deactivate rover
Gather science samples and tapes
Ingress habitat
Doff suit
Implement procedures for storage of science samples and tapes
Support crew performs suit and rover maintenance
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2.2.4 Solar Flare Emergency
The absence of a protective atmosphere in the lunar environment leaves the surface of the
moon exposed to the ambient solar and galactic radiation environment. The fiercest short-
term environmental hazard for humans on the lunar surface is solar storm radiation. Left
exposed to some intense solar storms, humans would receive a lethal dose several hours after
such events occurred at the sun. The ability to predict solar storm events is not perfect, but
the detection of X-ray bursts at the solar surface can be used as a warning aid to alert the
EVA crew on the lunar surface of a potential solar storm. From the time of X-ray burst
detection to the arrival of the highest density of heavy nuclei there is a one to two hour
period, about half of which can be used to hurry back to the base, to reach an existing shelter,
or to prepare and enter protective shelter.
The requirements for protection are clear, and the design solutions can take several forms:
emergency return to base, supplemental shielding in the suit or rover, prepared safe havens,
portable shelters, or in the case of this scenario, an emergency excavated trench shelter.
While the lunar EVA expedition crew are performing tasks away from the main base, they
are notified that an X-ray burst has been detected. The alert may be issued from the lunar
base, Earth, or the EVA crew's own radiation detection system. They are too far from the
main base to execute an emergency return, and the nearest hardened shelter is at a mining
site that is also too remote to assure a safe return. The crew terminate the current activities;
after a review of potential sites in the vicinity (already identified in pre-planning), the crew
transfer to a location that affords a field of large blocks and deep regolith.
The rover is maneuvered to a position near two of the larger blocks and the crew unstow an
explosive trenching system from the rover. The system is checked to verify that all safety
devices are in place and that initiator power to the charges is ready. The crew then deploy
the trenching system between the two large boulders, orienting the charges to excavate a deep,
narrow trench upon detonation. The safety pins are removed and the system is checked one
final time by the crew. They drive the rover from the vicinity of the explosion site, seeking
shelter behind other boulders or sufficiently far away to preclude being struck by ejecta, and
remotely arm the trenching system. After final verification of the safety requirements, the
crew remotely detonate the explosive trenching devices. The explosive control system accounts
for the detonation of each charge. The crew then drive the rover back to the trench site,
verify the system's performance, emplace trench support walls (if required), and maneuver the
rover over the excavated trench.
In order to carry out the next measures, some design requirements must be postulated for the
rover system. First, the rover equipment has been uniformly packed and distributed over the
rover chassis, or during an emergency the equipment can be uniformly distributed to cover the
top of the rover; similarly, the water supply is carried uniformly under the rover. Second, the
rover has been designed with side curtains or side walls that can be deployed during an
emergency. The side walls might form the undercarriage of the rover and be deployed in
much the same manner as a storage box wherein the box flaps rest on one another and are
extended one at a time to open the box. The side curtains might be a hardened fabric
deployed from the side of the rover. The requirement is for five-sided protection (top, both
sides, and both ends) afforded by the rover as it rests over the trench. The protection is not
necessarily radiological; the deployed walls or curtains can be covered with loose lunar soil
to provide the necessary material thickness to stop radiological penetration to the crew. The
rover system protection then keeps the trench walls from falling in on the crew, while the
piled up lunar soil actually provides the radiation protection. A soil piling tool or regolith
blower machine would be a useful crew aid for this emergency.
The rover is positioned over the trench and the crew now deploy the side and end walls of
the emergency shelter. Locking the walls together to form a secure "box" under the rover,
the crew then cover the sides and one end of the box with lunar soil to a specified depth.
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The boulders on either side of the rover also afford some protection; in are3s where there are
no large boulders the depth of loose soil piled around the rover would have to be greater.
The rover must serve as both a protective shelter and a consumables source during the solar
flare emergency. With utility connections in the undercarriage of the rover, the crew have
access to the life support and communications provisions installed on the rover. Otherwise,
the crew must bring into the shelter emergency provisions such as communications, command
and control computers, locator beacons, possibly a self-contained llfe support utility, lighting
and similar subsystems that can be operated by an EVA-suited crewmember.
Before entering the trench shelter, as time permits, the crew perform a final inspection to
verify the integrity of the soil back fill and the distribution of protection on top of the rover.
They then deploy radiation monitors to measure the amount and duration of solar flare
radiation, so they know when the emergency is over and what level of radiation exists both
outside and inside the shelter. This will enable the crew to stand down from the emergency
at the appropriate time and, in the event of radiation exposure inside the shelter, to take the
necessary countermeasures. The crew then enter the shelter, pulling down the last side wall
and securing it.
Once inside the shelter, depicted in Figure 2-6, the crew perform systems and subsystems
checks of life support and communications, radiological monitors, and any command and
control functions available to them from within the shelter. They remain in the shelter until
they have determined that the storm is over or that the initial X-ray burst was a false alarm.
The false alarm would be indicated within two hours of the initial burst and the subsequent
absence of solar particle radiation. The storm would be confirmed by detection of radiation,
and the crew would remain in the shelter until safe levels of radiation were indicated by their
monitors a day or more later. Terrestrial experience suggests that during the storm the
radiation might degrade communications with the main base or with Earth, so the monitoring
system would have to be independently reliable. However, current opinions are that such a
storm would not appreciably affect either point-to-point communications on the surface of the
moon or between moon and Earth. Laser direct communications with the near side of Earth
would not be affected.
The crew would be able to stand down from the emergency based on its own monitoring data,
but the preferred approach would be to verify safe exit conditions with the main base. With
such verification the crew could exit the shelter and stow the emergency provisions, clean and
retract the side walls, and mount a return to base for medical evaluation and care if necessary.
Requirements derived from this solar flare emergency scenario include:
• Shelter in the field if crew cannot quickly return to base
• Solar flare alert/warning system
• Radiation sensors (on-suit and ambient) and dosimeters
• Use of explosives to excavate a trench
• Soil-moving tool to make protective banks of regolith against shelter
p Rover-supplied consumables (power, 02, fluids)
• Uniformly packed rover, designed to serve as emergency shelter
• Extended duration EVA.
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Figure 2-6. Emersenc_Y " Shelter - Rover and Excavated Trench
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Table 2-5. Solar Flare Emergency
TIMELINE TASKS
Hrs/Min
0:00
0:01
0:05
0:10
0:15
0:20
0:25
0:30
0:35
0:40
0:45
1:00
Confirm solar flare detection
Terminate current operations
Select site for solar flare trench
Priority for site selection:
1. Flat area between two large boulders
2. Flat area next to large boulder
3. Flat area in bottom of accessible crater
4. Flat area
Prepare trenching explosive system
Remove explosive trenching system from rover
Verify safety pins in place
Verify initiator power
Deploy explosive trenching system
Deploy explosive trenching system in desired orientation for trench
Remove safety pins
Move to safety to monitor explosion
Detonate explosive trenching system
Deploy protective shield as required
Activate detonation signal system
Traverse to solar flare trench location
Verify solar flare trench is adequate
Check width, depth, and wall stability
Modify solar flare trench as necessary
Deploy reinforcing walls as required
Backfill against reinforcing walls as required
Position rover over solar flare trench
Drive rover into straddling position
Deploy side and rear shields
Gather regolith moving equipment
Bank regolith against side and rear fenders as required
Fill front shield with regolith
Ingress solar flare trench
Deploy front shield
Connect lunar extravehicular mobility unit (LEMU) systems to rover consumables
Connect LEMU communications to rover communications system
Connect LEMU electrical systems to rover power supply
Connect LEMU gas systems to rover gas supply
Connect LEMU water systems to rover water supply
Monitor radiation levels
Define post-emergency operations
36:00+ Confirm safe exterior radiation levels
Disconnect LEMUs from rover consumables
Disconnect LEMU water system from rover water supply
Disconnect LEMU gas system from rover gas supply
Disconnect LEMU electrical system from rover power supply
Disconnect LEMU communications system from rover communications system
Egress solar flare trench
Retract front shield
Egress trench
Reposition rover off solar flare trench
Clean and stow side and rear shields
Empty regolith from front shield
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Replace regolith moving equipment
Return to base
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2.2.5 Suit Failure Emergency
The crew goes to a region shown to be rich in minerals in order to survey the area for the
installation of a mining and processing plant. Upon arrival, the two crewmembers unstow
the surveying equipment and begin setup. While the first crewmember is adjusting the sighting
devices, the second crewmember ventures out with the sighting stakes and a hammer to set
them in the regolith.
The LEMUs worn by the crew are near the end of their service period, still within the
operational range but subject to failure under extraordinary stress. While the crewmember is
hammering one of the stakes, the right wrist joint on the LEMU is stressed; with additional
pounding and turning of the joint, the seals fail and the LEMU begins to leak at the joint.
The in-suit alarms for loss of pressure indicate to the crew that there is an emergency
depressurization and that the rate is significant but not catastrophic. The suit emergency
pressure system increases the flow rate of oxygen to the crewmember, while the communication
network announces an alarm to the system•
The crewmember with the leaking wrist joint applies pressure to the joint with his left hand
glove but is only partially successful in restricting the leak rate. The other crewmember
retrieves the splint and patch kit stowed in the emergency provisions locker on the rover. He
quickly joins his EVA partner and removes an external pressure patch kit from the emergency
bag. As shown in Figure 2-7, the pressure cuff is placed over the damaged seal and inflated
to a pressure greater than the internal pressure of the suit, thereby closing off the leaking
wrist joint. With the suit leak stopped and the internal pressure returned to normal, the two
crewmembers return to the rover and execute a quick return to base.
There are other ways to handle suit failure emergencies which are not of a catastrophic nature.
With vacuum umbilical connectors it would be possible for two crewmembers to share a
common life support system through a "buddy system'; the crewmember with the faulty LEMU
plugs into his or her partner's LEMU through a life support connector and umbilical. Another
approach is to envelop the crewmember with the faulty LEMU in a pressure bag inflated
with an attached emergency canister and providing breathable air under pressure. Either of
these approaches would mitigate a minor to moderate suit failure and allow time for
contingency operations preparation. Each has its drawbacks, too. The buddy system does not
in and of itself correct the failure, and the pressure bag makes mobility and translation either
impossible or extremely difficult. The translation and transportation problem can be solved
with the litter device, and the buddy system can be used in conjunction with a splint and
pressure patch.
Requirements derived from this suit failure scenario may include:
) Rover consumables adapter kit for direct suit supply (may be different from recharge)
• Emergency Enclosure
Ancillary Emergency Enclosure equipment/provisions
• Trailer/rover bed (carrier for the Emergency Enclosure occupied
crewmember)
Internal instrumentation and control (if required in addition
instrumentation/controls)
Adapters/cables/hoses to supply Emergency Enclosure from rover
Restraint system for Emergency Enclosure
by EVA
to suit
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Buddy system capability (harness, hoses, portable stowage)
Emergency suit failure patch/wrap/seal, devices ("finger in the dike" implementation)
Rover capability
• Single crewmember operation
• Instrumentation to monitor Emergency Enclosure as well as rover consumables status
• Capability to visually monitor Emergency Enclosure while driving the rover
• Capability to recharge/replenish rover consumables from other rover (rover "Buddy
System') or from shelter
Safe haven huts or "igloos'.
t
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Figure2-7. Suit Failure Emergency
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Table 2-6. Suit Failure Emergency
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Note: EV-I is crewmember with suit emergency. EV-2 is other crewmember.
Suit configuration is assumed to be generally the same as the Shuttle suit; that is, an
anthropomorphic LEMU and PLSS with a limited contingency oxygen source.
Detect/verify/report suit leak emergency:
• Caution and warning (C&W) system
• Overt physical cues
• Other
• Notify base of situation
Immediate action options:
• Reduce severity
• Patch
• Wrap
• Seal
• Exploit additional resources to sustain pressure above redline
• Buddy System (slow but progressive loss toward redline with possibility of reaching
redline before getting to rover)
• Rover: Move to rover (possibly using Buddy System en route) for better
consumables support, refined diagnosis/troubleshooting, less urgency
Classify emergency to determine return mode:
• Contingency Return to base with EV-I attached to rover consumables, if pressure
stabilized is greater than 3.2 psi (or other acceptable level) and/or flow rate stabilized
is less than emergency O2 flow makeup by rover
• Emergency Return with EV-I in Emergency Enclosure, if pressure stabilized is less
than 3.2 psi (or other acceptable level) and/or flow rate stabilized is greater than
emergency O z flow makeup by rover
Contingency Return to base (EV-I normal passenger seating, connected to rover consumables
supply):
• EV-I and EV-2 move to rover as soon as possible (ASAP)
• Reconfigurc from buddy setup to rover support of EV-I
• EV-2 verify EV-I pressure and flow rate within guidelines
• EV-2 configure site operations to safe/secure contingency status (optional)
• Gather and rcstow equipment and tools for return to base (optional) on rover
• Configure/prepare rover for Contingency Return to base
• Notify base of status and intentions; request backup rover preparation and standby
for dispatch to intercept/assist. Coordinate return route.
Contingency Return mode assumes that EV-I is self-tended and unable to assist EV-2 during
return trip. (EV-I is a passive passenger.)
Emergency Return to base (EV-I secured in Emergency Enclosure, with Emergency Enclosure
connected to rover consumables and communication):
• EV-! and EV-2 move to rover ASAP using Buddy System
• Reconfigure from buddy setup to rover support of EV-I; EV-I attach to rover
consumables; EV-2 assist EV-I verify pressure and flow rates from rover in limits
• EV-2 unstow, deploy, attach/restrain, configure Emergency Enclosure for EV-] transfer
• EV-2 assist EV-I transfer from rover system to Emergency Enclosure and ingress,
seating/restraint in Enclosure
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• Verify satisfactory pressure and communication
D, Notify base of status and intentions; request base dispatch backup
intercept/assist; coordinate with base on return mode
• EV-2 configure site operations to safe/secure contingency status (optional)
• Gather and restow tools and equipment for return to base (optional)
• Configure/prepare rover for Emergency Return to base
• EV-I in Emergency Enclosure, restraints secured
• EV-2 starts Emergency Return
rover to
EV-2 monitoring EV-I using visual assessment and communication reports from
EV-I
EV-2 monitoring rover consumables trends from standard rover instruments
EV-2 (rover -1) and backup rover crew (rover -2) coordinate route and rendezvous
for final stage of trip to base
Note: There is no mention here of a "safe haven" or intermediate station between worksite and
base. In eases where worksites are a considerable distance (an hour or more) from the main
base, the need may arise to construct way points or safe haven facilities where a stash of
consumables, supplies, spare suit, etc., could be maintained and which could provide
repair/refurbish facilities. In such cases, base would not dispatch rover -2 unless the situation
dictated (need for additional consumables, spare suit, etc.)
2.2.6 Sickness Emergency
Radiation exposure, an allergic reaction, toxic contamination, or a bacterial infection that
causes a systemic reaction may result in an EVA crewmember's becoming ill while in the
LEMU, with episodes of diarrhea, vomiting, and fever. The ability to handle these
emergencies must be built into the LEMU, but the contingency operations will involve
significant limitations. The first limitation is that either an episode of vomiting or diarrhea
must be dealt with without the use of the hands inside the suit, which means probable
contamination from wastes expelled during an episode. The second limitation is that the
equipment to accommodate this contingency must not interfere with the normal and usual
tasks of the crew. The equipment must be out of the way until needed, and the need may be
sudden and overwhelming.
During an episode of sudden sickness, all of the EVA and LEMU systems are required to
function normally and some are required to function at an accelerated rate. The head to toe
airflow should be increased to take solids, liquids, and noxious gases away from the head and
face to filters or traps in the lower body area; lunar gravity will facilitate this process. The
LCG should be able to compensate for an increase in body temperature due to infection. The
neck ring on the LEMU should provide enough room for the crewmember to expel vomitus to
the collection bag or other such device, or to expel it to the lower portion of the suit and not
have it in the helmet area. Emergency purge air flow could then transport the waste away
from the upper torso. To prevent cyclic response to vomitus in the suit, filters and airflow
would have to keep the vomitus gases from recirculating to the crewmember's breathing air.
The same would be true of bowel gases associated with diarrhea.
An episode of diarrhea could more easily be contained through the use of undergarments and
absorbent pads or an Apollo-type fecal containment system, but it would be no less frustrating.
The physiological response to acute episodes is generally overriding, with all of the
individual's attention focused on the bodily problems, which gives rise to the requirement that
another crewmember come to the assistance of the ill crewmember as soon as possible to aid
him or her in getting back to the rover and returning to the base. This assistance is required
to prevent the sickness episode from being compounded while the crewmember's attention and
concentration are focused on the acute aspects of the illness. It is assumed that neither an
episode of diarrhea nor vomiting in itself constitutes a life threatening condition as long as
the equipment performs as required; that is, purge air flow, coolant, and evacuation of solids
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to the lower portion of the suit all function effectively. Release of a deodorant into the suit
air flow also should be considered.
Once the ill crewmember has been aided by the other crewmember and placed on the rover,
the expedition can make a return to base or a nearby safe haven for cleanup and medical
care. The rover should be supplied with a first aid kit containing fresh medications/injections.
If a crewmember is in dire need of medical treatment, an additional provision could be a
portable pressurized litter compartment or ambulance module (AM). The ambulance could
be dispatched by base upon notification of emergency return mode to intercept the rover en
route to base. The ambulance module should accommodate two crewmembers and have
sufficient space to unsuit the ill/injured crewmember for emergency treatment. In the
unlikely event that two crewmembers are ill or injured and the ambulance is dispatched to
rescue both, the ambulance would have to accommodate three people. Such a capability
becomes more important as the population of the lunar base increases.
Requirements derived from the sickness scenario include:
_, Non-intrusive biomedical monitoring devices that can be worn by crewmembers performing
physically demanding work
Medical aid kit/station (MAKS), including interfaces to suit and rover communication
system to allow biomedical sensing (suit interface), display of biomedical parameters
(MAKS panel and rover driver's panel), and transmission to base
• Telemetry of biomedical data to base
• Litter recovery device (LRD) operable by one crewmember with or without mechanical aid
• Rover winch and cables for mechanical assist transfer of LRD
• LRD restraint system in the rover or rover trailer
• Non-voice emergency communication system (NECS) to allow an ill/injured crewmember
to communicate via hand signals, keyboard, etc.
• Rover-ambulance module
• Contaminant-sensitive patches worn on the suit exterior to aid in diagnosis and to prevent
contamination of the ambulance
• Enhanced capability of LEMU to tolerate and neutralize the adverse effects of external
toxic contaminants and internal biological contaminants
Biochemical isolation garment (BIG) to allow a crewmember to provide medical treatment
without exposure to an ill/injured crewmember who may be contaminated. The BIG should
be a dedicated piece of equipment for medical treatment stations and for the ambulance
module.
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Table 2-7. Sickness Emergency
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Confirm sick-in-suit detection
Activate caution and warning (C&W) system
Travel to ill/injured crewmember
Administer immediate treatment as required
Assess severity of illness/injury
1. Crewmember can walk, talk, and perform simple tasks
Escort crewmember to rover or drive rover to crewmember (judgment by
assisting crewmember)
Access rover medical aid kit/station (MAKS)
Perform additional diagnosis
Provide additional treatment
Coordinate activities with base
Configure suit for contingency return
Clean up as practicable
(Release in-suit odor absorbents)
Verify life support systems operation
Aid crewmember ingress to rover
Configure site operations to secure contingency return to base
Gather equipment
Prepare rover for contingency return to base
Notify base of status
2. Crewmember can walk, but cannot talk or perform simple tasks
Confirm crewmember capable of self-tending during travel to rover and return
to base
Escort crewmember to rover or drive rover to crewmember (judgement by
assisting crewmember)
Access rover MAKS
Perform additional diagnosis
Provide additional treatment
Coordinate activities with base
Configure suit for contingency return
Clean up as practicable
(Release in-suit odor absorbents)
Verify life support systems operation
Aid crewmember ingress to rover
Configure site operations to secure contingency return to base
Gather equipment
Prepare rover for contingency return to base
Notify base of status
Establish method of monitoring crewmember during return to base
Monitor rover medical status displays
Use base-monitoring of status if medical telemetry is available
3. Crewmember is unconscious
Notify base of prep for emergency return
Request dispatch of rover with ambulance module (AM)
Walk back to rover
Drive rover to crewmember
Deploy one-man litter recovery device (LRD)
Secure crewmember to LRD
Execute manual or mechanical assist transfer of crewmember to rover bed or
trailer
Secure crewmember in LRD transport restraints
Configure rover for emergency return to base
Notify base of status
Coordinate return route and rendezvous point with AM
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2.3 UNIQUE LUNAR ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
The human need for life support in an alien environment is the principal driver of EVA
systems requirements. However, the design of EVA systems is influenced principally by
characteristics of the environment in which they must operate. The environment of the moon
presents several critical issues for lunar EVA. These critical issues guide our thinking as we
develop requirements to support advanced EVA on the lunar surface. They are the guard rails
that we bump as we consider design criteria and requirements.
Having been to the moon and worked there, we already understand how to adapt EVA
technology (suits, rovers, tools, etc.) to this unique environment. Table 2-8 is a brief review
of the characteristics of the lunar environment; Table 2-9 summarizes the lunar radiation
environment. Table 2-10 presents some significant considerations for lunar EVA. Further
information on the lunar environment appears in sections 3.2.15, Radiation Tolerance, and
3.2.17, Sand, Dust, and Surface Terrain•
Table 2-8. General Physical Characteristics of the Moon
Mean distance from Earth: 384,405 km
i ....... 238,858 statute miles
207,562 nautical miles
.... -:.: .=::: ......... , .:. _.i:.. : . .- .....:-.. ..... . 60,3 Earth radii
Lunar diameter: ........... ............. 3476 km
' 2160 statute miles
Orbital velocity:
Escape velocity:
Surface circular satellite period:
Gravity:
equator)
0.64miles/see.
....... " : 2001 knots
2.38 kin/see.
1.48 miles/see.
4627 knots
-2 hours
0.165 g (I.62 m/s 2 at lunar
Atmosphere: .: nil .........::: ... ....
" (maria) ...... ::i!.:,;:! ::::-::::::_.:_::::_ _-:::_:!:::i_i:i!._!!:":""and 0-23 degrees (highlands) :
** " -,k " 'l ' "
................'" .....: .:- :._,.:_..........._ ,::-.....:: :i.::.::"171 C to 134 C • •
i c i
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=2.3.1 Absence of an Atmosphere
The moon is void of any substantial atmosphere, but surface molecules of gas have been
measured at densities of 2x]0 s molecules/cm s (10 "lz Tort). This value could increase modestly
with major activities on the surface and subsurface mining in support of lunar base operations.
Besides driving the requirement to provide breathing air and air pressure to the EVA crew,
the lack of an atmosphere on the lunar surface also affects the visual perceptions of the crew.
There is no attenuation and scattering of sunlight as it arrives from the sun. Solar
illumination at the moon is approximately 10,000 foot candles, and the mean albedo is about
.07. Consequently, there are sharp gradients in lighting on the lunar surface, with bright light
in one spot but adjacent dark shadows, as shown in Figures 2-8 and 2-9. However, solar
illumination falling on the lunar surface is backscattered into shadowed areas, so it is possible
for the crew to see and work there. Actual contrast is not as crisp as the photograph (Figure
2-8) implies.
At close quarters, this chiaroscuro can affect task lighting; at longer ranges, it masks surface
terrain features and compromises the crew's ability to judge the size, depth, and distance of
craters. The textural gradient component of our learned distance estimation is affected, and
distances are estimated with error due to the lack of feature softening with increasing
distance. This is especially true for new crews working on the lunar surface. Visual research
suggests that after two or three days of experience in the new visual environment, humans will
accommodate to the new visual cues, provided they have sufficient opportunity to learn
distance estimation in the stark environment. Artificial lighting, even in full sun situations,
may be required in order to provide the crew with full visual apprehension and comprehension
of the environment. While the Apollo films show the crew benefiting from reflections of
sunlight off their suits and the down-sun lunar surface to illuminate shadowed areas (see
Figure 4-3), an active illuminator that does not depend on the sun angle and crew position is
a more predictable approach, particularly for lunar night.
The lack of atmosphere means that there is no natural help in cleaning surfaces of lunar dust
contamination. One possible remedy is to use some form of canned air to blow surfaces clean,
provided this technique does not abrade those surfaces.
The absence of an atmosphere also means that there is no overhead protection from space
radiation and no atmospheric friction to slow or burn up micrometeoroids. Consequently,
precautions must be taken against exposure to these hazards.
39
ORtGtNAL PAGE I$
OF pOOR QUALITY
Figure 2-8. Sharp Light/Dark Contrast (NASA AS16-106-17413)
Figure 2-9.
6 •
Surface Features Obscured by Shadow (NASA AS11-40-5954)
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2.3.2 Reduced Gravity
The lunar gravity is about 1/6 that of Earth (0.I65 g), or 1.62 m/s z gravitational acceleration
at the lunar equator as compared to 9.78 m/s _ at the Earth's equator (Bufkin, 1988). This low-
gravity environment produces a kinesthetic and proprioceptive perception of up and down;
it causes things to "fail down _ but at rates different than on Earth. Nonetheless, in the design
of lunar equipment, the center of gravity must be considered, especially in equipment worn
by the EVA crewmember.
The one-sixth gravity on the moon provides humans with a visceral sense of up and down and
can be used to keep tools and equipment in place, unlike the floating environment of
microgravity, but it also permits humans to fall down in the regolith should they lose their
balance. It permits humans to handle larger masses with ease and reduces the energy required
to move these masses. It enables humans to leap and stride, but it also permits soil to be kicked
in long trajectories above the surface. Human sensitivity to radiation may be affected by the
reduced gravity environment. We should take advantage of this environmental feature in our
designs for equipment and procedures to support long term lunar activity, just as we design
to take advantage of microgravity in orbit.
2.3.3 Dust and Soil
The lunar regolith is mostly composed of extremely fine debris. (See section 3.2.17 for detailed
properties.) This dust penetrates very small openings, clings to equipment, and loses its natural
bearing strength and cohesiveness along routes and paths with repetitive traffic. Dust is an
omnipresent fact of life on the moon; it is the most serious environmental problem for routine
operations.
The dust and soil must be kept from the living spaces and shirt-sleeve environment of the
main base and remote stations. It must be kept out of joints and off fabric, out of tools, and
off radiators. Where it cannot be eliminated, it must be controlled; and where it can be used
to benefit humans, it should be used, as a source of oxygen and other gases and as radiation
protection piled up over shelters.
Dust carried into living spaces soon settles to the floor or is trapped in filters and represents
only a temporary respiratory irritant. Nonsmokers are little affected by dust in terrestrial
environments due to natural respiratory clearing processes. Unprotected bearings and other
parts moving in contact, however, soon lose their functional characteristics.
The issue of how to control and compensate for the soil must be the subject of a thorough
series of investigations. Can it be precipitated electrostatically? Can it be washed by water
or other fluid? Can it be vibrated, blown, or brushed off effectively? Can it be isolated by
the use of protective covers and garments? Can we derive design solutions from our clean
room experience and use slight positive pressure, forced air circulation, grid floors and the
like? What are the cumulative consequences of living and working in the regolith?
2.3.4 Terrain
The lunar surface terrain is divided into two characteristic regions: the smooth maria that
account for about 17% of the surface, and the highlands that make up the remaining 83% of
the surface. In the maria regions, the slopes are from 0 to 10 angular degrees with a standard
deviation (SD) of 3.7 degrees; in the highlands, the terrain slopes from 0 to 23 degrees with a
SD of 4.5-6 degrees and higher. Sloped, crater-pocked, and boulder-strewn terrains are shown
in Apollo photographs (Figures 2-10, 2-11, and 2-12, respectively).
The ridges, craters, slopes, blocks, and regolith present some design constraints for equipment
and life support systems. During the Apollo missions, the limited mobility afforded by the
EMU ankle design posed problems in negotiating the crater rims and slopes found on the
moon. However, crews worked for an hour or more on slopes up to 20 degrees. The absence
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Figure 2-10. Sloped Lunar Terrain (NASA AS15-90-12187)
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Figure 2-11. Crater-Pocked Lunar Terrain _NASA AS15-87-11748)
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Figure 2-12. Boulder-Strewn Lunar Terrain (AS14-64-9103)
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of a light diffusing atmosphere made the identification of subsurface craters very difficult
in the down-sun direction. The large blocks pose problems for some line-of-sight
communications, such as visual and microwave, while the smaller blocks pose problems for
lunar surface vehicles and ambulatory EVA crewmembers. These are not insurmountable
problems, and our equipment for the long duration exploration of the moon must account for
these features of the terrain.
2.3.5 Day/Night
The lunar day and night period is approximately 28 Earth days. The sidereal period is slightly
longer than 27 days and the synodic period is slightly longer than 29 days. The day/night
periods offer some cyclic protection from solar non-ionizing radiation and also make artificial
lighting for EVA a requirement.
2.3.6 Temperature
The variable lunar surface temperatures are a function of solar illumination and shadows.
The range of temperatures has been reported to be from 102 "K to 384 OK by Bufkin (1988),
and from 102 °K to 407 °K by Bova (1987). The roughly 300 degree temperature differences
can be experienced at the same time on a piece of equipment depending on its orientation with
respect to solar illumination and deep space.
2.3.7 Radiation
The radiation environment of the moon is harsh. The lunar surface is exposed to the
continuous flux of galactic cosmic radiation (GCR) and to infrequent periods of intense solar
energetic particle activity. Particle fluxes on the lunar surface are about 1/2 of their intensity
in free space because they are blocked below the horizon. Crewmembers are not protected
from these ionizing particles by either an atmosphere or a magnetosphere.
TheGCR flux is between land2.Sparticlescm "2s -l, depending on solar activity. It consists
of about 90% protons, 9% helium nuclei, and 1% heavier nuclei. GCR dose is difficult to
shield; approximately 5 to 10 m of lunar soil reduces the GCR dose to terrestrial levels.
Solar protons pose a significant risk to inadequately shielded crewmembers. Very large
energetic particle events, which can cause acute radiation effects, occur at intervals of 7 to
10 years. Intermediate events, which can limit mission activities, occur several times each
year. For nominal flares, build-up to peak radiation intensity occurs within a few hours or
less. Monitoring of X-ray precursors may provide 30 minutes to one hour of additional
warning.
We must contend with life threatening radiation hazards on the lunar surface. The galactic
cosmic radiation and the intense particle radiation from solar flare events are potentially
significant problems for the EVA crews exploring the lunar surface, remote from the main
base. It has been suggested that the radiation hazard may be aggravated by other factors in
space, including stress and low gravity. In addition to the natural radiation environment, we
must consider the introduction of non-ionizing radiation associated with communications
systems. High atmospheric nuclear explosions on Earth, currently banned by international
treaty, might also contribute to the radiation hazard on the lunar surface. (Radiation hazards
and shielding requirements are considered in detail in sections 3.2.15 and 4.5)
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Table 2-9. Charged Particle Environment at the Lunar Surface
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2.3.8 Range of Mobility, Navigation, and Communication
How far we can go beyond the protection and comfort of the main lunar base will depend
on the portability of our life support systems and the distribution of our communication
systems. With portable and distributed safe havens having medical and life support
capabilities and with a communication system that allows full-time contact with the main
base, EVA remote expeditions should be able to explore anywhere within walking or driving
distance of a safe return to shelter. Lunar orbiting communications and navigation satellites
could provide freedom to set up remote sites anywhere on the lunar surface. A network of
distributed safe havens could permit us to leap-frog great distances on the surface, much as
we did in exploring the American West, going from fort to fort and then establishing new forts
at the "end of the line," or as we have done in the Antarctic with distributed shelters. (Section
4.7, Shelters, and sections 3.1.7 and 4.9, Communications, address these matters in more detail.)
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Table 2-10. Environmental/Physiological/Operational Considerations for Lunar EVA
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2.4 LUNAR EVA MISSION OPERATIONS REQUIREMENTS
Extravehicular activity will be part of the normal daily routine at a lunar base, and the job
descriptions of some long-term residents there will include regular EVA assignments. The
Apollo, Skylab, and Shuttle programs have established the precedents for intermittent EVAs.
Space Station planning for EVA is derived from that experience database and from new
requirements and technologies. Lunar base planning gives us an opportunity to think about
extending the range of crewmembers on the moon by extending the duration of EVA. This
report considers current EVA philosophy in light of prior experience on the moon and suggests
some different ways to meet lunar mission operations requirements.
The Space Station EVA Systems (EVAS) User and Interface Guidelines (Kosmo, 1986) provides
for an 8-hour per crew work period every 24 hours. The 8-hour period includes pre-and post-
EVA operations in support of the actual EVA. (Unique ore-EVA operations for lunar activities
might include donning a protective garment to reduce soil and dust contamination; post-EVA
operations might include the removal of such a garment or the necessity of thoroughly
cleaning the LEMU after the EVA.) Some estimates of the pre- and post-activities in support
of lunar EVA place a 4-hour overhead on EVA; this would reduce the productive EVA work
period to 4 hours. The "overhead" time associated with donning, doffing, cleaning, and drying
will make short periods of EVA (4 hours or less) impractical. Work plans and crew inclinations
will probably tend toward longer duration EVAs.
2.4.1 Lunar EVA Work Period Parameters
The work periods for EVA to support remote lunar operations are determined by several
interrelated factors. Chief among these are the tasks that the EVA crews undertake, and the
geography and surface features of the area where the tasks are performed. For tasks that
demand traversing slopes to install manually transported equipment, the workload will be
quite high; consequently, the crew may become fatigued early in the EVA period. In video
tapes of Apollo 16 and 17, the crew stop every once in awhile to rest from the strenuous
science and sample-taking tasks. Although they continue to stay within set timelines, they
sometimes appear to have to rush or discontinue tasks to remain on schedule, largely because
of unexpected demands from discoveries or hardware malfunctions. The work periods should
allow sufficient rest between strenuous tasks. Planners should consider the target-of-
opportunity schedules for science missions. The surface topography over which the EVA crews
have to work should be considered in determining work periods.
Systems technology for lunar EVA is also a determining factor in the definition of work
period parameters. The EVA suit design and capabilities, the rover support capabilities, and
the degree of automation available to support operations will influence, if not determine, the
duration of work periods. With a baseline design similar to the Space Station extravehicular
mobility unit (SSEMU), the work periods would be limited to the requirements imposed by that
hardware and be similar to Apollo EVA work periods.
Significant environmental factors must be considered in determining the work period. The
exposure to radiation on the lunar surface, the day and night cycle, and the thermal extremes
have a limiting effect on the work period. Although Earthlight will be significant, EVA
conducted during the lunar night requires artificial lighting, and the power requirements to
support continuous operations influence how long, or even if, EVA is conducted at night.
Exposure to GCR and solar radiation influences the work periods according to the amount
of radiation protection afforded by the most vulnerable part of the lunar extravehicular
mobility unit (LEMU). In the SSEMU, the arms and legs are most exposed.
A major limiting parameter of the EVA work period is the amount of consumables provided
within/on the suit. The supply of oxygen, food, and cooling must be sized to the anticipated
metabolic expenditures. As an alternative or supplement to on-suit supplies, the use of
umbilicals attached to stationary, portable, or rover-mounted stores of consumables should be
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considered. Consumables replenishment via umbilicals is predicated on a safe, reliable vacuum
transfer system.
A summary list of parameters that will influence or determine the work periods of remote
lunar EVA includes the following:
• EVA tasks and sub-tasks
• Geography and surface features of the task site
• Radiation exposure, ionizing and non-ionizing
• Day and night cycles of the moon
• Temperature and thermal extremes
• Design and capabilities of the LEMU
• Number of EVA crewmembers involved in a remote task
• Degree of automation available to support EVA
• Design and capability of rovers and other mobility vehicles
2.4.2 Lunar EVA Workday Length
The Apollo program has proven the feasibility of consecutive EVAs involving a "full-day's
work." According to Dr. Charles Berry in "Biomedical Results of Apollo" (1975, page 591),
"We learned from Apollo that man can perform very nicely in a one-sixth gravity
environment. One-sixth of the gravity to which he is accustomed proved to be sufficient
to give man a feeling of near normalcy for performing functions with at least the same
ease as he does on Earth and, in some cases, with greater ease. The astronauts adapted
quickly to movement in the lunar gravity environment and traversed the surface of the
moon rapidly using many gaits..." "Apollo lunar surface activity also demonstrated that
the metabolic costs of working in that environment were completely acceptable."
The radiation exposure limitation to lunar EVA (without significant shielding) has been set
by Silberberg, Tsao, Adams and Letaw (Mendeli et al., 1985, page 663) at l0 hours per 24-hour
interval for the two-week-long lunar day. Their conclusions were that:
"Permanent residents on the Moon can spend about 20% of the time (or 40% of the two-
week daylight time) without significant shielding. Most of the time should be spent in
shelters of > 400 g/era" or about two meters of densely packed lunar soil, either below
the surface or at the surface beneath a shielding mound. At the time of rare gigantic
flares, shelters > 700 g/cm 2 are needed; such a protection is particularly important for
radiation-sensitive fetuses."
The longest lunar surface EVA was just over 7 1/2 hours on Apollo 17. It is reasonable to plan
on an EVA workday that is 6 to 8 hours long under conditions similar to those existing on the
Apollo missions. With donning, doffing, and cleaning, the EVA workday could be l0 to 12
hours per day on a 6-day per week basis.
2.4.3 Lunar EVA Duty Cycles
The lunar EVA duty cycle (shifts on/off or EVA/IVA) is influenced by mission operations
requirements, physiological constraints, and technological factors.
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MIf there is a requirement for continuous remote operations (e.g., at a mining site), provisions
will be made for EVA shifts. There may be no inherent need, however, to adhere to a
standard weekly work schedule based on 5 days on/2 days off or 6 days on/l day off; other
options might be 3 on/l off or 2 on/l off, depending on physiological and technological
considerations. The Space Station Program Definition Requirements Document (JSC-31000,
Covington, 1987) limits EVA to 18 hours/week per crewmember.
Shift rotation may be determined on the basis of permissible radiation exposure, both
incremental and cumulative. Individual crewmembers may need to alternate EVA and IVA
work periods to avoid exceeding their dose limits.
Physical fatigue is not expected to be a significant limiting factor for EVA duty. Apollo
crews generally did not report being tired. Forearm muscle fatigue from compressing the
glove in repeated manual operations disappeared overnight with normal rest. Fingernail
soreness associated with prolonged use of the EVA gloves lasted for several days and would
have made consecutive EVAs painful. However, fingernail trauma or chafing of other parts
of the body can be avoided by suit design, and many improvements have already been
incorporated in Shuttle and Space Station era suits. Articulated finger joints or mechanically
assisted finger bending would help to reduce forearm fatigue.
Technological constraints on the lunar EVA duty cycle include the LEMU recharge and
servicing requirements, rover recharge and servicing, and availability of any other EVA-
critical hardware.
2.4.4 Lunar EVA Duration Optimization
With an advanced version of the SSEMU as the baseline for the LEMU, lunar EVA duration
is 8 hours. The baseline EVA work period fits plans for prior missions and experiences in the
workplace and places minimal requirements on food, water, and personal hygiene. However,
this g-hour EVA period includes a requirement to prepare for EVA and to clean the LEMU
following EVA, which tasks are estimated to take about 4 hours, leaving only 4 hours for
productive EVA labor. If travel to and from the site is subtracted, the EVA work period
becomes very brief. It is not practical to have EVAs of 4 hours or less in support of remote
site operations.
The average EVA duration for lunar astronauts on Apollo was 5.77 hours, with a maximum
experience of 7.62 hours. Longer EVAs can be accomplished by humans in good physical
condition. Apollo crewmembers indicate anecdotally that 10- to 12-hour EVAs would not be
physically prohibitive, if the suit and glove design and the consumables would support longer
duration EVAs.
The duration of lunar EVA might be extended and productivity might be optimized by
preserving the 8-hour baseline period for actual labor. "Overhead" suit maintenance activities
and transit time to the remote site need not reduce the effective EVA work period. If, for
example, life support consumables are supplied through the rover while crewmembers are
traveling to and from the worksite, the entire LEMU charge is preserved for the work period.
Similarly, if suit inspection and cleaning procedures are simplified to take only 30 minutes or
if those tasks are assigned to suit technicians rather than the EVA crew, the "overhead" burden
on EVA time drops and more time is available to do work.
During the conduct of remote expeditions more than 4 hours from the main base or distributed
shelters, it will be necessary to provide a habitable environment for the EVA crew. This may
be a pressurized cab or habitat on the rover. The 4-hour requirement is derived from the half
time of the g-hour EVA permitted in a 24-hour period.
On the other hand, if we provide consumable or regenerable life support aboard the rover, it
will be possible to drive to a remote location while on rover life support, conduct a full 8-
hour period of EVA at a remote site using portable life support systems, and then reconnect
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to the rover life support for the trip back. This permits more time of productive EVA by
treating the drive time as overhead, provided that the EVA crew remains within the
established radiation exposure limits for the particular LEMU design.
The optimum resupply of EVA consumables will be from lunar base. A remote excursion
might normally involve daily trips back to base for sleep, personal hygiene, and meals.
Occasionally, however, an "overnight camping trip" might be envisioned during which the
crewmembers sleep in their suits while connected to life support and consumables on the rover.
Such an extended EVA would probably require special accommodations for sleeping, waste
management, and some other functions.
Current EVA equipment will support EVA missions of up to 10-hour duration. Additional
factors to be considered in optimizing EVA duration will be the workload, both mental and
physical, the degree of automation to support EVA, and the expedition crew size.
2.4.5 Lunar EVA Translation Considerations
There are at least three means of translation on the lunar surface: walking, riding in a surface
vehicle, and flying. Only the first two means are considered in this study. The assumed
driving speed to a remote EVA site is about 10 km/hr, the typical speed of the Apollo lunar
roving vehicle on level terrain.
In walking and riding, the considerations are regolith, blocks, slopes, craters, and the EVA
safety parameters applied to the mission. The video tapes of the Apollo lunar missions reveal
that walking about the lunar surface kicks up a great deal of soil and dust, thereby
contributing to contamination problems.
Unaided walking appears to require some concentration and energy to move and maintain
balance. The crewmember tries to maintain dynamic stability, achieving balance by
continuaIly making fine adjustments to stance and posture. One consideration might be to
assist the EVA crewmembers with walking poles that would provide a means of balance and
"propulsion," as shown in Figures 2-13 and 2-14. Resultant mobility would be comparable to
cross-country skiing.
For vehicular translation, a lot of dust is generated by the wheels of the rover that might
contaminate radiators, solar panels, the EVA crew, and other exposed items. The Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has an ongoing program to develop multi-
legged walkers for traversing rough terrain with payloads. These translation vehicles are
modeled after insects, specifically the cockroach; they provide stable translation over a surface
with little surface contact and disturb less soll than a wheel or track.
Large and small blocks of rock, slopes, and craters must be considered in lunar surface
translation, whether walking or riding. Based on experience during Apollo 17, the crew
cautions that distance with respect to these surface features is generally underestimated. The
rover must be able to negotiate slopes and to avoid craters, and the ambulatory EVA
crewmember must be Able to ascend and descend slopes in the working area, or avoid them if
they exceed the capabilities of the LEMU.
The safety parameters of the remote mission influence surface translation. The walk-back
distance to the main base or shelters in the event of rover failure must be considered. Also,
the ability to locate oneself, to be located, or to identify a landmark influences translation
safety factors. Translation in any direction should be within visual or RF range of the last
trail mark, and the distance of translation should allow a walkback to shelter.
For maximum stability under 1/6 g conditions, all suits should have a normal center-of-gravity
that is close to the body's longitudinal axis. Boots that engage an optimized surface area of
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Figure 2-13. Lunar Walking Sticks
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Figure 2-14. "Ski Pole" for Crew Mobility/Stability
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loose lunar soil should be used. Consideration should be given to the natural walking, running,
or "skiing" motion promoted by the environment.
Rovers could be of several different types designed for various categories of activities and
transportation needs; trailers also should be considered. Each rover must be equipped with
navigation aids that enable the crewmembers to determine their exact location and the base
operators to track the location and movement of each rover. Map displays with markers from
locator beacons should be considered for use at the base and in each rover. Batteries recharged
and supplemented by solar arrays will probably prove to be the most practical power source
for small rovers. However, in the case of a large "Conestoga Wagon" or MOLAB (Apollo era
concept for a Mobile Laboratory) type rover, a small high-energy/density power source such
as a fuel cell may prove to be desirable.
The range of operation might be approximately 20 km from the lunar base. This would allow
crewmembers to tend blasting operations located well away from base. Since this range might
be out of the comfortable and safe walkback range, the use of buried consumables and shelters
at way points along the longer routes should be considered. Safe havens in the form of caves,
tunnels, or other excavations in the regolith might be placed at about 2-hour intervals along
major routes; thus, EVA crews would usually be within an hour from shelter. It may be
possible to build facilities that allow crewmembers to drive rovers directly into the shelters
to escape solar flare events that might occur while en route from lunar base along established
pathways. These excavations would not preclude the need for portable or emergency shelters.
2.4.6 Lunar EVA Rescue Capability
Design efforts for EVA rescue should emphasize having an ill or injured crewmember stay in
his suit for most rescue procedures. Some consideration should be given to the probability or
risk of sudden decompression during a remote EVA; if that risk is appreciable, provisions
should be made to sustain and rescue the stricken crewmember. Contingency plans involving
"buddy systems" to share life support consumables should be considered a part of the rescue
system/capability.
The sickness scenario exemplifies the necessity to provide emergency rescue capability.
Rescue assumes the availability of a backup rover and an ambulance module as well as a one-
person litter recovery device (LRD). Availability of a hyperbaric chamber is another possible
provision. Biochemical Isolation Garments (BIGs) might be provided to protect crewmembers
engaged in a rescue from an injured or contaminated crewmember. However, sources of
contamination requiring such heroic efforts might not exist in the lunar base environment.
2.5 CRITICAL SYSTEMS FOR LUNAR EVA
How do we best take advantage of humans in space, and how do we protect them from the
environmental and technological hazards associated with space exploration? This question
leads us into a consideration of critical EVA systems and ways to make our technology best
suit the human and the mission. The issues discussed here are not strict requirements, but
discussions of possible requirements, based upon what we have learned from our experiences
on Apollo, Skylab, and Spacelab.
2.5.1 Pressure Suits
The underlying assumption for this study is that an advanced version of the Space Station
EMU (SSEMU) will be available to support lunar EVA. This suit will be a basic SSEMU with
design improvements in the joints and gloves and some additional protection from lunar soil
contamination. In this study, the lunar suit is called LEMU. The lunar reference mission
scenario points up the opportunity to increase human productivity by varying the LEMU
design requirements to accommodate the environment, the range of anthropometric variation,
and the variety of tasks envisioned for remote lunar operations.
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VA requirement derived from observation of the Apollo films is for mobility aids and stability
of the EVA crewmember. The ambulatory modes employed by the several crews appeared to
disturb large amounts of regolith, require large amplitude movements, and contribute to loss
of balance in some circumstances. The Apollo suit design did not permit full radial and axial
movement in the ankle and lower leg, so downhill movements and negotiation of slopes and
grades appeared to be difficult and uncomfortable. Also, the large amplitude motions in
decreased gravity did not always end in a precise and controlled stop. Apollo crews rapidly
learned to anticipate such problems. Design changes to the ankle joints might permit greater
control during ascent and descent of grades, ridges, and rims. A means of providing lateral
and anterior/posterior stability while moving might aid in mobility, particularly in an
emergency or recreational traverse, and in the control of surface contamination. Ski-type
poles and an outrigger device are possible design solutions to the problems of motion and
station. (See section 4.3.1, Crewmember Translation.)
The variety of tasks for the EVA crew on the moon lends itself to the argument that there
should be a variety of LEMUs designed for accomplishing these tasks with the greatest degree
of safety and productivity. The wardrobe of suits that might be available in the future could
include the following:
• Hard armored, for working around mining and other heavy equipment
* Self mobile, for traversing the lunar surface in a self-contained life support and mobility
unit
• Mechanically enhanced, with exoskeletal force enhancers for performing both arduous
and dexterous manipulative tasks, or integrated enhancers built into the suit or gloves.
The idea to bc explored is that the LEMU might reflect not only the basic life support
function but also the job and task functions in a more specialized way.
Other items in the wardrobe might be an over-garment, cover-all, or easily replaceable outer
layer to protect the LEMU from excessive exposure to lunar dust, soil, and possibly radiation
and an easily donned intravehicular activity (IVA) pressure suit for use if integrity of the
pressurized main base is violated.
Consideration was given to a hands-in-suit capability, which would afford a convenient way
to attend to eating, drinking, waste management, and some communication functions. The
primary reason for hands-in capability was to reduce radiation exposure to the crew through
the arm and leg portions of the suit. For extended lunar EVA missions, increased protection
from radiation hazards may be necessary. However, a hands-in suit with a unitary lower torso
does not satisfy the lunar EVA requirements for mobility and a lightweight LEMU.
Therefore, the functions of eating, drinking, waste management, and communications control
are accomplished using a Space Station era EMU technology without the benefit of hands
inside the suit.
Another consideration in suit design is custom fit and resizing. While logistics and cost may
preclude a dedicated LEMU for each inhabitant of a lunar base, a suit that can be adjusted
to fit individuals may improve crew comfort and productivity. A "tailored" suit (either by
custom design or by interchangeable/adjustable parts) would give the individual maximum
limb motion, postural range, and hand-eye manipulative envelope. It would also reduce the
chafing, pressure points, and other discomforts and restrictions of an ill-fitted suit.
Conceivably LEMUs might need to be adjusted for weight loss/gain or changes in the size of
long-term lunar residents. It may be cost-effective to provide custom fitted suits for dedicated
EVA crewmembers and shared suits for other lunar base residents who go outside rarely or
only for local excursions. Another possibility is to custom fit only the crucial portions of the
suit, such as the gloves.
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The issueof suit fit and sizingraisesquestionsaboutrelevantanthropometricmeasurements
for I/6-gEVA: what are the critical parameters,and how do they correlatewith l-gand
0-gmeasurements?
Long-term use is a factor in LEMU design and maintenance. To date, orbital and lunar EVAs
have lasted less than 20 hours. Lunar base EVA schedules may impose suit-useful-life
requirements of hundreds of hours. Heavy use may cause suits to stretch or deform, develop
worn or frayed spots, or fail at critical junctures. Suit maintenance considerations include
regular inspection, replacement of heavy wear components, and repair techniques and
standards. For ease of servicing, heavy wear components should be interchangeable and
standard sized; an inventory of spares should be maintained to support the servicing schedule.
Helmets, faceplates, and visors need regular maintenance to prevent degradation of their
optical properties. Periodic servicing of the LEMUs will supplement routine cleaning of the
suit interior and exterior after each EVA.
Two other general suit design topics are worth consideration at length. First, a specifically
designed physiological monitoring undergarment to be used exclusively for the collection of
biomedical research data would afford medical specialists the ability to collect data without
interrupting and greatly inconveniencing the operational lunar crews. The biomedical
research monitoring suit could be an integrated undergarment worn by medical test subjects
while performing routine and specific tasks to collect physiological data. Second,
anthropometric reconfiguration and functional reconfiguration should be evaluated as ways
to accommodate the widest range of people undertaking the greatest variety of tasks in support
of lunar EVA.
2.5.2 Rovers
The roles of vehicles in remote lunar operations can be as limited as providing a basic means
of transporting personnel and material from the main base to a remote site or as varied as are
our transportation vehicles here on Earth. During the early years of lunar colonization, the
majority of attention and resources probably will be spent on the establishment of the main
base and the support systems to maintain life on the moon. The near-term requirement for a
sophisticated transportation system is not evident until the base is fully operational and
populated, and subsequent remote stations are established for specific scientific and
exploratory purposes.
During the establishment of the main base and early remote expeditions, there is, however,
a requirement to support human productivity and safety by providing sufficiently
sophisticated hardware systems to allow machines to do best what they can and humans to
do best what they can. Without argument, machines can be designed to travel farther, carry
more weight, go faster, provide more environmental protection, and be reconfigured with
greater ease than can humans. This implies that where requirements exist for going long
distances, carrying large masses, or proceeding with speed, these functional requirements be
met with machines, specifically transporting machines.
Some of these transportation requirements do not blend well with others, such as transporting
large masses and transporting with speed. In cases of competing requirements, we can either
compromise our design for the best mix, or we can have several different design solutions
which maximize specific capabilities of the machines. There are varied and sometimes
conflicting transportation requirements to support remote lunar EVA:
• Transporting personnel on the surface
• Transporting material on the surface
• Transporting science laboratories to specific sites
• Transporting miners, ore carriers, and processors to mining sites
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* Trailering large quantities of materials
• Carrying small habitats, safe havens, and portable shelters to distributed sites
• Carrying workstations to remote sites
• Providing emergency protection from environmental hazards
• Rescuing stranded EVA expeditions and returning them to base
• Rapidly returning to base
• Serving as communications and work platforms
• Supporting tools, jigs, and fixtures for remote EVA operations
• Negotiating rugged terrain.
For almost all of the activities in the lunar scenarios, the rover serves as more than just a
means of transportation: it also serves as a source of consumables, work platform, shelter,
and pack horse. We should consider a set of special purpose rovers to meet the requirements
for lunar EVA remote operations, using a variable rover configuration atop a standard drive
train and frame or chassis that supports several types of cabs and beds. One configuration
probably will not be adequate for the many tasks envisioned for lunar surface vehicles.
The basic transportation functions could be handled by a standard vehicle for hauling people
and equipment from site to site, but when additional tasks are assigned to this machine, such
as tool handling, shelter, and rescue, the configuration and functions of the rover also change.
With a basic drive train and chassis, the rover could be outfitted as an ambulance for the
rescue and removal of sick or injured crew. It could be outfitted as an excavation vehicle for
establishing remote camps, and it could transport the shells for the remote camps as we move
to distribute way stations and safe havens on the lunar surface. It could also serve as a remote
scientific laboratory for on-site material samples characterization, or it could be a mobile
scientific workbench for minor maintenance and analysis activities. The rover could serve as
a support platform for drilling operations and as a shelter in the event of solar flares.
Equipped with a small habitat, the rover could support extended duration remote operations,
or equipped with life support provisions it could support extended EVAs via umbilical while
the crew travels on the rover. The rover cab might be open, closable, or pressurized. Figures
2-1, 2-4, 2-5, and 2-15 depict different rover concepts.
A corresponding transportation scheme is used on Earth, with pickup trucks and jeeps to
move lightweight payloads to remote locations, all terrain vehicles for remote touring, and
recreational vehicles and campers to support remote living. A similar potential exists to
expand our transportation system on the moon as a function of varied requirements derived
from operations.
The outfitting of the rover is such that the generic equipment common to all remote operations
is stowed in the same location for all missions. Specialized equipment to support a particular
mission objective or activity is stowed in mission dedicated areas aboard the rover. If a trailer
cart is used, it should be loaded with equipment that is least needed in the case of contingency
or emergency operations so that it may be temporarily abandoned for a rapid return to base.
All life support equipment, emergency provisions, communications, shelter, and rescue
equipment should reside in dedicated areas on the rover, just as the generic equipment has a
specified place for storage on the rover. This provides for positive transfer of training;
reduced time to acquire, identify, and stow commonly used articles; and efficient operations
under emergency stress.
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Severaldifferent configurations of lunar rovers have been identified. These range from
complete outpost facilities (motor home or Conestoga wagon concept) to miniature "All-Terrain
Vehicles" (ATVs). Modules for special purposes, such as ambulance (Advanced Life Support)
facilities should be considered. The generic use of the word "rover" in this study applies to
all configurations and sizes of rover.
Figure 2-15. Open Cab Rover with Equipment Trailers
Deployable Travel Shield
(for dust/sunlisht
Task and "IV Lighting l
General EVA Module
Mission Specific Module
Terrain Lighting
.a
Tool and Equipment Bays
OPEN CAB ROVER WITH EQUIPMENT TRAILERS
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Science Workstation
For remote science operations, the rover may be equipped with the following equipment and
modules:
Active seismic equipment
Gravimetry equipment
Science stati6n upgrade equipment
Science station replacement modules
Active radar equipment
Active regolith analysis equipment
Deep drilling equipment
Maintenance workstation.
Some of the equipment will be used to replace and upgrade previously installed scientific
packages, while other equipment will be used to conduct operations at new sites or to conduct
scientific investigations that can be moved from site to site.
The onboard systems to support the science expedition include stereoscopic TV, route planning
navigation, geophysical data recording along the route, and active correlation of crew
observations with geophysical data. The data are stored either on board for return to base or
sent back via communication link for real-tlme analyses at the base laboratory.
The science maintenance workstation is equipped with restraints for tools and equipment,
task lighting, computer data packs for maintenance procedures, computer diagnostic packs
for on-site testing of functions, provisions for controlling contamination of the science pack
during repair (such as a glove box device), and holding and positioning devices to assist the
crew during repairs. The rover maintenance workstation also has LURU storage for old and
new modules. Figures 2-4 and 2-5 depict rover-workstation concepts.
Visual inspection of equipment may well require workbench lighting and visual aids such as
magnifiers if small parts must be carefully examined by the crew. Some type of air blower
to blow off debris during inspection may be necessary. The Apollo films show that on several
occasions that the crew attempted to do this by blowing within the helmet as a natural way
of clearing debris from equipment.
Ambulance Module
An ambulance module could be attached on a rover or a trailer behind a rover to function
as a remote urgent care vehicle. The capability required would be similar to that of a
terrestrial mobile coronary care unit or an advanced life support vehicle with one major
difference - the capability to supply and to control a pressurized atmosphere. This module
should allow up to four people in zero ore-breathe suits (ZPSs) to enter a pressurized
environment. As the number of crewmembers participating in EVA increases, provisions for
transporting two crewmembcrs in ZPSs in supine position becomes important.
In addition, the cabin (or a portable, collapsible air chamber) should function as a multi-place
hyperbaric chamber with pressure of a minimum of 2.8 ATA. Further studies of the need and
feasibility to supply pressurization up to 6.0 ATA should be conducted. Although the need for
a 6 ATA chamber has been emphasized in recent studies (Whidden and Horrigan, 1988), it may
be possible during an emergency transport situation to start treatment of an emergency
decompression with a chamber rated at 2.8 ATA and 100% oxygen by mask.
The entrance to the ambulance module should be outfitted with a dustlock and various dust
control equipment. A detailed discussion of the required equipment and medical operating
philosophy is given in Section 3.2.10 of this report. The ambulance module should be equipped
with a source of supplies and consumables to allow life support for 4 crewmembcrs for
approximately 4 hours. This would allow for stabilization of the patient or patients and
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return to base plus time to dispatch other supplies, if needed. An analysis of the distribution
of the water stored in this module and the thickness of the walls of the module should be made
to determine the level of radiation protection that it affords and its feasibility for use as a
form of safe haven.
Whenever EVA activities are taking place within a lunar colony, an ambulance module should
be available at the lunar base for dispatch and rendezvous in contingencies, such as the need
for additional supplies and for support in the event of remote-site malfunctions.
Back-Up Rovers
A back-up rover should always be kept in readiness at lunar base. This rover should have
the capability to make a rapid excursion to the remote site for emergency rescue and
transportation. Although a major function might be to deliver an ambulance module on a
trailer, a series of trailers with different capabilities could be available to be towed behind
this back-up rover. The availability of a back-up rover could extend the useful range of
EVA beyond that of walk-back. A typical back-up rover might be considerably smaller and
operate faster than a full-capability rover, although rovers of similar capabilities would
prevent disruptions of base activities. Consideration should be given to the use of the back-
up rover as a tow vehicle that could be used to return a disabled rover back to lunar base.
Rover Cab Configuration
There are numerous advantages (especially in ease and speed of ingress and egress) of the
open cab concept of the Apollo lunar rover, which proved to be an efficient vehicle in its
application. In the environment of an active lunar base, a closed cab configuration might be
of advantage during certain remote operations that involve chemical or dust contamination.
It is possible that a compromise cab configuration might be designed that would allow the
crew to close or partially close a driver's cab temporarily for certain applications or for transit
through certain zones of activity on the lunar surface. Such a cab might be fabricated in the
form of clear partitions that telescope or deploy by drawing and extending like curtains. No
clear requirement exists for a hard crew cab that would restrict and slow movement of the
driver or passengers into or out of the rover. Ease of entry and exit are highly desirable, and
design goals should ensure this capability to the same degree that it existed in the Apollo
rover.
2.5.3 Shelters
Throughout this report, there are references to safe havens and shelters that provide sanctuary
for the EVA crew during nominal and emergency operations. Table 2-11 presents various
shelter and safe haven options and the provisions that might be available in each.
Generally, the shelter concept refers to a system that protects the crew from radiation
exposure during a solar particle event. The shelter may be in place and fixed at a site of high
activity or where EVA crews frequently visit, it may be a portable device that is taken along
with the rover, or it may be a trench that is explosively excavated in an emergency. A shelter
need not be a pressurized containment, and provisions for food and comfort are not implied.
Such shelter is generally used in an emergency when the crew cannot safely return to base.
It should support the full EVA crew (supplying air, water, and communications) for the
longest anticipated duration of a major solar storm.
The safe haven concept provides for EVA crew protection and recovery from more general
classes of emergencies, such as suit leaks, sudden illness and injury, isolation due to equipment
breakdown, and other emergencies that might force the crew into a pressurized environment
that could support them with or without the protection of the LEMU. These safe havens
provide food and water, medical supplies, communications, and other necessities until the crew
can make repairs or be rescued by the main base backup crew. Safe havens could be installed
along major routes or worksites, transported with the crew, or integrated into a major system.
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They would not have to be activated until they were needed, but all of their subsystems would
be on standby in the event of a retreat to safe haven.
If a remote EVA site is beyond the range of a safe haven or other shelter, the crew may need
to deploy (or partially deploy) a shelter there as the first order of business. Whether or not
protection is provided depends on the risk philosophy adopted by mission planners. The issue
of a shelter against solar flares may be resolved for any remote traverse as it was for Apollo
EVA. That is, planning can be based on the statistical probability of a flare being so small
for any one EVA that a flare can be ignored relative to other contingencies. In that case, no
provision would be made for shelters; this approach probably will not be acceptable for long-
term occupation and EVAs at a lunar base.
Tradeoffs should be made between the construction of shelters and alternate means of
protection against solar flares. Options include supplemental shielding (hand covers, hardened
visor) worn by the crew as they "make a run for it n back to base, established shelters along
main routes, portable shelters, and explosively excavated emergency trenches.
If shelters are provided to support remote operations, their location may be determined on
the basis of either population density or distance. For density, the shelters may be placed
where high levels of activity are taking place, such as a mining site or a major science site,
involving repeated trips to a single location or occupation of the site for extended periods.
For distance, the EVA crew should always be within return distance of a safe haven, or they
may take their safe haven with them. Table 2-12 shows shelter options suitable for various
distance ranges and types of sites.
The shelters installed at remote locations where activity is concentrated should be able to
accommodate the full complement of EVA crew at the site for emergency periods associated
with solar flares, plus a margin for rescue from main base. The shelters should afford
protection from solar radiation and provide for emergency life support and food and water.
Shelters can be buried in the regolith to accommodate remote site requirements. When the
activity at the site has become less concentrated, the shelter could be recovered and moved to
some other site of heavy visitation or activity.
The shelters and safe havens that are provided for remote exploration either could be taken
along with the expedition as an integral part of the rover equipment, or they could be
distributed along the paths of exploration, or they could be a combination of both approaches.
This assumes that our lunar exploration is not random, but progresses out from the main base
with known direction and purpose much like the western U.S. and the Antarctic were explored.
A solar flare emergency while crewmembers are more than one hour from a habitat or
adequately shielded safe haven represents a significant risk during lunar base operations.
The current state of the art of producing appropriately shaped trenches by explosive
excavation in uniform and cohesive rock debris (Dick et al., 1986) suggests that this technique
may be a viable option for protecting crewmembers during solar flare emergencies. The safe
deployment and detonation of explosive systems designed for rapid trenching of the lunar
regolith can build on the precedent of explosive systems (up to 6-1b TNT equivalent) deployed
for the Active Seismic Experiment by the Apollo 17 crew.
Figure 2-6 depicts an emergency shelter concept for an excavated trench under the rover. The
incorporation of protective materials and water supply in the floor of the lunar rover would
provide a readily available roof for the trench. Lunar regolith placed on this floor and
banked against deployable fenders on the rover could be used for additional protection.
Outlets for oxygen, water, and power through the underside of the vehicle would allow for
conservation of LEMU consumables for the duration of a solar flare emergency.
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Table2-11. Shelter/Safe Haven Options for Lunar EVA
................... ;Z;::.:.:I:.:::_:.:.I;Y}! !::::; i:,:!i_i_:i¢.:::::::_:_.::.:::_:_::}i:i_:i:::_i:::ili:!i;/.::/.Z::zI.Z_I:!I::!I.I.I_::::IZ::i:!:'::.::i:}i:i_i:}ii!iq:.i q!:_:-` }7: i _iW_i_1!_!_!i_i_{_!_!_i_::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::___i !ii k , .r. ! . ,. ........!....... -• :.
iiI:IIZI;:i:i;ii;i:_iil_iiiiiii !:i!!i_i!_ii!i;!i :i iil! !ii:::_:ibi;_:i!ili__i_i!:!!i} i:.i!iii_:i!i!li!!ili/ i:_iili! ;iiiii_; _i :ii!!il_::!_i!_i:_i!_if!iii-filli;i il:;ii!_:iiii!i!ii!; lii!;!i!il _i!:ii:il;i!};_:iii;!!iil,i;!iiliii ;!iiiil_i!iiiii_, ! i!i!/!i3ilii!iii!;i!iii:il;;i!!!iiii_illi _!i:ii_i:!_i_:_-ii_!i_i_::4_:-!ii::/:;:_i:::;: -:: ._. ::_::i;.i_-:i!:;;:i;:i;. i'_i,_;!i_,.. ..... : ....• ,
...._?_iiiii?i:.ii,._ai_a_!i:]0.11i:]i!iW:!i.i]:OT;L;.iiiiilV!iii.O;/Z.:Ti_i!!iii_iilL/-_-"!_:;:;.I;D-;;i.... -.........J
:i;{?{{_!;!!ii!(i:!ii;;}.Z'._:_ii:._'P;;:!:!:;f/!':":;_/!?'_;'_;;!'!_"_;_ .'"_ i: ii,!i,ii!i: i:i ii!i"3?' !?_ iiiiiiii!i!ii'_ {_/ ..........:";:_:"'":O _ ...................0 _
!......;/ i}""eo___!_i:_:""r::_;i:i_._i:!:_:_4_i_!:;_......._"3!;;!'r"j.:?_!i]!iiii!_:,3j'ii!;!3;i3;:J _;:_!i!:.17"'.;:i_;:¢'V....._ J "
::_:_;"_i!i':i:i:_;i;;_'_:::"':_/_)__o_"_"_"_"_!_i__i_i:::_i;__!:.......6 "'_ _t:i?;'3::':i;!_c':6 .i:_i!!:.i}_i_ii3-ii:ii;i"0i /_iii3 ;i'J':_!:3::!::_ _ !iJ.......:/;::...J .......:j
_i:.'i_!_;:!i'*_:_:i;_4_.:!i£''*-':::"':::""_:}/L.........._L
" "/:iZmer_G_;:s._i_:!:!:!f':__;__?!::_!i!;,.'_i_i_:i_;::i;::.i{_;;:;_i_}:i;;fi.!i!i_i_;!i:i;_iiJi!iiiiiiiii!;iii@i?i;ili_i i!{ i: i;; ii: ;!i!! ! ; _ _ ;_ _ :{} !_"i!_::"U 7:,}; -i:_-_::{":::_'_:_-::_!_!i:;_;:!:.;:::_:_-.i.
• ::.?ii!i;i:_:;:i.;:_.ai_.;.:;.;!;i:i:;;!ii_i:_i:_i_-_i_;;_;_iy:'Sl/_::;:;:-;;:.}i!O " ;i .}"_'!i!_iii]i ;.?i!J . ;.J........ j
: -._:"-:--:._;i;/;;;./.;_on_in_i!_ _i: :'::.:i;::;_ :!:i:.!i!;i;i!i:i!}:; i.i!_!iiiiiii:iii!;_;i;_i!:.::!i!_ ; ii!i;iili} li iiiiiiiii!iiii:l _ !!ii;i!i!ii;ili!!:}_]iiii;!i_iJ_!i}:!::i:;i;}: ,:_ !_?il;_:!! :iiii ! :i;i:ii :: s;i_. ii:!i;iii!iiii_i!;i _i!:"/:__i::;;;,: ::;:;_/:-;
• :-:.:,.,.,:.,._,, ii.:_..:.i. .. . ...............: . ;.:.:.::.............; ,;:: :, !'._'.:,. , " '::.-,:-, J - J
.... :_;_i_i_ils_i;;!i_i!_i_':iil;_ili_._:i;:_ii_i_!::.'!_:!!ii_!!._:i,H_i_.:!,_i! i iil;iiii;_i i':iii3!Vi 3iii !}i; _;iiii Viii:iYii!:;31_q;ii:; ::ii,_:..::!;;,!:;/i;:.:i;_;:;%:._:;_-_i :_.,.:, .
• ............../:/:/L ......" J
: _ -;;;/,i',ii',_;_!_.:;:.;(:/V:.::,13_III!!I:IIIP/.}_ _/,i'_ ii_"!_._:!/:_"_i!!iiii!iii!!i.iJ..- $ J
. " o
...................................._ / ................................................,:: _ ._..:,/.. ........._....:..::.:_:..,/........:._,..:......... .... o
61
Table 2-12. Operational Desirability of Shelter Concepts
(On a Scale of 0-10; BU=Backup)
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2.5.4 Dustlock
The people of the world have devised many physical and operational ways to exclude
environmental contamination from their homes and buildings. The mud room serves the
farmhouse as a place to deposit dirty boots and covers before coming into the house. The
front halls of houses in the snow belt are hung with coats, boots, scarves and other snow-
covered clothing. In the Orient, it is customary to remove one's shoes before going into the
living quarters, to keep the outside dirt outside. These front halls and ante-rooms also
moderate the environmental extremes of temperature and humidity as people enter and leave
the building.
During the operation of the lunar base, people will be coming in and going out of the main
habitat for a variety of purposes. A small, dedicated dustlock such as that shown in
Figure 2-16 which is equipped to moderate the environmental extremes and control the
transport of lunar dust into the habitat will be required. This requirement arises from the fact
that the regolith covers and penetrates the outer garments of the EVA crew almost
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immediately. The Apollo films show the bright white EMUs as men first venture out of the
lunar module, and then, within minutes, the white turns grey below the knees, regolith covers
the gloves, and with an occasional fall, dust covers the whole EMU. Figure 2-17 shows the
soiled suit of an Apollo crewmember. The lunar dust also covers the equipment used on the
surface; while an occasional journey in and out of a lunar habitat over a short duration
mission will not lead to the accumulation of large amounts of debris, for extended missions
the accumulation may present a substantial housekeeping problem unless it is accommodated
in the habitat's design.
The dustlock must serve the dual purposes of isolating the lunar soil transported in from
EVAs as well as disposing of it or allowing for easy disposition. A dedicated area for this
purpose will ease the design burden on the habitat itself. It will also ease some of the
housekeeping requirements for the main base crew. It was reported by the Apollo crews that
dust was more than a surface presence in the lunar excursion module (LEM); it also caused
temporary nasal and oral irritation.
The dustlock should serve the primary requirements of isolating most of the soil contamination
and providing a means of disposing of it, and it might serve other purposes, such as a storage
room for EVA dedicated equipment that need not always be returned to the main habitat area
for servicing or storage. If it is a combined air- and dustlock, it could serve as the don, doff,
cleaning, and storage area for the LEMUs.
The design of the dustlock, especially the hatches, should acknowledge the abrasive soil
characteristics and avoid the long-term build up of soil as EVAs are conducted over the life
of the main base. The design should reflect the requirements to dispose of all soil and to
eliminate the build-up of any soil around seals and hatches of the dustlock or airlock. The
design also should accommodate necessary cleaning operations.
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Figure 2-16. Lunar Dustlock
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Figure 2-17.
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
Apollo Suit Soiled by Lunar Dust (NASA AS15-85-11514)
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2.5.5 Major Equipment
The arduous tasks of mining and drilling and processing raw materials cannot be left to the
delicate equipment used to transport, conduct science, or support human life. Major systems
must be designed and developed to fully exploit our lunar operations. Miners and ore
transporters should be highly automated, specially designed machines to meet the task
objectives of recovering and processing large amounts of regolith. This is not work that
humans do very effectively or productively; it is dangerous and dirty and repetitive, better
suited for machinery, with human oversight.
Humans are much better at thinking and perceiving. To support these activities, another type
of major equipment may be required: a portable science station that can be brought to a
specific site of interest. Such a station could support examination and characterization of
lunar materials and samples, or it could support far side astronomical observations. The
technical team has considered a Spacelab type of operation, staffed by the EVA crew for
both IVA and EVA in support of remote operations. The remote laboratory would enable
activities that cannot be performed at the main base, such as far side observations, or activities
to be performed in near real time rather than delayed until return to base, such as
characterization of materials.
The use of explosives for trenching raises the need for an explosives control system to ensure
crew safety. This system must include three elements: a detonation sensor to verify that all
charges have exploded or are in a "safe" configuration, a locator to find any unexploded
"duds," and a grapple tool to "safe" a dud if necessary.
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3.0 Lunar EVA Hardware Design Criteria
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3.1 LUNAR EVA MAN/MACHINE REQUIREMENTS
Under EVA conditions, humans will do what they do best- analyze real-time situations,
predict consequences, devise alternative strategies, and select from these strategies. It is in the
resolution of the unexpected opportunity, condition, or problem that the human clearly
demonstrates superiority over the most advanced artificially intelligent robots. In a sense,
the human exhibits instant and automatic reprogrammability in response to stimuli, such as
those represented by problems, observations, and opportunities. The ability to improvise
solutions to problems will be vital to the successful completion of the EVA scenarios.
3.1.1 Unique Human Capabilities in Lunar EVA
The majority of work for the lunar EVA crews will not be improvising but executing well-
defined tasks for which they have trained. For these tasks, the unique human capabilities are
observation, manipulation, and analysis. The Apollo tapes show the EVA crew engaging in
observation and manipulation. With appropriate support equipment at the remote EVA sites,
future crews should be able to perform on-site analysis of samples, make observations with
telescopes, or manage large mining and processing plants.
As on Earth, people on the moon will manage and control machines that augment and
complement their efforts. Humans should decide when, what, and where a machine executes
a function and then monitor, evaluate, and redirect the machine.
Humans also have the capacity to repair machines and components should the hardware
become worn or damaged. The Apollo experience affirms the importance of designing
components to take advantage of this human capability.
The Apollo experience also demonstrates the unique human capability to persevere and exceed
expectations. Despite some limits in mobility, for example, the Apollo crews had long and
productive EVAs. The design of the Apollo EMU restricted some kinds of movement (e.g.,
bending over to pick up something, traversing slopes), but the crews adapted to such
constraints and still achieved their objectives efficiently. Despite strenuous timelines, the
crews did not report unusual fatigue in the lunar EVAs; in fact, they felt that longer EVAs
would have been possible and desirable. In general, past lunar EVA experience indicates that
humans perform well on the moon and are capable of performing a wide range of tasks with
only marginal fatigue.
3.1.2 Logistics
For the away-from-base lunar EVA reference mission, an active logistics system should be
considered. This would require that equipment loaded for an expedition be outfitted with
radio frequency (RF) or another active device so that the equipment can be located, monitored,
or otherwise "found" through a system inquiry rather than a personal search. Many times
during the Apollo missions, the crew had to look for a piece of equipment or ask another
crewmember where a particular item was located. The active logistics system should operate
over some specified range so that the crew do not need physical possession of the article to
"locate" it in the logistics inventory as with bar code readers. This requirement will reduce
look-up time and ensure that equipment and productive time are not lost during a mission.
Concerning "lost" equipment during a mission, it was noted that on some of the Apollo missions
equipment was discarded at the conclusion of a task or expedition. For future remote lunar
operations, there should be a requirement to return all equipment, regardless of its status, to
the main base or logistics stores area. No equipment should ever be discarded, except in an
emergency. Debris around work areas can hinder operations and data-gathering. Discarded
and partially-expended equipment and supplies may have value to the base at some future
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date. Designated areas should be established at all worksites where equipment may be
temporarily stored. Equipment logged out of the logistics stores for a remote EVA should be
logged in at the end of the EVA.
Logistics stores should be transported in a separate vehicle pulled by the rover. In the event
of an emergency or a rapid return to base, the logistics trailer could be detached from the
rover and left at the remote site for later pickup. The EVA crew should not be required to
transport equipment or logistic stores on their persons except to conduct specific tasks.
The logistics package for remote operations should have two components: general and mission-
specific. A general core of logistical supplies should be taken on each remote mission. This
general core should be supplied and configured the same way for each expedition and located
on the trailer in a dedicated area. The mission-specific logistics also should have a dedicated
location on the trailer. This will enable the crew to benefit from positive transfer of training
with respect to the common logistics core, the equipment available from the common core, and
the specific location of this equipment. This should increase productivity by decreasing the
time necessary to familiarize the crew with the common logistics elements.
Common core logistics should include backup power and life support provisions. The life
support provisions could be provided via umbilical to the crew.
All recharging of oxygen tanks should take place at lunar base. Replacement of oxygen
supplies during EVA should be necessary only in an emergency and should be accomplished
by replacement of an entire tank rather than by recharging a tank from an oxygen supply
on the rover.
Logistic equipment should be provided in a modular form so that changeout can be
accomplished by removing one module and plugging in a replacement. These modules are
lunar replacement units (LURUs). To reduce the requirement to replace units frequently,
regenerable and recycling systems should be considered.
It is reasonable to require the sensing of each item's presence in its stowage location and to
input this information into a central logistics computer. In addition, it is reasonable to check
tool/equipment transporters automatically before and after a work mission to ensure that all
scheduled items taken out are brought back. This can be accomplished before leaving the
remote worksite via the communications link and appropriate service request. The following
automatic identification techniques should be considered:
• bar codes
• optical character recognition
• electronic vision and pattern recognition
• magnetic stripes
• speech recognition
• radio frequency identification.
Radio frequency tagging seems best to fit the stowage concept suggested above; the variations
include active coded transmissions, coded responses to interrogation, passive-no code, and
passive coded. There are already several products on the market and by the time these
scenarios are realized, small, battery-powered coded transmitters and transponders that
respond to RF interrogation signals may be available that would serve the lunar base
requirements very well. Electromagnetic interference (EMI) will be a major problem that
requires an extensive, deliberate effort to provide a stable system that overcomes limitations
associated with operation in RF fields.
3.1.3 Maintainability
The permeating and abrasive qualities of the lunar dust are the overriding factors in increased
maintenance activities associated with lunar EVA. Dust removal, coating application, and
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lubrication will occupy the majority of the maintenance efforts unless precluded by initial
design. A major maintainability requirement should be that equipment exposed to and used
in the lunar regolith be protected from the abrasive character of the lunar soil or be designed
to be serviced in that environment at a remote maintenance station. Patching material should
be supplied for application to worn areas of the integral thermal/micrometeoroid garment
(ITMG) and/or suit. Replacement of the garment with a spare is another option.
The lunar base and the Space Station should conform to the same level of maintainability
requirements. For the Space Station, the design requirements for minimum achieved
availability are 90%. "Achieved availability" is the probability that a system or equipment
when used under stated conditions in an ideal support environment will operate satisfactorily
at any given time. This includes active preventive and corrective maintenance down-time, but
does not include supply, waiting, and administrative down-time (JSC Maintainabiq_-_orking
Group Requirements Memo, July 11, 1986). The maintainability requirements for lunar EVA
should require an availability of 90% or better as determined by lunar-base-specific trade-
off studies. Special skill requirements for maintenance should be minimized by automated
checkout and module replacement wherever feasible.
The requirements memo also states that hardware should be designed to facilitate maintenance,
inspection, and repair to the replacement unit (LURU) level plus the servicing and de-
servicing of consumables, waste, and refuse. Based on crew experience, the most desirable
features for system and subsystem maintainability are:
• Ease of disassembly and reassembly
• Modular design
• Commonality among different items and systems
• Ease of test, checkout, and verification after refurbishment
• User-friendly techniques to perform fault analysis and diagnostic and corrective
procedures or actions
• Efficient workstation and restraints and appropriate tools and test equipment
• An adequate inventory of spare and repair materials.
Maintenance of the LEMU should be accomplished at a dedicated site at the main base by
specially trained personnel. The LEMU should be maintainable at the LURU level for the
replacement of parts and components. Scheduled maintenance should be performed following
each lunar EVA and at intervals required by the LEMU designer, NASA, and experience.
Maintenance specialists should visually inspect and functionally check the LEMU prior to each
EVA to verify proper functions and pressure integrity (leak check). Any remote site
maintenance of the LEMq.I should be limited to adjustments in the LEMU for personal comfort
and task type.
3.1.4 Hardware Servicing
Automatic checkout and self-test will be major components of the EVA equipment. All vital
functions of the suit and life support system should be self-tested at a minimum rate of twice
per minute. The use of "press-to-test" functions should be allowed for EVA equipment
parameters that are not life-critical.
Tools and equipment used by the EVA crews should be designed to limit the need for servicing
during a mission to the greatest extent possible. The majority of planned servicing should be
conducted at the base station in special servicing bays and workshops where there are means
to control the abrasive lunar soil and remove it from equipment and the environment.
Where it is necessary to perform hardware servicing at the EVA site, it should be possible to
isolate the hardware component from the regolith. This could be done at a clean workbench
or in a glove box, if feasible. Appropriate tools, diagnostic equipment, task lighting, and solar
illumination shading should be provided. Holding and orienting fixtures should be provided
for the hardware to be serviced, and if necessary, more than one crewmember should be able
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to work on the equipment at the same time. For the servicing of permanently in place
hardware, such as a remote science station or observatory, the largest serviceable component
should be removable and serviceable by a single crewmember. The largest serviceable
component should also fit in the glove box or workbench for servicing.
Based upon our flight and lunar experience, humans have performed mission-saving operations
through contingency servicing and repair. It would be sensible to design equipment to take
advantage of this capability, even if no servicing is anticipated. This might be as simple as
designing large equipment in modular fashion, so the EVA crew can remove and replace
modules that have failed or have been updated. At the very least, the EVA crew should be
able to return a unit in need of servicing to the main base without having to return the whole
assembly.
Hardware with moving components will require servicing on a periodic basis to replace
lubricants and clean bearing areas. The lubricants appropriate to the lunar environment must
contend with a virtually hard vacuum and wide thermal extremes. Consideration of new solid
lubricants is proposed for lunar base operations (Kimzey, 1988) rather than liquid or dry
powder lubricants, which would degrade rapidly under operational conditions.
3.1.5 Cleaning and Drying
Cleaning and drying EVA hardware, especially the suits and outer coverings, is a major
activity in these scenarios and requires detailed, innovative design work to minimize the time
and effort involved.
The outside of the suit will require the ancillary use of a durable overgarment (ITMG) and/or
specialized coatings to keep the lunar dust from impregnating and destroying the surface and
fabric. Considerable effort should be expended in the formulation and development of
coatings that will keep the dust from sticking to the exterior surfaces. Such coatings might
be replenished by wiping, as demonstrated by the use of "wipes _ on connectors and zippers
during the Apollo program. The use of alpha emitters to neutralize static charges should also
be explored.
Precautions must be taken to keep dust out of the lunar base habitat by removing as much dust
as possible before the crewmember enters. One option (presented in section 2.5.4, Dustlock)
is a combined dustlock/airlock at the entry to the habitat. This facility would be equipped
with boot brushes, scrubbers, a grid floor, filters, forced air circulation, and a vacuum cleaner
for mechanical dust removal. This facility would contain stowage areas for cover garments,
tools, and expended equipment. It might also include recharge stations for batteries and
compressed air equipment.
Another alternative might be a "shower stall" (using water or air) located between airlocks at
lunar base; this area would be pressurized and heated if water is used. The use of recycled
water in a hydraulically-pulsed shower with a grated floor can be envisioned. However, the
wetting characteristics of lunar soil must be known in order to predict the effectiveness of
water as a cleaning agent. It may be found that lunar dust repels water and will not become
truly wet to cleanse the surface of the suit. If this is the case, then an air shower might be
more effective. Ionization of the cleansing stream (either air or water) by the use of electronic
or nuclear ionizers may be helpful in removing the dust. The airlock should contain a
filtration system with electrostatic precipitators.
Cleaning of the interior of the suits should also be made as automatic as possible. Swabs and
solvents with biocides should be used adjunctively to "soap and water" in the cleaning process.
The service time to clean and resupply the suit should not exceed 1 hour, and each suit should
be reusable for at least 100 times (800 hours) without extensive rework.
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3.1.6 Caution, Warning, and Checkout
The caution and warning (C&W) systems of lunar surface EVA should be similar in all
applicable respects to the systems used for the space suits and Space Station at that time.
C&W tone and synthesized speech formats should be common with those of the Space Station
for efficiency in crew cross-training and use.
The following requirements are quite specific since they are based on document
No. EE-2-87-005 (U) Rev. A (Space Station Audio Systems Derived Requirements). If Space
Station requirements are revised, then these requirements should be changed to maintain
compatibility, especially as related to crew cross training in safety related systems.
• Tone classes - Signals shall be generated according to the following classes of events:
CLASS I (CREW EMERGENCY)
Siren tone (fire/smoke)
Klaxon tone (pressure decay)
CLASS II (HARDWARE FAULTS)
Dual alternating tones, 400/1024 Hz
CLASS III (SOFTWARE LIMIT FAULTS)
Single tone, 500 Hz
New classes - To be evolved during development of the base and proximity operations.
Any faults having overall system implications related to safety must be CLASS II or III.
New crew emergency conditions will probably be reflected back into Class I.
Distribution - All classes of C&W tones should be distributed by the audio system. Class
I tones should not be switchable. C&W for the suit should be autonomous and not depend
upon processing in the lunar base central station for actuation of tones within the suit.
An appropriate suit system reset should be provided on the suit.
CLASS I, hardwired - The design should provide direct hardwired connection of CLASS
I tones from the C&W system to a separate, non- switchable audio speaker coil located in
at least two places within the helmet. The C&W tone volume should be controllable to
permit voice communications at the same time but should have sufficient minimum level
to ensure immediate attention.
Interfaces - EVA-Base - A two-way hardwired interface should be provided when the
EVA crew are under test in the airlock. A two-way radio interface should be provided
when EVA is in progress.
Voice synthesis - The system should provide the capability to synthesize voice C&W
messages in addition to generic audio tones and provide the crew with the capability to
enable/disable voiced messages. All message commands should originate in the C&W
system and be distributed by the audio system.
Displays/indicators - In addition to the tones and generated speech, C&W messages should
be presented to the EVA crewmember via alphanumeric displays (including the HUD) and
dedicated indicators.
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Checkout - The pre-/post-EVA checkout and the in-service monitoring should be under
the supervision of the suit checkout and data management system. Fault conditions should
be sensed, analyzed, and corrective action indicated to the crew. An expert system should
be evolved as the data base grows. Typical functions to be evaluated automatically
include:
Pressurization system integrity
Primary and emergency oxygen supply
Thermal cooling loop
Communication subsystem
Data, command, and display subsystems
Wiring and power continuity
Emergency purge or flush system
CO s removal system
Humidity control
b. Radiation warning
• Advance warning for solar flares and particle radiation arrival should be provided
from a monitoring station on Earth or lunar base.
• EVA crew should have a local detection/alarm system so they are not dependent on
the 'communication system for a timely warning.
• Real-tlme active dosimetry should be provided at several sites, both inside and
outside the suit.
RF radiation warning
• Warning of RF fields into which the EVA crew are entering should be provided.
3.1.7 Communication Requirements
This section identifies requirements for EVA communication hardware that are driven by
operations. These lunar base requirements are similar in many respects to those established
for the Space Station. However, there are significant differences in the methods of routing
and the additional functions accommodated by the much more advanced technology available
in the later time frame.
The system should be built around a central station, located at lunar base, which controls an
expandable network of local and remote users through dynamically selected direct and relay
transmission links. Channels should be assigned in response to user requests and should
automatically be sized in bandwidth, power, and processing to accommodate the user specified
services.
The network should be transparent to the user and should incorporate reference/test signals
that allow automated detection and analysis of a system malfunction. Automatically activated
redundancy should maintain functional operation while repairs are being made. System failure
should be graceful with the worst case still allowing simple manual operation or relayed
transmission through alternate nodes. System operation should require a minimum of user
insight into its mechanism. The number of redundancy levels available for a transmission
should vary in accordance with the importance of its function. Several redundant signal paths
should be provided for safety critical transmissions. Sortie or mission success communications
should have some redundancy while enhanced capability functions may be single string.
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IMPLEMENTATION:
• Routing/Capacity
A crewmember should be able to make a service request by voice or by using a keypad.
The request, specifying the destination(s) and the types of service needed, shall cause the
central base unit to configure the channel, directly or through relays, and provide the
function and bandwidth necessary. The service request itself should not interfere with
existing operations and should not be heard by other remote users. (See also "Access" and
"Voice Privacy" in section 4.9, "Voice" in section 3.1.7 below, and "Voice Privacy" in
section 3.2.12.)
Routing shall be through direct line of sight RF transmission, if possible; otherwise relays
should be used as required. Transmission to or from shadowed or shielded areas, such as
unpressurized work enclosures, should be through installed passive or active repeater
antennas. Before resorting to a satellite relay, contact will be attempted automatically
through a number of strategically placed local scanning beam antennas.
• Access
While every unit in the system should be technically accessible, inhibits shall be provided
to protect specific channels if desired. Units typically accessible should include other
EVAs, base consoles/individuals, teleoperated equipment, voice activated equipment,
surface vehicles, remote stations, en route space vehicles, Space Station and Earth (via
comm-platform, Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS), Advanced
Communication Technology Satellite (ACTS), or other distribution networks available at
the time).
• Frequencies
The frequencies used should be selected to minimize UHF-VHF interference from Earth
and locally generated EMI to radio astronomy observations in microwave and HF-LF
bands. Other considerations are discussed in section 4.9, Communications Interface
Requirements.
• Signal Processing
Automatic level control, voice activation, digitizing, coding, multiplexing, demultiplexing,
and packetizing are typical signal processing functions to be performed within the EVA
communication system. While significa.nt advances in the processing techniques and
implementing hardware are expected, functions such as these will be required.
SERVICES PROVIDED:
• Voice
Each standard remote unit, such as that incorporated into the EVA suit system, should
provide one operational voice channel having full duplex operation (simultaneous two-
way operation). This is the requested/assigned channel already discussed.
An additional standard fixed channel should be provided for emergency use. A call for
assistance made on this channel should be heard by all other units in any designated area,
regardless of the assignment configuration. This channel should also be full duplex.
Through this channel all crewmembers should be able to receive broadcast alerts, such as
a warning of increased incident radiation hazard.
A duplex emergency backup channel should be provided for a minimum of EVA-to-EVA
voice communication.
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Multiple conversations and audio from various sources should be combined, if desired,
so that persons can work together and so that voice documentation may contain all
necessary inputs. This combined service should be full duplex.
The voice signal should be digitized using an algorithm dictated by the total system
integration engineering. The digitized signal will be packetized, coded, and multiplexed
with the other services prior to modulating the RF carrier. Address information
contained in each packet will ensure proper destination regardless of node or relay
routing used.
The option of encrypting the crew's conversation on the assigned channel to a level
sufficient to ensure privacy should be provided.
• Telemetry
Suit systems and biomedical data shall be telemetered when required by the mission plan.
The digital data should be multiplexed, packetized, combined, and processed with other
services for transmission. These data can be routed to destinations other than those of
the voice signal for processing by the health and safety monitoring systems.
Consideration should be given to the possibility of routing tool or task-specific
instrumentation data through the EVA communication system.
• Commands
Incoming commands that control critical emergency functions should be transmitted to
the EVA where they are displayed and/or automatically acted upon. Noncritical
commands may enable a supporting console operator to manipulate remotely the TV
camera controls or some other sensor mounted on the EVA suit.
Outgoing commands may control functions such as teleoperations and text-and-graphics
for the in-helmet display. Commands may be initiated by voice or a task-specific hand
controller/input device. A specific voice command should be able to inhibit outgoing
voice communication while voice commanding is in progress. Consideration should be
given to incorporation of new techniques, such as command generation by head and eye
motion and possibly even cortical activity, into teleoperations and positioning.
Like all other services in this integrated system, both incoming and outgoing commands
should be digitized, packetized, interleaved, and processed prior to transmission.
• Remote Sensors
Numerous sensors including television, laser scanner, IR scanner, radar or others may be
combined to produce enhanced video and other information. Such enhanced target
,information is especially valuable on the lunar surface where the absence of atmosphere-
scattered light produces images of immense brightness contrast. The dynamic range of
most optical sensors is greatly exceeded and it becomes difficult to see both the
illuminated and unilluminated portions of the subject. Other sensors fill in the invisible
portions. Combinations and "smart" sensors provide additional significant data. Range,
range-rate, and angular change are typical.
A suit-borne sensor should be provided to monitor the radio frequency energy impinging
on the suit. Information from the sensor should be displayed in the suit and should
trigger an alarm if a safe level is about to be exceeded, allowing the crewmember to move
out of the signal field or have it turned off.
Signals from the various sensors shall be multiplexed and processed into the composite
which transmits the other services. Provision should be made to allow routing of the
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various signal components, representing each sensor or combination, to different
destinations as required for display, recording, computation, and teleoperation.
Combinations of selected voice sources and alphanumeric data should be routed to the
video recording site where they will be mixed and integrated into the stored or
transmitted video signal to prevent separation and loss.
• Incoming Data
Packetized data coming into the EVA shall be processed and delivered to the appropriate
suit-borne systems such as the in-helmet-display. Telerobotic data should be provided to
the EVA crewmember in various forms including audio, synthetic speech, video, graphic,
alphanumeric, and tactile/force feedback.
• Helmet Utilities
The required video, text, graphic, suit, and life support data signals shall be routed to the
heads-up display within the suit. Manual and automatic light attenuation should be
considered for the visor/faceplate. Microphones and miniature speakers should be
mounted on the helmet interior in strategic locations which allow free head movement.
Special electronic and acoustic treatment are required to prevent interaction of the
speaker and microphone signals. Careful attention must be paid to reduction of noise
from air motion, pumps, fans, and other suit machinery. Similarly, noise due to suit
motion, rubbing, and external vibration that is transmitted mechanically and through
the suit air must be efficiently attenuated.
• Reliability
System reliability shall be achieved through proper design and fabrication of circuits and
hardware as well as through redundancy of equipment and signal paths. As described,
automated internal testing allows reconfiguration of components or paths with minimum
user action. System failure shall be graceful with nonessential functions lost first and
mission functions lost next, while safety critical functions are maintained.
3.1.8 Contamination
The most positive way of avoiding a toxic episode is to assure no exposure whatsoever to any
toxicant or potential toxicant. Since zero concentration of contaminants is impossible, there
will always be some exposure to chemicals, and it is necessary to have sufficient knowledge
of the toxicity of those chemicals to be able to anticipate what effects will result from which
exposure. With that knowledge, judgment can be used to formulate limits for exposures that
are unlikely to result in immediate adverse health effects. There are some problems in
exercising such judgment, however. Most available data on the toxicity of chemicals is based
on either the results of experiments with animals utilizing relatively high concentrations of
the chemicals and relatively short exposures or the results of human experiences with
exposures to much lower concentrations.
A toxic effect of a chemical can be manifest in many ways. Most experimental animal
exposures have studied frank, overt toxicity; e.g., gross effects on liver or kidney. In addition,
many behavioral studies have been done, both with animals and humans. Elucidation of
behavior modifications in experimental animals is frequently done in animal models that are
much more crude than the human counterpart. This is because it is possible to use much
higher exposure concentrations than would be acceptable with human test subjects. The same
is true, of course, for determination of toxic effects in other organ systems. However, it is
difficult to extrapolate from species to species in a quantitative fashion, even though
knowledge of the human health effects is what is desired. Recently, the application of
physiologically-based toxicokinetic models (Andersen, 1981; Andersen et al., 1980; Gerlowski
and Jain, 1983; Himmelstein and Lutz, 1979) have shown utility in aiding that kind of
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extrapolation by relating to physiological processes that form a sounder basis, for such
extrapolations (Adolph, 1949; Dedrick, 1973; Dedrick and Bischoff, 1980).
The concept of criticality of function is applicable to contamination prevention in EVA
activities. There is usually sufficient knowledge on the toxicity of chemicals that are likely
to be encountered to be able to promulgate contamination limits that are not likely (to
whatever level of statistical probability is desired) to evoke frank toxicity or mortality.
However, that prediction may not be sufficient. When an astronaut is placed in a hostile
environment, such as that on the lunar surface, it is possible that a small decrement of
function (such as mental acuity) can result in a situation which renders the astronaut more
susceptible to the hazards of the environment. Thus, a small decrement that would not be
critical in a laboratory test situation can result in potentially dire consequences if it impacts
his ability to cope with the hazardous environment. Consider the analogy of consuming
several ounces of ethanol at a cocktail party with the subsequent operation of a motor vehicle.
Lethality can result at a far lower blood alcohol concentration than would be encountered in
direct ethanol toxicity. Nonetheless, inability to cope with the environment is a direct result
of exposure to the toxicant (ethanol). Methods to assess neurotoxic effects on cognitive
function are being developed, and instrumentation to perform such tests should be considered
for possible installation and use at a lunar base.
Two sources of contamination are possible for EVA on the lunar surface: (1) materials that
man has introduced into the environment (off-gassing from cabin and other habitat materials,
components and equipment as well as thermal degradation of electrical equipment, plastics,
hydraulic fluids, etc.) and (2) materials that are naturally present in the environment itself.
In setting exposure limits, it is anticipated that information on existing materials will be
available, information on new materials will be developed, and the effects of the lunar surface
materials will be catalogued.
Decontamination procedures should take place as close as possible to the source of
contamination and external to all airlocks, if possible.
The disposal of human wastes should be done through the lunar base sanitary disposal system
only. The processing of such wastes will require major design effort. Established waste
management/containment procedures and good personal hygiene procedures should always be
observed.
Lunar gravity will help clear particulates from the Work area but at a much slower rate than
that on Earth. The widespread distribution of fine lunar dust will present a major problem,
and slower clearance must be taken into account in scenario development.
Although the exact gaseous or liquid contaminants likely to create an exposure problem in
lunar scenarios cannot be listed at this time, it is certain that several will ultimately be
identified. Activities such as refueling might involve exposure to propellants and will require
that a chemical control barrier be a part of the ITMG. It is suggested that selective trace
contaminant detectors (patches that change color upon significant exposure) be placed on the
suits and/or cover garments.
3.2 LUNAR EVA PHYSIOLOGICAL/MEDICAL REQUIREMENTS
The establishment and operation of a permanent lunar base with routine EVA require detailed
attention to the requirements for physiological and medical support. Many unanswered
questions about the adaptation of humans to long-term stays in the lunar environment must
be answered. Our success in future space missions, including lunar habitation, will be
determined, in large measure, by our ability to maintain and ensure the health of each of the
crewmembers during the mission as well as upon his or her return to Earth.
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The major physiological and medical requirements for EVA in a lunar base might be classified
in five broad categories:
• Appropriate provisions for life support
• Accommodation of anticipated physiological and psychological changes
Provision of countermeasures against long-term physiological and psychological
changes
Provision for medical treatment of natural disease processes as well as accidents
_, Health assessment and maintenance.
These requirements have an impact on the design of almost all lunar base hardware and extend
from considerations of methods for detoxifying, purifying, and recycling the environment to
the development of dietary and exercise regimens.
3.2.1 Anthropometric Sizing Accommodations/Dimensional Limits
There is a requirement to size to the full range of the potential population given the
colonization approach of bringing many people to the moon. If this requirement is not met,
then the population performing EVA must be limited to the sizing range of the LEMU, and
provisions will have to be made to supply others with emergency pressurized capsules to
provide life support in the event of a system failure at the base.
The sizing of the LEMU will have to accommodate the changes in the physical stature of
individuals in the 1/6 gravity environment that will differ from those on Earth and in
microgravity. Anthropometric sizing should consider the following reported dimensional
changes (Waligora, 1979) that occur at 1/6 g as compared to 1 g:
• Postural changes associated with changes in gravity
• Spinal curvature and dimensional changes
• Abdominal dimensional changes associated with fluid shifts
• Other anthropometric changes.
Of course, dimensional changes may occur in the opposite direction if the crewmember arrives
on the moon after a stay on Space Station; thus, some planning is required to accommodate
resizing changes that are dependent upon whether the crewmember is arriving directly from
Earth or from a long-duration sojourn at Space Station. Dimensional changes associated with
changes in gravity (from 1 g to 1/6 g or from 0 g to 1/6 g) should be considered.
If there is a major resizing capability by LEMU component, then a clean assembly and
disassembly area must be provided to protect the components from lunar soil contamination
during resizing. This should be carried out at the main base rather than at a remote site.
There should be some capability to perform resizing at the remote site to accommodate
adjustments as a function of tasks and workload; this might be limited to arm and leg
adjustments to provide a more comfortable working envelope for the crewmember while
walking or performing manual tasks.
3.2.2 Metabolic Profiles
The metabolic expenditures during Apollo lunar surface EVAs have been analyzed in detail
using three independent, and somewhat indirect, methods of metabolic assessment. The data
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contain no major anomalies and compare well with those anticipated by extrapolation from
orbital EVA data and terrestrial studies.
Table 3-1 contains a summary of the data on metabolic expenditures for Apollo lunar surface
EVA data (Waligora and Horrigan in "Biomedical Results of Apollo," 1975). These data
demonstrate the approximate range of metabolic expenditures that might be anticipated for
the activities contained in the scenarios of this study. The range of metabolic rates that
occurred during the entire lunar EVA experience on Apollo was 229 to 351 watts (197 to 302
kcal/hr), with a range on selected tasks of 115 to 522 watts (99 to 450 kcal/hr). The exact suit
design and configuration will have some impact on the numbers to be anticipated; however,
the additional burden of increased suit pressure might well be offset by the increased mobility
of better joints and flexibility that have been designed into the newer generation of suits. It
is also anticipated that individual variations from crewmember to crewmember might be far
greater than that which might occur from one type of suit to another.
Thus, the data contained in Table 3-1 will be taken as roughly typical of those to be expected
for similar tasks in the advanced EVA scenarios. Of particular interest to this study are the
lower metabolic rates associated with driving and riding the lunar rover and the higher rates
associated with more strenuous activities. The data of Table 3-1 provide a significant level
of confidence in the bounds of metabolic expenditures to be expected. It should be noted that
peak work rates are more important in assessing the strain on the crewmember than are mean
work rates (Astrand and Rodahl, 1986).
Based on previous NASA missions, the Environmental Control System should support the
following approximate Liquid Cooled Garment (ECS) (LCG) metabolic rates:
Average metabolic activity rate of 290 watts (250 kcal/hr, 992 Btu/hr) or 1.86
watts/lb (1.6 kcai/hr/lb, 6.3 Btu/hr/lb) for duration of EVA.
Maximum metabolic activity rate of 581 watts (500 kcal/hr, 1984 Btu/hr) or 3.72
watts/lb (3.2 kcal/hr/lb, 12.7/Btu/hr/lb) for 15 minutes and 468 watts (403 kcal/hr,
1600 Btu/hr) or 3.02 watts/lb (2.6 kcal/hr/Ib, 10.3 Btu/hr/lb) for 1 hour.
Minimum metabolic activity rate of 75 watts (65 kcal/hr, 285, Btu/hr) or 0.49
watts/lb (0.42 kcal/hr/lb, 1.67 Btu/hr/lb) for 1 hour.
k.._"
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Table 3-1. Metabolic Expenditures During Apollo Lunar Surface EVA
(Biomedical Results of Apollo, NASA SP-368, 1975)
w
Mimion EVA
No. No. Cmwm_
11 I CDR
IMP
COR
1
LMP
12
CDR
2
LMP
CDR
I LMP
14
CDR
2
LMP
CDR1
LMP
15 2
LMP
CDR
3 LMP
CDR
1 IMp
CDR
16 2 IMp
CDR
3 iMP
COR
1 IMp
17
MQIIn
Total time (hr)
CDR - Commander
LMP - Lunar Module Pilot
ALSEP
D_oy-
ment
818 (19'5)
1267 13021
864 (206)
1006 (240)
762 (182)
947 (226)
494 (118)
851 1203)
1182 (282)
1369 (327)
1019 (243)
1110 (2653
1085 (261)
962 (230)
869 (207)
1081 (258)
1192 (285)
1166 (278)
1018 (244)
26.18
Iktd_k p.m. J_r x 101 (Im¢,_*)
Smtion
Activity
1023 (244)
1471 (351l
1017 (243)
1028 (245)
913 1218)
I058 (253)
1230 (294)
729 (174l
996 (238)
1120 (267)
1153 (275)
778 {186}
1227 (293)
?92 (189)
1013 (242)
788 (158)
905 (216)
1125 (268)
933 (223)
1023 (244)
966 1231)
1013 (242)
1094 (281)
I255 (300)
1094 (261)
1255 (300)
1094 (251)
1255 (200)
1018 (2441
52.47
R_ng
Overhe_ Vehicle
op_tk_
899 (214)
1269 (303)
1232 (294)
1119 (267)
902 (215)
1038 (248)
820 (219)
1084 (259)
895 1213)
894 1213)
1417 1338) 669 (152|
1226 (293) 435 (104)
1202 (287) 624 (148)
1116(266) 4141 99)
1303 (311) 578 (1381
981 (234) 447 1106)
1146 (273) 726 (173)
1154 (275) 666 (159)
1044 (248) 470 (112)
987 (236) 438 1105)
983 (235) 618 11241
1107 (264) 430 (103)
1267 (302) 606 (121)
1193 (285) 472 (113)
1267 (302) 506 (121)
1193 (285) 472 (113)
1267 (302) 606 1121)
1193 (285l 472 (113)
1123 (270) 618 (123J
5Z66 25.26
Total For
Activltkm
949 (227)
1267 (302)
I028 (246)
1064 (282)
922 1221)
I054 (252)
843 (202)
980 (234)
959 (229)
1054 (252)
1159 (277)
1033 (247)
1054 (252)
854 (204)
1066 (260)
854 (204)
917 (219)
1065 (255)
822 (197)
874 (209)
854 (204)
864 (207)
1150 (2?6)
1139 (272)
864 (207)
874 (209l
980 (234)
99O (237)
980 (234)
158.74
EVA
Dclrl-
Oon
(hr)
2,43
2.43
3.90
3.90
3.78
3.78
4.80
4.80
3.58
3.58
6.53
6.53
7.22
7.22
4.83
4.83
7.18
7.18
7.38
17.38
5.67
5.67
7.20
7.20
7.62
7.62
7.25
7.25
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It should be noted that metabolic rates required for activity on the lunar surface were
accurately predicted for a suit pressure of 3.7 psia (25.5 kPa or 192 Torr). For example, during
Apollo 14, walking traverses averaging 0.45 mph (0.2 m/see) and 1.54 mph (0.69 m/see) required
278 kcal/hr (323 watts) and 305 kcal/hr (355 watts), respectively (Waligora and Horrigan,
1975). The predicted values for numerous simulations were about 25% less than the measured
values (Roth, 1968). An important question remaining is what a reasonable prediction might
be for the metabolic cost of working in a particular type of suit pressurized to 8.3 psia (57.2
kPa or 429 Torr). Linear extrapolation of the earlier simulation data summarized by Roth in
1968 for 0 psig and 3.7 psig to 8.3 psia (57.2 kPa) suggests that metabolic rate during walking
at 0.5 mph would be increased by 34% by the added suit pressure. At a speed of 1.54 mph (0.69
m/see), the increase would be approximately 42%, and at 3.5 mph (1.56 m/see) (speeds reached
during Apollo 14), the added pressure would add about 50% (to 576 kcal/hr or 670 watts).
Increasing this by 25% for the difference between previously measured and predicted values,
a value of 720 kcal/hr or 837 watts is obtained for the higher pressure suits of a design similar
to those used in prior lunar missions. It would seem imperative, therefore, that adequate
simulation testing be performed with the Zero Prebreathe Suits (ZPSs) to determine that the
increased mobility and flexibility do indeed reduce the metabolic cost below an allowable level
of 500 kcal/hr or 581 watts. Other factors that influence metabolic rate, independent of suit
pressure, are suit weight, suit flexibility, and astronaut training. Factors influencing
metabolic rates that are unique to this scenario are:
• Deconditioning during Space Station sojourn or long-term occupation of lunar base
• Specific suit design parameters
• EVA equipment (tools, foot restraints)
• Lunar day/lunar night cycles
• Work tasks in rugged terrain at reduced gravity (1/6 g).
The following topics are recommended for further study:
What impacts do age, gender, and degree of physical fitness have on EVA metabolic
costs?
What effect does a constant light cycle have on EVA metabolic costs? How does this
relate to the overwork potential imposed by constant daylight?
How does the suit affect individual metabolic costs; i.e., different fits, ratio of
crewmember size to weight of suit, etc.
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3.2.3 Suit Operational Pressure Level
An operational lunar base, using normal Earth gas composition of 78% nitrogen and 21%
oxygen, should be designed with cabin and suit pressure combinations that allow zero-
prebreathe EVAs. The maximum feasible cabin pressure is that of sea level (101 kPa or 14.7
psia), but there are numerous potential advantages to reducing the cabin design pressure to the
equivalent of approximately 4,000 feet altitude on Earth (87 kPa or 12.6 psia). There may also
be some system advantages to the use of different gas mixtures.
The R value, the ratio of nitrogen partial pressures in tissues to the final total pressure, should
not exceed 1.4. Figure 3-1 is a plot of cabin pressure versus EVA enclosure for R = 1.40 (no
prebreathe requirement). The LEMU should be pressurized to 57 kPa (8.3 psia) to provide a
"no prebreathe" capability when moving in and out of facilities pressurized to 101 kPa (14.7
psia). Tradeoffs can be made in suit pressures to achieve improvements in suit flexibility at
lower pressures. If the condition that R is maintained at 1.4 is applied, the LEMU could be
pressurized to 48 kPa or 7.0 psia in order to provide no prebreathe capability when moving
in and out of facilities pressurized to 87 kPa or 12.6 psia. If the cabin pressure is allowed to
be reduced for short periods of time to the equivalent Earth altitude of about 10,000 feet (70
kPa or 10.2 psia), then suit pressures as low as approximately 37 kPa or 5.3 psia might be
utilized. The rate of change of pressure to which a crewmember is subjected shall be limited
to 0.34 kPa per second (0.05 psi/see) maximum under normal conditions of depressurization
and repressurization.
Emergency pressurization shall be provided to maintain the suit at a minimum pressure of 41.4
kPa (6.0 psia) for a minimum of 30 minutes. Emergency repressurization shall be limited to
6.9 kPa/sec (1.0 psi/see). (See NASA STD-3000.) Further studies of the feasibility of
emergency pressurization of the suit to 2.8 ATA for potential use in hyperbaric treatment
should be conducted. This type of overpressure may require defeating emergency "pop-off"
safety mechanisms and probably will not prove feasible. However, it would be a highly
desirable feature for expediting the emergency treatment of a crewmember experiencing
barotrauma.
The composition of the atmosphere of the suit, if it is an oxygen/nitrogen mixture, shall meet
all requirements for "zero prebreathe." The oxygen partial pressure shall be maintained above
the minimum normoxic pressure level and below 41 kPa (6 psia). (See NASA STD-3000, pg.
14.2-6.) Some recent data report that oxygen toxicity may not be as significant a factor as
previously thought (Webb, 1988). NASA is currently sponsoring oxygen toxicity measurements
by the United States Air Force.
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Figure 3-1. Cabin Pressure Versus LEMU Pressure for R = 1.40
NASA STD-3000)
100
"; 95
i 8s
75
7O
(15.00)
(14.70)
(14.00)
- (13.00)
(12.75)
(12.00)
(11.00)
• (10.20)
( 10.OOt4.001
I
30
i
B
, I f
(5.00) (6.OO) (7.00) (8.OO)
! t 1 i I
35 40 45 50 55
EVA endosure prmmJre,Kpmcal (IXiO)
I
(9.00) (10.00)
L !
60 65
w
3.2.4 CO 2 Levels
The inspired level of carbon dioxide in a suit is composed of the ambient CO s partial pressure
in the suit plus that rebreathed from the crewmember's expired gases. NASA STD-3000 states
that the inspired carbon dioxide during EVA:
"Shall not exceed 1.03 kPa (7.6 Torr or 0.15 psi) at metabolic rates up to 465 watts
(400 kcal/hr or 1600 Btu/hr). The inspired CO 2 shall not exceed 1.31 kPa (10 Torr
or 0.19 psi) for periods up to 15 minutes at metabolic rates up to 581 watts (500
kcal/hr or 2000 Btu/hr), and shall not exceed 2.00 kPa (15 Tort or 0.29 psi) for
periods of $ minutes at metabolic rates up to 732 watts (630 kcal/hr or 2500 Btu/hr)."
It also states that the optimum value for the partial pressure of carbon dioxide is 0.04 kPa
(0.3 Torr). Thus, it is imperative that the scrubbers in the suit maintain the carbon dioxide
partial pressure below 1.03 kPa (7.6 Torr) for daily operation under the conditions of this
scenario. A warning alarm shall occur for partial pressures above 1.33 kPa (10 Tort) and the
crewmember should reduce activity and limit exposure to 15 minutes maximum. If the C02
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partial pressure rises above 3.0 kPa (23 Torr), the EVA should be terminated as soon as
possible or emergency methods should be used to reduce the carbon dioxide level while
reducing metabolic activity.
Accumulation of CO 2 in a human habitat will result in two serious consequences, (a) a
progressive rise in pulmonary ventilation resulting from the rise in PACO_ and arterial PCOz
stimulating the chemoreceptors (Figure 3-2) and (b) visual and auditory hallucinations,
headache, nausea, asphyxic sensations, sweating, and loss of consciousness which occur with
increasing prevalence as concentrations and time of exposure increase (Figure 3-3).
If the space around the crewmember in an enclosure pressurized to one atmosphere has a
volume equal to the body, about 70 liters (Lovelace Foundation, 1975), a 10% level for a
resting individual will be reached after approximately 28 minutes if the CO.2 scrubber fails
totally. If the individual were working at 3 times the resting metabolic rate m manipulative
tasks, then this level would be reached in less than 10 minutes. If a crewmember were working
at a metabolic activity rate of 581 watts (500 kcal/hr), then this level would be reached in
about 4 minutes without an active CO 2 removal system. The partial pressure of CO s is
independent of suit pressure; however, the percentage of CO_ varies inversely with suit
pressure. In order to allow for l0 hours of work at an average of three times the resting
metabolic rate, a total of 0.250 x 3 x 60 x l0 = 450 liters or 20.2 moles of CO 2 will be produced
which must be effectively scrubbed to prevent the concentration from exceeding 2% or a
partial pressure of 1.0 kPa (7.5 Torr or 0.145 psi) for a suit pressurized to 50 kPa (375 Torr or
7.3 psia). Even at this level, there will be significant CO 2 storage in the body, which will take
an appreciable time to be eliminated when returning to the CO2-free environment of lunar
base. For example, a 10-hour exposure to a 0.93 kPa (7.0 Torr or 0.135 psi) CO 2 environment
will cause an increase of approximately 3.3 liters in body CO 2 stores (Farhi, 1964). This is
about a 50% increase in the normal CO 2 stores of the body.
The use of disposable lithium hydroxide canisters should be reserved for emergency
requirements. Due to the frequency and duration of EVA activities, recyclablemethods for
CO 2 removal will be essential. Several recyclable techniques might be applicable and should
be traded off in the design of the suits. Such a scrubber should be capable of removing CO 2
at the minimum rate of 50 liters per hour and should provide advanced warning of depletion.
On occasion, a crewmember might be working in a pressurized facility with an elevated CO 2
level, such as an agricultural facility where atmospheric conditions are optimized for plant
growth. Although most lunar base facilities will be pressurized up to a maximum of 101 kPa
(760 Torr or 14.7 psia), some consideration should be given to the desirability of allowing a
suited crewmember to enter a partially pressurized facility with an elevated CO 2 environment.
Recommended further study: How does long-term exposure to CO 2 affect calcium metabolism?
Figure 3-2. Cardiorespiratory Response to Carbon Dioxide
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The immediate effects of increased CO= on pulse rate, respiration
rate, and respiratory minute volume are shown for subjects at
rest. The hatched areas represent one standard deviation on each
side of the mean. To convert percentage of CO_ to partial
pressure, multiply fraction of CO= by "/60 mm Hg. (Roth, 1968.)
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Figure3-3. Symptoms and Thresholds of Acute and Chronic Carbon Dioxide Toxicity
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! This chart presents the general symptoms common to most
subjects when exposed for the times indicated to mixtures of
carbon dioxide in air at a total pressure of 1 atmosphere. In Zone
I, no psychophysiological performance degradation, or any other
consistent effect, is noted. In Zone II, small threshold hearing
losses have been found and there is perceptible doubling in depth
of respiration. In Zone III, the zone of distracting discomfort,
the symptoms are mental depression, headache, dizziness, nausea,
"air hunger," and decrease in visual discrimination. Zone IV
represents marked deterioration leading to dizziness and stupor,
with inability to take steps for self preservation. The final state
is unconsciousness. (Roth, 1968.)
3.2.5 Thermal Storage of Body Heat
The limits to crew performance may be defined in terms of the maximum allowable internal
temperature, which is given as 39 °C for a resting or lightly working person (and 40 °C during
exertion), or in terms of the maximum allowable heat storage, which is given as 6280 Joules/kg$ 2 2
(1.5 kcal/kg) of body weight ,_r 3.14 x 10 Joules/m or 75 kcal/m of body surface)
(Grumman, 1985) and as 4.2 x 10 Joules or 100 kcal (Blockley, et al., 1954). NASA STD-3000
allows up to.l 1,302 Joules/k$ (2.7 kcal/kg or 4.9 Btu/lb) of body weight or 565,110 Joules/m 2
(135 kcal/m _ or 49.9 Btu/ft') of body area. The Grumman report (1985) and Marton et al.
(1971) both agree on the use of 0.83 as the average specific heat of human tissue but differ in
the description of heat storage. Marton (1971) offers formulae for terms in a heat balance rate
equation, and so the heat storage term is made proportional to the time rate of change of
temperature. Waligora (1979) and Marton (1971) consider the overall quantity of what one
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might call "excess" thermal energy stored in a human body. It is to this overall quantity that
the numbers given above as maximum allowable pertain. With regard to the prediction of
thermal limitation due to storage, Waligora points out that the approach is accurate when the
limitation to heat transfer is the removal of heat. When the storage is due to failure of the
thermoregulatory system, individual variations will make predictions less accurate. The
implication of this observation is that in the situation of a person working hard in a hot, dry
and Wwindy" environment, thermal storage of body heat may not be predictable on the basis
of heat transfer theory alone. Thus, if a high ambient temperature is allowed to occur in an
EVA suit, development of specific countermeasures on an individualized basis may be
necessary. Some dietary countermeasures to heat tolerance, such as various electrolytes and
vitamin C, might be of use.
The liquid cooling garment (LCG) was found to work extremely well during the Apollo EVAs
by allowing "work rates as high as 581 watts (500 kcal/hr) without thermal stress"
(Nicogossian and Parker, 1982, pg. 110). This is particularly important for minimizing fatigue
and maximizing comfort during long EVAs on the lunar surface. Air cooling, in addition to
its generally inefficient heat transfer, produces a greater background noise level that could
be a nuisance to the EVA crewmember engaged in daily EVAs. The overwhelming preference
of a limited sample of astronauts who have evaluated both types of cooling and used the LCG
in operations is for the recommendation of an LCG-type cooling system for advanced EVA.
One of the purposes of suit environmental control is to achieve a continuous balance between
heat production and heat loss. Obviously, the exterior surfaces of the suit on the lunar surface
are exposed to a wide range of temperatures as the exposure to incident radiant energy
changes. Historically, the suit has provided isolation between these temperature extremes and
the crewmember inside the suit while removing body heat with a LCG cooled by controlled
sublimation of a water supply. For repetitive operation on the lunar surface, it will be
important that the water supply be conserved. Thus, it may be a requirement that the LCG
be cooled (1) by a change of state (such as from solid to liquid) without loss of consumables
or (2) by a "heat pipe" type design that radiates the heat to the cold (lunar shade) environment.
The total body heat to be dissipated is roughly 12 x 106 Joules/day (3000 kcal/day) per person.
When the amount of energy involved is calculated on a long-term basis, it becomes obvious that
efficient methods of transferring heat must be used for lunar surface EVAs.
Figure 3-4 lists the average daily input requirements and output estimates for humans in
space. It is obvious that resource reclamation processes are an important technology gap that
must be closed to make an operational lunar base possible.
A topic requiring further study is the degree of effect that exposure to ionizing and non-
ionizing radiation has on the body's ability to thermoregulate.
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Figure 3-4. Daily Support Requirements in Grams/Person/Day
R.L. Sauer: "Metabolic Support of a Lunar Base," in Mendell, 1985)
Food (dry) 641
Water (free) 2845
Metabolic
(oxidation)
water 371
Oxygen 806
Total Water 3216
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water 1558
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3.2.6 Personal Hygiene
All Crewmember personal hygiene activities in preparation for EVA that have been
established for EVA in LEO are also applicable to advanced EVA at lunar base. However,
there is a clear requirement for full shower facilities in the lunar base. The use of sponges
and skin wipes is appropriate only as a supplement to a shower. Attention should be given to
deodorization as well as to the provision for a supply of pleasant aromas.
All suits, as well as the LCG, must be designed for ease of cleaning and drying. Efforts must
be made to minimize the entrapment of dirt, cleaning solutions, biocides, and body fluids
within crevices. All materials used in the suits should be selected such that they do not serve
as major growth media for bacteria or fungi. Methods of verifying the removal of bacteria
and fungi should be developed and incorporated in the cleaning process. Any lubricants
required to be used on the interior of the suits should be designed to be applied under reduced
gravity conditions and should meet all toxicity requirements.
87
t..._
t...-
w
[ •
Cleaning and disinfecting procedures for all materials in contact with a crewmember should
be thorough, effective, and simple to conduct. The use of large swabs saturated with cleaners
and bactericides is appropriate. Drying may be best effected by the use of forced air.
Techniques should be developed for automated cleaning and drying of the suits so that each
enclosure can be cleaned and dried within the time allowed between EVA episodes.
The relatively short times between the extended EVA of each crewmember may make the use
of salves or ointments important for crewmember comfort when abrasions have occurred. The
types of activities in the scenarios and the relatively loose-fitting suit could cause a
crewmember to abrade his skin in unpredictable places. The use of a salve or ointment may
be an important palliative (and lubricant) to relieve ongoing skin irritation at pressure points.
However, such materials must be carefully selected to avoid contaminating or damaging the
suit.
3.2.7 Waste Management/Containment System
EVA activities will require that human waste products (urine, feces, menses, and vomitus)
be containerized. Cumbersome devices for waste management and containment should be
avoided. The devices currently used have proven adequate for zero-g EVAs, but slight
modifications may be necessary to optimize their use in 1/6 g, where the weight of the waste
is once again a consideration. Of course, dietary intakes of low-residue food should be
considered during periods of planned EVA, but reasonable limits should be established to
assure proper nutrition and hydration.
Treatment of the collected wastes within the confines of the suit should be considered. If a
suit has "hands-in" capability, it might be possible to treat these wastes chemically in order to
render them non-noxious, physiologically safe, and deodorized.
The quantities of human wastes to be contained (listed below) have been derived on the basis
of historical guidelines as reconciled to the most recently accepted standards (NASA STD-
3000):
* Urine Containment Devices must accommodate male/female usage and have an internal
storage capacity for 1000 cc.
p. Fecal Containment Devices must have an internal storage capacity for 500 cc.
• Vomitus Containment Devices must have an internal storage capacity for 750 cc.
• Menses Containment Devices might utilize conventional absorbent/collection devices
(tampon or sanitary napkin) with a capacity of approximately 100 cc.
All devices must be designed for hygienic collection, containment, storage, and disposal in the
l/6-g environment. They also must be designed to operate as a system in the suit for the
maximum duration of an EVA. Cross-contamination from containment subsystems to other
suit subsystems (such as drinking water, food, circulating air supply, and helmet/visor) must
be prevented. Consideration should be given to cleaning and reusing certain collection devices.
Routine EVAs in a lunar base would use a significant volume of disposable containment
devices which would be costly to supply for one-time use. Provisions must be made to dispose
of the contents within the human waste disposal system of the lunar base. A combination of
disposal and reuse techniques to reduce cleaning time might be desirable.
3.2.8 Food/Water
Provisions for adequate food and water will be necessary within the confines of the suits.
Weight and volume limitations in the suit will make it necessary to provide small quantities
of high-energy-producing foodstuff that will be matched calorically to the physiological load
anticipated during EVA. Prior studies have shown that up to 1700 cc (56 ounces) of water and
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3.14 Xl0 ° Joules (750 kcal) of food might be required during each major EVA event in this
scenario. Based upon the anticipated energy expenditure and the duration of each EVA, and
recognizing the satisfying nature of "recreational" snacks, it is recommended that up to 6.3 x
100 Joules (1500 kcal) of food be provided in the suit, especially for those missions involving
strenuous activities.
The daily diet should supply the basic nutritional requirements of the National Research
Council as established by their Recommended Dietary Allowances (RDA). The content of
protein, carbohydrates, fats, vitamins, and minerals in the food supply should be monitored
and controlled. A high caloric and low residue diet should be used to the extent possible
during EVA activities.
To carry the required amount of water, the drinking bag may have to be distributed in the
suit and compartmentalized to avoid "sloshing" disturbances with motion. It should be
constructed of FDA-approved materials that can be cleaned and disinfected easily. Positive-
activation valving is an essential part of the design to minimize spills within the suit.
Supplementation of dietary electrolytes, such as potassium, will be essential and might be
accomplished within the food or water supply. Considerable care should be exercised to
maintain adequate electrolyte levels but to avoid overdosage that could lead to diarrhea. Oral
administration of timed release supplements should be considered. Some method of indirectly
monitoring serum electrolytes would bc highly desirable.
The predominately vegetarian diet may be one of the unique characteristics of the food in a
self-sustaining lunar base. Thus, plant proteins will, to a large degree, replace animal proteins
in the diet, and additional effort and planning will be required to maintain nutritional
balance. This high residue high fiber diet might present problems in waste containment and
disposal. It may become more practical to develop and raise fish or other animal products that
produce less residual bulk in the feces.
3.2.9 Biomedical Data Monitoring
The biomedical data monitoring requirements on an operational basis at a site remote from
the lunar base during lunar surface operations will be derived to measure and monitor only
those data that arc essential to assess the real-time physiological well-being of each of the
EVA crewmembers.
The following indirect (noncontact) measurements are required for each EVA crewmember:
• Radiation exposure (dosimetry of both ionizing and non-ionizing radiation)
• Oxygen partial pressure (and consumption)
• Carbon dioxide partial pressure
• Suit pressure.
The following measurements might be made with direct contact transducers/sensors (perhaps
built into the LCG):
• Lead II (or M-VS) electrocardiogram (processed for heart rate and arrhythmia detection)
• Respiration (monitored for respiration rate)
• Skin temperature.
Since these measurements will be made routinely on an operational basis, all transducers
and/or sensors should be applied automatically when the LCG is donned. It is envisioned
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that two (perhaps three) sensors can be configured to sense the electrocardiogram, respiration,
and skin temperature.
The monitoring of these data must take place both at the EVA site and at lunar base. All
data should be presented to the suit data system for alarm detection and selected display.
The data also should be telemetered to lunar base where they should be monitored
automatically for preset and adaptive limits. A complete arrhythmia detector should be used
for analysis of the ECG data. Alarm conditions shall alert both lunar base personnel and EVA
crewmembers.
Consideration should be given to the use of biological dosimetry techniques. These techniques
might supplement electronic instruments and be sensitive to a wider range of radiation.
However, it is not envisioned that such sampled techniques will completely replace real-time
processing of radiation data in the time period of interest.
Pulse oximetry, with its expanding capability and shrinking size, might be a valuable addition
to the biomedical monitoring instrumentation, especially if techniques can be developed for
easy and automatic application of the sensor.
3.2.10 Medical Care/Facilities
EVAs at a site remote from lunar base provide an obvious planning problem for the provision
of adequate emergency and routine medical care. It is assumed that the lunar base will
contain a complete, well-equipped medical facility for both testing and treating all anticipated
medical conditions. One of the rovers might be equipped with an ambulance module which
will allow it to function as a remote urgent care vehicle, similar in many respects to a
terrestrial mobile coronary care unit or an advanced life support vehicle but containing more
specialized and diversified capability. Some of the provisions currently under consideration
for the Crew Emergency Return Vehicle (CERV) might be considered also for installation in
the ambulance module. The medical facilities and equipment in the ambulance module must
have the capability to stabilize an ill or injured crewmember for transport back to the lunar
base for more definitive care.
Medical care at the remote site might utilize the equipment and facilities of an ambulance
module on arover. Lunar EVA crewmembers should be provided with training in advanced
life support techniques and procedures that are equivalent, at a minimum, to the level of
"paramedic." Radio communications with lunar base are vital for detailed medical instructions
and data transfer. Consideration should be given to the use of the LEMUas an emergency
hyperbaric chamber, if pressurization to 2.g ATA (41.1 psia or 284 kPa) can be safely
accomplished.
Emergency rescue at lunar base may be better effected by bringing rescue supplies, equipment,
and personnel to the base rather than by evacuating the critically ill or injured crewmember
back to Earth or to Space Station. It is expected that a telemedicine system will be an essential
part of the lunar base with interconnections to Earth and possibly Space Station.
Some of the major medical issues for a lunar base are the following: (Logan, April, 1988)
m, Extent of general surgery capability
• Closed-loop control of general anesthesia
_. Shelf life of medical supplies, consumables, and pharmaceuticals
Reusability (vs current "disposability" medical concepts)
Sterilization
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• Blood products (handling, storage, and resupply)
• Appropriatc imaging techniques
• Extcnt to which mcdical laboratory capability is required
• Use of artificial intelligence in medical diagnosis and medical management
Provisions for dental procedures.
Consideration also must be given to the medical training of the crew. Because of the size
and permanent nature of the lunar base, it is assumed that at least one of its inhabitants will
be a physician. Continuing medical education must form a part of the activities of the
physician(s) in order to maintain proficiency.
Other considerations include the extent of provisions for multiple patients and the extent
that "paperless" record keeping can be realized. Provisions for health assessment and routine
physical examinations also should be provided.
One of the major physiological/medical problems expected to develop during long-term
missions on the lunar surface is the demineralization of bones and resultant loss of bone
strength. While this might not be important to the well-being of the crewmember while on the
lunar surface, it is vitally important to his or her health upon return to Earth. Since it has not
been proven that bone loss under reduced gravity conditions is regained upon return to Earth,
effective countermeasures must be developed in the form of bone-stressing exercises, dietary
supplements, osteogenic-inducing agents, etc. Bone strength losses in lunar gravity are
estimated to be 0.7% per week without the use of countermeasures (Keller and Strauss, 1988).
This would limit the crewmembers to a cumulative stay of about 1.5 years on the moon.
Individual variations in the rate of loss in bone strength make it desirable to have periodic
measurements of each crewmember. Instrumentation to measure bone loss should be available
at lunar base.
An exercise program is an essential part of lunar activity. EVA-specific exercises of the arm,
forearm, and hands should be considered. Exercise countermeasures should be designed to
provide some level of maintenance of l-g conditioning against loss of strength and muscle
mass, loss of bone minerals, and cardiovascular deconditioning.
Some anticipation of and provisions for "occupational hazards" of EVA at lunar base must
be included in the planning for medical care. Consideration of the occupational ergonometrics
of EVA in the various suits should assess the possibility of repetitive activities leading to
problems such as carpal tunnel syndrome. Possible allergic reactions to lunar dust also must
be considered.
The pressurization of the suits with an air mixture rather than a highly oxygen-enriched
atmosphere precludes the likelihood of oxygen toxicity, except under contingency emergency
situations where high partial pressures of oxygen might be breathed for prolonged periods of
time. Anecdotal reports of recent research results indicate that the conditions leading to
oxygen toxicity may be even more unlikely than previously assumed. Also, the use of high
pressure suits coordinated with the lunar base pressurization level eliminates the prebreathe
requirement for nitrogen washout. Any small difference in pressure between the lunar base
and the suits reduces the probability of evolved gas embolism to a minimum under routine
operations. However, the possibility of a rapid decompression of either a suit or other
pressurized facility exists. Therefore, the probability of bends should be considered in the
event of a major system failure or disruption of the skin integrity of any pressurized
enclosure.
It is assumed that a slow leak of the pressurized suit would be brought to the early attention
of the crewmember by an appropriate caution-and-warning system. Under this condition, the
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crewmember will have adequate time to implement contingency procedures and stop the leak.
The suit failure emergency scenario of this study has mentioned the need for EVA
crewmembers to share pressurization by hooking together with a "buddy system." It also has
suggested that an emergency pressurized enclosure should be a part of each rover, either as
a special section or as a trailer. Emergency oxygen systems with pressure demand regulators
will be necessary to provide 100% oxygen under pressure. In "this scenario, one or both
crewmembers may be exposed to near vacuum for a significant time. Without pressure
protection, dysbarism and subsequent gas embolization become a major possible risk. A
hyperbaric capability could help minimize central nervous system (CNS) damage in the
probable event of embolization. The LEMU might serve as such a facility if it were provided
with adequate pressurization capability.
The tradeoffs for the requirement of a mobile hyperbaric facility with a pressurization
capability greater than 2.8 ATA should take the contingency scenarios into consideration as
the worst cases. The capability must be provided to treat barotrauma and dysbarism and also
to help prevent serious CNS problems in the cases cited.
The toxic hazard risks for these mission scenarios are not identified as substantial. Protocols
for dealing with inhalation exposures as a result of possible life support system contamination
and surface exposure decontamination should be delineated clearly for each of the anticipated
hazards. These will be very similar to the protocol procedures for the Space Station
inhabitants, and no new technical data are anticipated.
Mechanical trauma within the suits should be considered as a possible occurrence. The
severity of the trauma could range from minor cuts and abrasions to broken limbs and
puncture wounds. Emergency supplies such as splints, sutures, and antiseptic ointments, as
well as instructions for a crewmember trained in their use, must be available in the ambulance
module and at lunar base.
Electric shock also should be considered as a remotely possible risk. Injury could occur from
burns, cardiac dysrhythmias (including ventricular fibrillation), and mechanical injury due
to recoil. However, such incidents are much more likely to occur at lunar base than during
EVA. This contingency warrants the presence of a cardiac monitor/ defibrillator in the
ambulance module. Defibrillation would have to be instituted as soon as the dysrhythmia is
recognized. It would be unacceptable medical practice to rely on mechanical external cardiac
compression alone for transport back to lunar base.
Although the crewmembers' immune systems may be compromised from a sustained stay in
weightless or reduced gravity environment, infections of crewmembers in this scenario will
probably be limited, for the first few weeks, to those which were already incubating while
aboard the Space Station or prior to leaving Earth. It is assumed that infectious disease will
be well controlled on Space Station and within the lunar base and that resident organisms will
have been identified. The additional stress of EVA at lunar base may, however, cause
subclinical diseases to become manifest. Antibiotic therapy must be available, by both oral
and intramuscular routes, for the most common clinical infections.
With the absence of the protective shield of the Van Allen Belts in LEO, the lunar base
operation presents greater risk of radiation sickness and/or life-threatening radiation overdose.
Redundant and precise monitoring of the crewmember in EVA is necessary. This should be
accomplished with personally worn monitors. Each crewmember's dose can then be added to
his/her career dose by ground personnel. In the event of a highly radioactive solar flare,
portable shelters and safe havens should be used for protection. Further consideration should
be given to using some of the new experimental drugs being developed to provide some
protection for cells against damage by ionizing radiation. The most promise in this area seems
to be the development of drugs that promote the regeneration of bone marrow after
destruction by high doses of radiation. Such developments, generally in the field of oncology,
should be studied for possible utilization in this environment.
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Blood volume shifts and changes it, plasma electrolyte concentration have been demonstrated
to be adaptive mechanisms to the microgravity environment of space. The added work load
and metabolic load of EVAs on successive days may cause temporarily imbalanced electrolyte
values. A non-invasive method of monitoring electrolytes and imbalances probably will be
required. Dietary supplementation of possibly critical electrolyte losses may also neecl to be
a part of the EVA protocol.
Other medical conditions, mostly of the variety treated by elementary first aid (e.g., minor
burns or abrasions), are likely to occur and must be treated appropriately. Any medical
problem not deemed to be definitively treatable in the rover ambulance module should be
assessed for its severity and for the possible termination of the remote activities and
immediate return to base. Under these circumstances, the crewmember's condition should be
stabilized, if possible, and the vehicle returned to lunar base. The prevention of shock should
be a major goal in stabilization. Therefore, analgesics, fluid and electrolyte replacement, and
maintenance of circulation and ventilation are the paramount considerations and should be
reflected in the equipment and supplies stowed in the ambulance module.
Based on the previous discussions, the facilities, equipment, and supplies required for the
ambulance module should include the following:
• Portable radiation shelter
• Hyperbaric treatment capability up to 2.8 ATA
• Pressurized safe haven
• Mechanical external cardiac massage unit
• Pulmonary ventilator/respirator
• 100% oxygen supply with oral/nasal mask
• Cardiac monitor/defibrillator and external pacemaker
• IV fluid administration system.
Various examination and treatment kits, similar in content to the "High Technology
Physicians' Black Bag" and medical kits already developed by NASA and used in the past,
also will be required. These instruments will be needed to make and confirm diagnoses and
monitor the progress of a disabled erewmember.
A "hands-in" capability of the LEMU would allow the crewmember to administer his/her own
oral drugs, skin patches, or injectables as required (for example, antiemetics and radiation
countermeasures). These could be provided in emergency-kit form within the LEMU. The
use of such procedures and drugs should be under the supervision of lunar-based or ground-
based medical personnel.
In the absence of a "hands-in" capability, which would facilitate medical care by the in-suit,
self administration of oral or injectable pharmaceuticals to each of the EVA crewmembers,
a injection patch in the thigh area or integral automatic injection system might be necessary.
A patch on the thigh (as in Apollo)should prove adequate, but an automated system with
adequate safeguards against accidental triggering might be more satisfactory. The use of an
injection patch will be constrained to a unique administration device or use in pressurized
facilities. No critical need for this patch is identified at this time with the planned rescue
capability. Another possibility is an automated medical aid system using automated
hypodermics, electrostimulation devices, and devices to clear the respiratory tracts, as reported
by the Soviets (Bogomolov, 1986). Rapid injections of antiemetics or radioprotective
pharmaceuticals during a solar flare might be desirable.
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Health assessment of the crew should combine routine diagnostic physical examinations and
monitoring during both exercise and EVA missions with pre- and post-mission health
assessments. This assessment might also include the psychosocial and group dynamics aspects
of the crew. The frequency of monitoring and testing should be based upon the findings and
should be increased or decreased based upon deviations from normal and expected values.
Standards should be set which define the limits of the monitored parameters and procedures
to be followed in the event that a parameter approaches or exceeds its limits.
It is assumed that smoking and drinking alcoholic beverages at lunar base will be prohibited.
A strict policy should be established and firmly enforced to control such activities or the
impact on the medical care system might be significant.
3.2.11 Perception Acuity for Visual Displays and Warnings
Primary EVA-related visual displays and warnings can be displayed in the helmet/visor area
of the suits. The technology for a see-through, heads-up display is well defined. All images
should appear in focus when the crewmember is looking at a distant object. Generally, this
means that the virtual image must be located at a viewing distance greater than eighteen
inches away from the eyes of the crewmember. The brightness and/or contrast of the display
should be adjustable by the crewmember over a limited range of control established by
visibility studies.
The display should accommodate a combination of seven-segment alphanumeric data as well
as scanned video. Discrete warning lamps should also be used where appropriate. The
transmittance and reflectance of the see-through display should be optimized.
All crewmembers should be corrected to 20/20 vision with individually-fitted eyeglasses
designed for adequate retention during use in l/6-gconditions. Also, the lunar base should
be equipped for vision testing and correction of any refraction errors that might occur during
the crewmembers' stay on the lunar surface.
3.2.12 Audio Level, Quality, Range and Warnings
The following requirements are quite specific since they are based on document No.
EE-2-87-005 (U) Rev. A (Space Station Audio System Derived Requirements). If Space Station
requirements are revised, then these requirements should be changed accordingly.
The characteristics of the EVA suit audio system for use at a lunar base should include the
following items:
_" Acoustic Transducers
Microphones: Transducers should be redundant and non-noise-canceling. A noise-canceling
type should not be needed since external acoustic input to the suit is eliminated by the
lunar surface vacuum. Further, acoustic pressure conditions within the suit/helmet alter
the relation of far-field and near-field signals such that very little benefit can be achieved
from canceling type transducers. Used in this environment, canceling transducers must be
very accurately located near the mouth or voice cancellation will result. Mounting the
transducers on the helmet and not the head precludes the required positioning accuracy.
Headphones/speaker: The internal EVA noise level should be kept low enough that small
loudspeakers may be used instead of headphones. (See also section 3.1.7, Helmet Utilities.)
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Audio Level
Speaker: The receiver AGC should be followed by a crew-accessible level control providing
a maximum level of 75 dB(A) for operations. C&W tones should be at least 20 dB above
voice communications but should not exceed 100 dB(A). Class I C&W tones may not be
reduced below TBD dB(A) but should be controllable to permit hearing voice
communications.
Microphone: This should be leveled to a nominal 0 dBm input by an AGC circuit with
TBD ms attack and TBD ms release times (-12 dBm threshold referenced to nominal 0 dBm
input). When noise-canceling microphones are used, a 10 dB SNR improvement should be
attempted.
Audio Feedback
Effective active and passive measures should be incorporated to allow open microphone
and loudspeaker operation on the full-duplex signal that transmits and receives continually.
_- Hardware Interface
Hardware compatibility should be provided for use during checkout, in the airlock, and
when operating certain vehicles.
Redundancy/Reliability/Maintainability
The design should provide levels of redundancy required for mission criticality IR and
very high reliability within each redundant system "string." It also should provide good
checkout interfaces, accessibility, and repairability. (See also section 3.1.7, Reliability.)
Speech Syntheses
The design should provide flexible synthesis capability to service multiple applications.
Speech Recognition
The design should provide speech recognition for noncritical command functions such as
the control of lighting, TV functions, HUD data display, and tool selection, inventory, or
location. Manual or voice activated inhibit of outgoing voice transmissions should be
provided for use during voice commanding to reduce non-communication chatter on the
network.
Caution and Warning
Processing/Distribution: All classes of C&W tones should be distributed by the suit audio
system and should not be switchable. C&W for the suit should not depend on processing
in the central control station for actuation of tones within the suit. An appropriate suit
system reset should be provided on the suit. C&W tone and synthesized speech formats
should be common with those of the Space Station for efficiency in crew cross-training
and use.
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End-End Quality
Processing/Distribution: The digital processing and audio distribution system within the
EVA suit should provide "very good" voice quality (A. I. NTL 0.7) using the same
bandwidth and voice channel rate as the surface station and relaylinks to Earth. Very
long duration exposure to distorted speech (typical of that used to minimize bandwidth)
may reduce crew performance and cause other undesirable effects as have been
demonstrated for continuous exposure to high noise environments. Research in this area
appears to be appropriate.
Noise/Distortion: The processing should maintain a 50 dB SNR, with no more than 5 %
distortion.
Time Delay: Local audio delay should be kept to a minimum to support an overall voice
annotation synchronized to the video within 50 ms to ensure good "lip sync" and assist in
achieving natural interactive conversations.
Bandwidth: Bandwidth is not expected to be a constraint. A voice channel rate of 64 kbs
is considered the probable baseline for Space Station and the next generation of EVA
hardware.
Verification Test: The standard modified rhyme test (or an equivalently accurate test)
should be used to verify the articulation index achieved for end-to-end.
_. Voice Privacy
Crew-switchable two-way voice privacy should be provided for all transmissions to and
from the EVA. Processors should not degrade the link quality. Compatibility with all
system elements should be maintained.
• International Compatibility
It is expected that 64 kbps (50-7000 Hz) wideband voice encoding associated with CCITT
G.722 standard (SB-ADPCM encoding) will be in use during the mission and should be
considered for a standard.
3.2.13 Perception of Surrounding Environment
Current suit technology provisions for vision (visors) and sensory feedback to touch (gloves)
should be adequate for this mission. However, in the event of an emergency rescue, it may be
necessary to provide some location aids. Some design consideration has been given to
incorporating automatic ranging into a "smart" TV camera. It will be necessary to provide
some equipment to assist the crewmembers in determining the location and range of large
objects or other crewmembers. If the proposed communication system using direct EVA to Ll
link is used, then discrete address of each EVA allows its position to be measured by the
central station together with range and bearing from other EVAs.
The optical quality of the space helmets and visors currently being designed should be
adequate for use on the lunar surface. However, the lunar environment places several other
requirements on this equipment. The visors and faceplates should be hardened against
scratches to the maximum extent. Lunar soil is extremely abrasive and will surely scratch most
visors and helmets. These scratches were a problem during the Apollo missions. (See Apollo
technical crew debriefing reports.) With the reuse requirements of these lunar EVA scenarios,
scratches will accumulate over time and possibly impair vision. A disposable (replaceable or
resurfaceable) shield also should be considered.
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The extreme range of lighting conditions on the lunar surface might require the use of an
automatic visor. Such a visor would change density (or possibly aperture) as a function of
lighting. However, any automatic operation of this type should contain provisions for each
crewmember to override the automatic setting under selected circumstances. This will allow
him/her to optimize the transmission characteristics of the visor in the event that automatic
control does not provide the visibility required under the circumstances.
For some detailed work under shaded conditions or during the lunar night, supplemental
lighting will be required. Thus, supplemental light sources should be supplied to illuminate
selected areas to a minimum level of 200 foot-candles, controllable by the crew.
The tendency to underestimate distances on the lunar surface can be solved partially by
training, but optical or electronic aids for ranging might be required to compensate for the
lack of textural gradient normally caused by atmospheric attenuation.
3.2.14 Toxicity
Toxicity is an inherent characteristic of a chemical--the ability to interact with and cause
damage to a living organism, organ, tissue, or cell. Hazard is the likelihood or probability,
under a given set of circumstances, that the toxicity of a chemical will be manifest. However,
it must be remembered that a chemical must enter the body for most toxic responses to occur
and, in so doing, it usually must pass through a membrane. The site of entry can be in the
upper or lower airway, the naso-pharynx, or the gastrointestinal tract. Since they are an
integral part of normal bodily functions, such as respiration, eating, etc., these sites are the
usual ones for the entry of exogenous chemicals. Chemicals can also exert their effects at the
surface of the membrane, causing irritation. Chemicals that enter the body usually must be
transported to a site of action, such as the liver, kidneys, or lungs.
The data available from experimental toxicity studies and evaluations are usually the result
of a carefully designed experiment where most variables except the chemical itself are
eliminated. However, when making judgments on maximum allowable limits for EVA on the
lunar surface, there are many complicating factors to consider. Exposures will most likely not
be to only one chemical at a time, but to mixed materials. Committees of the National
Research Council (in 1980 and 1987) have addressed some of the complexities associated with
mixed exposures. For many years, the skin was considered to be a relatively impenetrable
barrier, but recent studies have shown that dermal absorption can significantly add to the
body burden (McDougal et a1.,1985). Exercise (Horvath, 1981) and adaptation to hostile
environments can significantly affect physiological functions such as blood circulation and,
therefore, delivery of doses of absorbed chemicals to sites of action. All of these variables
must be considered when determining maximum allowable concentrations.
Materials used in the construction of the suits, as well as in the construction of pressurized
lunar habitats, should be selected from those acceptable as "non-toxic" on lists and
specifications such as NASA STD NHB 60601B.
The extensive degree of regeneration and recycling required to take place at the lunar base
will complicate the prevention of toxicant build-up. At least 97% of the water and atmosphere
must be recycled in order to sustain the base. This presents potentially major problems of
toxicity that must be solved in the design of each subsystem and in the derivation of the
overall system operating plan.
3.2.15 Radiation Tolerance
EVA crewmembers will be exposed to both ionizing and non-ionizing radiation. Both types
of radiation have natural as well as manmade sources. Ionizing radiation comprises charged
(and uncharged) particles and high-energy electromagnetic waves. Natural radiation hazards
include galactic cosmic radiation (GCR) as well as solar flares and storms. Manmade sources
include reactors and possibly terrestrial high-altitude nuclear detonations. Non-ionizing
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radiation possesses an energy level that is too low to ionize molecules. A broad definition
might include pressure waves (infrasound, sound, and ultrasound) as well as magnetostatic and
electrostatic fields.
Ionizing Radiation
Health effects due to long-term exposure, even to low levels of ionizing radiation, must be
considered in planning lunar base operations. It has been proposed that the crewmembers be
considered "radiation workers" when applying terrestrial exposure limits to the space
environment (Angelo et al., 1988). However, the effect of chronic, low-level radiation on the
health of the crewmembers, especially on the immune system and the development of auto-
immune disease, is unknown.
The effects of low-level heavy ion exposures also are not well known. Behavioral
modifications, such as a measurable "performance decrement," may occur at heavy-ion dose
rates experienced in space (Hunt et al., 1988.) Studies of Carausius morosus ('stick insects')
in space demonstrate the synergistic effect of microgravity conditions and heavy-ion exposure
(B_.icker et aI., 198g). Further studies of heavy-ion effects are needed to fully characterize and
quantify the risks of galactic cosmic ray exposure on humans.
Ionizing radiation exposure limits (Table 3-2) for Space Station and short missions to
geosynchronous orbit have been defined for NASA by a subcommittee of the National
Committee on Radiation Protection (NCRP) (Fry, 1986). Radiation exposure limits have not
been established for a lunar base. Our understanding of the deliberations of the NCRP is that
career dose limits are based on a maximum increase of 3% in cancer mortality over the
projected lifetime of a crewmember, and monthly and annual limits are based on avoiding
any acute radiation effects, such as skin burning, "radiation sickness," and hematological
depression. While monthly and annual limits are likely to apply to a lunar base, career limits
may be different.
Table 3-2. Space Station Radiation Exposure Limits (Fry, 1986)
Period
Dose Limit (Sv)
Bone Marrow Eye Skin
30 days 0.25 1 =1 1.5
1 year ..... 0.50 1 2 ........ 3 ...........
Career ...... :: '::: .........." ::::_:"/-:::-:_i-_i=.................::::::::::::::::::::_:_::::4..............":- i":i_i::::: "::6 :":: :: ...... : "
Table 3-3 shows effective doses for 10%, 50%, and 90% of an exposed population to suffer
various acute radiation effects (Langham, 1967). These effects occur at high dose rates such
as might be experienced during a large solar energetic particle event. Except for skin effects,
the dose refers to "bone-marrow" or "whole-body" exposure. Note that a space mission can be
threatened by exposures as low as 0.5 Gy and that exposures of 4 Gy or more are considered
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to be lethal. Astronaut radiation exposure to artificial sources of radiation must be limited
to 0.05 Sv yr "1 according to international convention and federally mandated regulations.
Some recent advances have been made in developing pharmaceutical countermeasures to
increase the tolerance of humans to ionizing radiation (Kumar and Ponnampcruma, April,
1988). Although the primary protection for the erewmembers should be provided by shielding,
the adjunctive use of radioprotectors should also be considered• Such pharmaceuticals, in
order to be effective, must be given before irradiation occurs. The current radioprotectors are
not effective after symptoms of radiation sickness have developed.
Table 3-3. Effective Doses for Acute Radiation Effects (Langham, 1967)
Effect
Skin:
Erythema
Prodromal Sequelae:
Anorexia
Nausea
Vomiting
Diarrhea
Hema tological Depression:
Piatelets
Lymphocytes
Neutrophils
Early Lethality:
4 5.75 7.5
....... 0.4 ........... i.o " 2.4
0.5 1.7 3.2
0.6 2.15 3.8
0.9 2.4 3.9
0.5 1.2
0.6 1.5
2.5
3.0
3.9
2.2 2.85 3.5
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Simple dietary supplements have been found to provide a minor radioprotective effect.
Among these are:
• Vitamin A
• Vitamin C
• Vitamin E
• Zinc
• Selenium.
Also, manipulations of antioxidant enzyme activity may be important for radiation protection
in EVA. Dramatic results have been reported on experiments with mice (Kumar and
Ponnamperuma, 1988) which might lead to non-toxic compounds as suitable regimens for
radioprotection in the time setting of these scenarios.
Solar Energetic Particles
Large solar particle events occur at intervals of 7 to 10 years. For a one-year mission on the
lunar surface, the probability of such an event is 10% to 20% (Burrell, 1971). The proton
fluences for large events are about 101° cm "_ or greater (Heckman et al., 1988). Whole-body
doses exceeding the threshold for lethality can occur in "worst-case" models if crewmembers
are inadequately shielded.
Intermediate-size solar energetic particle events occur with a frequency of 4 to 6 per year.
Exposure to both large and intermediate events may result in radiation doses that contribute
significantly to the crewmember radiation budget. Proposed dose limits for Space Station may
be exceeded in one hour by a large flare if crewmembers are inadequately shielded.
Solar energetic particle events, once initiated, build up to peak flux intensity within 30
minutes to a few hours. Predictions based on X-ray precursors may provide 30 minutes to one
hour additional warning. High particle intensities may be maintained for scveral days. It is
not uncommon for two or more events to occur within a week.
Galactic Cosmic Radiation
Galactic cosmic radiation (GCR) doses on the lunar surface do not threaten acute radiation
effects and do not exceed dose limits proposed for the Space Station. Models of the GCR
environment and heavy-ion transport agree within a factor of two or three with dosimeter
measurements on the Apollo lunar missions (Letaw and Adams, 1986). The GCR dose will
make a significant baseline contribution to the crewmember radiation budget which is
difficult to reduce. Uncertainties about the effects of low-level exposure to heavy ions exist
and must be resolved before credible estimates of the risk of GCR can be made.
Non-Ionizing Radiation
The non-ionizing radiation spectrum is shown graphically in Figure 3-5. Non-ionizing
radiation exposure has received considerable attention over the past few years due to the
potential health hazards involved. Widely different limits have been set by various groups,
and there is no international agreement on what these limits should be. Tables 3-4 and 3-5
contain the most recent U.S. terrestrial limits, set by the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI). Figure 3-6 is a graph of the NCRP ultraviolet exposure limits and
Tables 3-6 and 3-7 contain the available data for visible light.
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Figure 3-5. Non-Ionizing Electromagnetic Radiation Spectrum (Schulze, 1988)
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Table 3-4. Radio Frequency Protection Guide (RFPG) from American National
;tandards Institute (ANSI) Standard C95. 1-1982 (1982)
Frcciueney Range E= ................... H_ Power Density
(qVIHz) (V21m 2) (A2/m 2) (mW/cm:l)
..... : :" i "
0.3-3 -400,000
3-30 4,000(900/f_) 0.025(9001f2) 900/f2
30-300 4,000 0.025 1.0
300-1,500 4,000(f/300) "0.025(f/300) f/300
1,500-100,000 20,000 0.I25 5.0
NOTE: f is the frequency in megahertz (MHz)
Table 3-5. Intermittent Exposure Limits from ANSI Standard (1982)
z
Exposure Level Exposure Time .... Time Out of
" "" "tmw/cm') Allowed .... Field .
1.0 6 rain. --- ....
31o
5.0 _::I rain.;12 4:nain_:;48 seC ::
t
L2 102
Figure 3-6. Ultraviolet Radiation Exposure Limits (Boeing, 1986)
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Table 3-6. Maximum Permissible Exposure Limits for Visible Light (Point Source)
Grumman, 1985)
Wavelength (nm)
• H
MPE (MJ/cm _)
400-450 3.
451-500 6.
,551-600 35.
. 601-650 I00.
651-700 500.
Note: For t _< I0 sec, multiply the above MPE by .18 (t) '¢s
Maximum Permissible ExposUre Values for Point Source Radiation Between
400-700 Nanometers(with 7 mm limiting aperture t = 101 to 104 sec)
'." :: :::" "77 i :"i': ii 7:1 :i::: i:i.:-:_:.!, :i ' :i ' " "
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Table 3-7. Maximum Permissible Exposure Limits for Visible Light (Extended Source)
(Grumman, 1985)
t....,d
-'_ r
;--.,O
Wavelength (nm) MPE (Joules/cmS-sr)
400-450 ...."............6
451-500 " 12
501-550 "" ..........: " :::":"'24 "
-- . " ;iii:_::_::_.: : : _._
551-600 ..........70
601-650 ":i:.:":" 200" '+
Note: For t _< 10 sec, multiply the above MPE values by .18(0 ")5. Source solid
angle, in steradians (sr), = Area.ou,ce/(Distanee to source from eye) t
Maximum Permissible Exposure Values for Extended Source Radiation
Between 400-700 Nanometers (with 1 mm limiting aperture at cornea and
time, t = I0 (sec). " .... :_ .... .
• a
7 _"
•__ _
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The approach to limiting exposure to radio frequencies (RF) during EVA, up to the present
time, has been to turn off the transmitters or to avoid an imaginary zone around them. In
the operation of lunar base facilities, this approach to exposure limitation may not be feasible.
Terrestrial RF installations are usually elevated above normal work paths such that the
probability of inadvertent exposure is minimal. Lunar installations might not be elevated.
The following actions should be taken to reduce health risks associated with exposure to non-
ionizing radiation:
• Define the maximum dose limit (frequency, duration, field strengih) based upon
predicted biological effects.
Measure the biologically weighted, non-ionizing field strength on a continuous, real-
time basis during EVA such that the worker can detect the presence of the field and
minimize his exposure to it.
• Construct all antennas and radiating devices such that zones of concentrated and
focused energy are not encountered in the most probable work paths.
Use established design practices of radio-frequency interference (RFI) and
electromagnetic interference (EMI) isolation techniques in the design of critical EVA
systems, such as life support equipment, which are likely to encounter non-ionizing
radiation fields.
w
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v3.2.16 Meteoroid/Impact Requirements
The absence of a protective atmosphere on the moon means that micrometeoroids and
meteoroids are of concern. The impact velocities of micrometeoroids impacting the lunar
surface have been measured at 2.4 to 72 km per second. These micrometeoroids are generally
of three different classes: cometary debris, interstellar grains, and lunar ejecta. Measurements
have predicted that the established impact rate is 1.1 to 50 craters per square centimeter per
million years for particles greater than 500 micrometers in diameter.
Meteoroid flux in the vicinity of the moon is comparable to that in LEO, so the design
requirements for LEO will support the design requirements for lunar EVA as well. The NASA
SP-8013, Meteoroid Environment Model - 1969, Near Earth to Lunar Surface, Chapter 3,
Criteria gives a detailed description of the lunar surface and meteoroid interactions.
Additional information on which to base requirements is gained from NASA-TM-82478, Space
and Planetary Environment Criteria Guidelines for Use in Space Vehicle Development (1983).
3.2.17 Sand, Dust, and Surface Terrain
NASA-TM-82478 provides a description of the distribution of lunar soil by particle size.
Ranging from a medium sand to a medium silt, the regolith generally consists of particles
less than 1 mmin diameter down to those of about 0.01 mmin diameter. More than 50% of
the soil particles are less than 100 microns in diameter. The size distribution of particles less
than 1 mm is approximately log normal.
The soil is a significant design driver; Table 3-8 lists some of the mechanical properties of
the lunar surface.
The major requirement concerning soil and the lunar environment is that all equipment be
operable in or protected from the silt-like abrasive soil and sand. This is an overriding
consideration, like taking water into account in the design requirements for a submarine.
An excellent description (and a large bibliography) of the lunar surface is contained in "Rocks
and Minerals on the Moon: Materials for a Lunar Base" by Lawrence A. Taylor.
w
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Table 3-8. Mechanical Properties of Lunar Surface (from NASA-TM-82478)
Lunar Soil Parameter Value
Density
Reference or Comment
near 1.0 g cm "s surface
1.5 to 2.0 .......... I0 to 20 cm depth
Angle of internal
friction 30 to 50 deg.
Mean porosity
Cohesion
Bearing strength
higher for
lower parosities
4.3 _+2.8% All Apollo sites
for upper 15 cm
0.03 to Increase in cohesion
0.3 Ncm "_ for density from 0.99
to 1.87 gm -°
0.02 to ......... density:
0.04 Ncm "_ ............ -. !.15 g cm "s
30 to ..... i_i. density: .
100 Ncm -2 :.:i . i..... i.9 g cm "°
r=.._-
L.._
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4.0 EVA Hardware and Hardware Interface Requirements
-2
During remote lunar extravehicular activity, humans rely almost entirely on hardware
components and systems for life support, environmental protection, transportation, and shelter.
This section discusses the lunar EVA hardware, how the crewmembers interface with it, and
what requirements the hardware systems must meet in order to function together.
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4.1 DESIGN LOADS, OPERATING LIFE, AND SAFETY FACTORS
The lunar surface presents many of the same environmental conditions that are generally
present in space and that affect the operating life of equipment and hardware. The hard
vacuum and the thermal extremes will quickly degrade conventional lubricants, the unfiltered
solar radiation will degrade plastics and fabrics unless they are specially treated, and the
thermal gradients will affect equipment and materials much as these conditions affect
materials in Earth orbit. The two notable differences with respect to hardware requirements
for the moon are the gravitational acceleration and regolith.
The one-sixth gravity force will influence design load requirements. The experience gained
in Earth orbit cannot be considered valid due to the gravity differences, and the brief Apollo
missions cannot be used to develop design criteria for very long duration missions. The
current STS launch load requirements dictate that equipment withstand launch and recovery
loads of _+7.0 g in X and Z, and -+3.0 g in Y; it may be appropriate to use these launch load
factors for large assembled articles. For small packaged equipment, where the launch
requirements are met by containers around the equipment, specific load factors would have
to be developed.
The vacuum conditions on the lunar surface and the thermal extremes can be duplicated in
test chambers on Earth, and the extreme values should represent the minimum design criteria
with an additional safety factor. Current safety factors for space-based equipment range from
1.4 for components that can be mechanically and structurally tested to their limits to 4.0 for
high pressure vessels.
The lunar soil characteristics offer a particularly difficult operating factor to consider in
design loads, operating life, and safety factors. The abrasive nature of the soil is well
understood, but the effects on material and equipment of large amounts over long periods of
time are not documented. While current operating requirements call for thousands of
operating cycles for the EMU joints, these cycles are in the void of space and not subject to
contamination by lunar soil.
Ultimately, it is the combined environmental and task effects that will determine the
requirements for operating life. When the Long Duration Exposure Facility is returned from
orbit, we will be able to gather data on material degradation as a function of orbital exposure.
Combined with testing that uses actual or synthetic lunar soil under appropriate thermal and
vacuum extremes, investigations should reveal appropriate requirements for operating life on
the lunar environment before refurbishment or replacement is required.
The current philosophy for major components and subsystems being developed for the Space
Station is to have an operational life of 30 years with periodic maintenance and replacement
of ORUs. It is not unreasonable to expect that major components for lunar EVA can be
designed with the same goal in mind, especially given the capability to perform servicing and
refurbishment at the main lunar base. Major components suitable for a 30-year design life,
with replacement and refurbishment, include rovers, miners, science stations, communications
stations and outposts, tools, lighting systems and shelters. Although the state of technology
will be changing over any 30-year period and new models and new technologies will be
brought to the lunar base to support EVA, for planning purposes the Space Station operating
life cycle requirements appear to be achievable for lunar EVA equipment as well.
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The operating life of primary and secondary life support equipment and LEMUs should be
expressed in terms of hours of operation as a function of the types of operations performed.
It should also be expressed in terms of the individual components that make up the primary
and secondary man-systems EVA hardware. For example, gloves should have a specified
design life for mining operations, a specified design life if used in assembly and servicing, and
a specified design life for surveying and exploration. The more manual the tasks and
operations and the more exposure a glove has to the blocks and regolith, the shorter its
effective operating life will be and the sooner replacement of the glove will be required as a
function of routine scheduled maintenance. This same approach would be followed for other
components of the LEMU and the life support systems: operating life is defined as a function
of design goal and operational exposure.
4.2 EVA TOOLS
The design of lunar tools and tool systems must accommodate their effective use in the one-
sixth gravity environment. As noted in the Apollo films, considerable effort was required
to use hand tools and adapt them to overcome some design shortcomings. In particular,
hammers were used on their sides to permit the EVA crewmember to knock in probes. It was
evident that the face of the hammer did not have enough surface area to be used as intended
(see Figure 4-1). There was also noticeable verbal concern about the hammer flying free from
the grip of the crewmember during operations. Swinging movements of the hammer appeared
particularly difficult to perform with accuracy. The crew appeared to exert considerable
energy to pound probes into the surface. Slide hammers or power hammers may be acceptable
alternatives.
From these observations two requirements can be derived. First, the operating interface of
the tool should be sized to accommodate the amplitude of the movement necessary to operate
the tool. In the case of the hammer where a large swinging arc is required, the face of the
hammer should be sized larger to reduce the terminal accuracy required. In the case of a
socket wrench, the amplitude required to bolt and unbolt is much smaller at the tool and bolt
interface; therefore, the terminal placement accuracy required can be increased to ensure a
close fit between the bolt and tool. Second, the mass of the tool should be adequate to the task.
In the case of the hammer, the mass should be greater; therefore, the amount of energy
expended by the crew in driving a stake or probe will be less.
The integrated tool handles used on the Apollo missions were designed to accommodate the
range of potential users. Experience reports and debriefings indicate that the handles were
too small for some and too large for others and resulted in slipping and cramping. A
requirement derived from these findings is to provide a custom-fitted tool handle for each
EVA crewmember and to affix snap and lock-on tool heads to these handles. The handles
would be designed to the individual and outfitted with a restraint system to preclude dropping
the tool handle and tool or having the tool fly out of the crewmember's hand during
operations. Hammer heads, drivers, scoops, wrenches, and like tools would snap in and out of
the handles. These tool effectors would serve general and special purposes.
Tools used during EVA should be appropriately allocated to humans and machines. Drilling,
for example, would be best done by a power driller mounted on the rover to relieve the crew
from aligning and holding the drill during operations. Pile- and post-drivers might be
similarly automated. Automated mules could haul bags of ore or samples about the surface
more efficiently than the crew. The rover should be considered as a tool support and
operations bed as well as a transport vehicle in order to reduce the EVA crew workload.
= =
109
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
Figure 4-1. Apollo Hand Tool (NASA AS16-108-17697)
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Power tools should have a manual operation and contingency override capability. Voice
control of power tools might be considered.
For large tool systems such as a lunar miner, a greater degree of automation should be
employed to permit the EVA crew to monitor the mining operation from a safe distance.
Table 4-1 lists some appropriate tools and equipment derived from the lunar reference mission
scenarios.
Table 4-1. Tools and Equipment for Lunar EVA
L.-
i .
. " i. _. ::Generic fabrication kit for:EVA_USe: :ii:I:::_:_:..... ::i. ii.: " ::i.:. _:::
....... -"Exten:diSle/erectabie _evices_:td:iesco_ing_ piJies/booms:,:reach ....
• Transporters/haulers for personn6i ana: carg0: inc:iuding agold- .....
up cart similar to METS (Apollo i4)
* Power tools (materials cutters, loppers, joiners)
Automated soil baggers, balers, stackers .... .. " " .......
......................................... _ :_:%./..iii.:_:ii i :i _/II ..i_ ::_ _:i..._:.. _"_.i_i?i_ '
• "Dry dock" rigs for servicing, maintenance, repair disassembly ..............
• Erectable/deployable aids/fixtures (ladders, stairs/platforms,
bridges)
• Hoists, lifts, jacks '::- ':
• Cherry picker/hole lbluckcr
. ....-.
• Soil oiler (to bank regolith against shelter)
• C0ntingency manual soil movel-s (shovels, h0es, rakds) ....... '
• Dust removal equipment (for use before entering airlock)
4.3 RESTRAINTS/WORKSTATIONS
Lunar gravity provides the EVA crew with a sense of up and down as well as some stability
while working on the lunar surface. Consequently, there is no evident need for foot restraints
and workstations that provide a universal hold-down capability like those used in
microgravity. It is evident from the Apollo experience that some means of crew stabilization
is required to help them maintain balance during excursions and operations. Figure 4-2 shows
an Apollo crewmember using a soil sample scoop; his stance suggests that he is also using the
tool for balance. Support for the crew should be provided at workstations where stability is
important or required. This might take the form of a chair, stool, or upper torso support to
enable fine manual tasks to be performed without attending to body balance.
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Workstations for the remote expeditions will vary as a function of the mission requirements.
Some workstations might be provided at the rover for maintenance functions, calibration of
scientific equipment, analysis of samples, and similar operations. The workstation for the
lunar miner might be a computer console and automated test station. The workstation must
provide artificial lighting, protection from environmental contamination, access to tools and
equipment, access to databases and diagnostic information, space to store tools temporarily,
and space to work on LURUs or similar equipment. At the remote sites, the workstations
should provide flexibility to accommodate a wide range of activities. Specialized work can
be accomplished at the main base.
Restraints for the EVA crew should b'e provided while they are in transit on the rover.
Figure 4-2. Crewmember Stability and Balance at the Worksite (NASA AS16-106-17340)
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4.3.1 Crewmember Translation/Equipment Translation
The assumption in this study is that crewmember translation occurs by ambulation or in a
surface vehicle. The primary means of crew translation should be by vehicle, and the distance
of this translation should be determined by the walk-back or drive-back time required to reach
the base or other shelter. The primary means of equipment transport should also be by vehicle,
reducing the EVA crew workload of moving equipment to and about the site.
The vehicles used to transport the crew and equipment across the lunar surface will be
required to negotiate those features of the lunar surface where EVA sorties are conducted or
where specific geological features and areas of the moon must be avoided. Vehicles such as
the rover will be capable of extracting themselves from anomalous features of the surface,
such as small craters or ridges, small blocks, or trenches, with a minimum of setup or
preparation by the EVA crew.
Ambulatory crew translation should permit stabilized movement about the lunar surface,
including the negotiation of ridges, craters, trenches, small blocks, and the loose regolith.
Ambulation should be restricted to the vicinity of the rover, worksite, or shelters. While
walking, the crew should be provided with a means to keep their balance and to avoid kicking
up or falling down in the regolith. A "ski pole" approach to translation aids should be
considered as a way to provide the crewmember with increased stability during movement
on foot.
4.3.2 Worksite Interface Requirements
The lunar worksite interface requirements associated with remote operations will be concerned
principally with tools, local and task lighting, motion and station aids, and special equipment
brought to the site such as science stations, workbenches, and major equipment. The
particulars of each of these are described in the scenarios and requirements survey in section
2.0.
Tools should be divided into tool handles, which are designed to accommodate the grip of the
individual, and tool heads, which are designed to accomplish the task. Tool heads should be
exchangeable and effectively retained during operations. It should be possible to locate tools
through an active inquiry system in the event that a crewmember drops or misplaces a tool.
Major tool subsystems, such as core drills, should be mounted on and operated from a platform
(e.g., the rover) to reduce crew workload.
Lighting should be provided for both day and night operations. As shown in Figure 4-3,
Apollo crewmembers often used reflected sunlight from their suits and the lunar surface for
local illumination. Task lighting should be provided at workbenches and workstations and
should be adjustable by the crew up to 200 footcandles. Scene lighting should be provided
where wide area operations involve going in and out of shadows and intense light normal for
the lunar surface, or when an area of interest is in the shadow of obstacles. Lighting for film
and video recording should be provided. Both shades and reflectors may be necessary.
Station aids should be provided to the crew for working at one location for an extended
period. On the moon, it is possible to use seats as station aids in front of workbenches in much
the same way that we do on Earth, and this approach should be considered.
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Figure 4-3. Local Illumination by Sunlight Reflected from Suit (NASA AS14-64-9089)
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4.3.3 External Configuration
The external configuration of the LEMU should present a minimum opportunity for the
collection and retention of lunar soil and dust. Creases, cracks, folds, exposed joints, and
open-weave fabric should be kept to an absolute minimum, if not avoided altogether. The
external configuration of the LEMU should afford ease of cleaning.
The external configuration of support equipment for lunar EVA must be free of sharp edges
and corners, as specified in NASA-STD-3000. Equipment also must preclude snagging or
pinching the crew while they are working with the equipment.
External configuration of the rover should minimize the collection of soil, especially on
sensitive components such as radiators and solar panels. The configuration also should
preclude entrapment of the EVA crew during normal and contingency operations.
For remote lunar EVA, the external configuration of all systems, subsystems, and components
that require or accommodate any connection or disconnection should he such that soil and dust
contamination at the fittings is prevented.
4.3.4 Sharp Corner/Impact Requirements
All sharp corners on equipment likely to contact the EVA suit shall be rounded in accordance
with established radii standards. The rovers especially should be analyzed in detail for sharp
corners, as should all tools and major replaceable components of the life support system. For
tools which must be sharp or pointed, appropriate storage and operational guards are required.
The requirement to protect the EVA crew from damage to their suits and equipment is well
documented in NASA-STD-3000 for system and component design features. The lunar
environment, however, presents the EVA crew with environmental hazards that are beyond
the control of equipment designers. The regolith is covered with small blocks of rock, and
many of the larger blocks have corners, edges, and points that do not meet the requirements
of NASA-STD-3000. Equipment and personnel will have to be protected from the
environmental hazards posed by these lunar landscape features.
4.4 EVA RESCUE EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS
A major component of the EVA rescue equipment will be the ambulance module installed on
a rover (see sections 2.5.2, Rovers, and 3.2.10, Medical Care Facilities). This module wilI
contain all emergency medical equipment normally required for rescue of an EVA
crewmember. A preferred mode of rescue for sick or injured crewmembers at lunar base will
involve moving equipment and medical personnel from Space Station or Earth to the lunar
base, rather than returning the sick or injured to Earth. Only in extreme circumstances should
return to Earth be considered because the stress of re-entry may contribute to morbidity.
4.5 RADIATION SHIELDING
The principal radiation threat during lunar EVA activities is the intense proton flux following
an energetic particle event on the sun. Letaw et al. (1987) have recommended that "all manned
spacecraft intended to spend a period of a week or more outside the [Earth's] magnetosphere
should be equipped with a [solar-flare] storm shelter providing 9 cm aluminum (or equivalent)
shielding in all directions." This shielding thickness will limit the radiation dose of
crewmembers to a manageable level. Radiation protection strategies that provide for partial
shielding of the face, hands, and torso while EVA crewmembers return to a fully-shielded base
or a safe haven may be useful.
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Galactic cosmic radiation (GCR) continuously contributes to crewmember doses. It is difficult
and possibly impractical to shield crewmembers from GCR during an EVA. Over 1.5 meters
of lunar soil would be required as shielding to reduce the dosage to the allowed level for
radiation workers (Figure 4-4). Within the lunar base, the dose may be reduced to terrestrial
levels with 5 m to 10 m of lunar soil.
High-altitude nuclear detonations, such as weapons testing, may be a possible contributor to
radiation dosages on the lunar surface. Advanced detection and warning systems should
provide the lunar base crewmembers with sufficient time to enter a safe haven or shelter.
The following additional research into radiation protection and radiation shielding for lunar
surface EVAs is recommended:
Identify redundant and fool-proof techniques for anticipating a large solar
particle event. These techniques would allow time for EVA crewmembers to
head for shelter prior to an event that could make them ill.
. Evaluate the effectiveness of radiation shielding materials of various thicknesses
and compositions for protection of EVA crewmembers from solar proton events.
Provide this information to those who will design spacecraft and equipment so
that radiation protection may be optimized at an early stage of project
development.
. Continue research into characterization of heavy-ion effects on biological
systems. Such research can eventually give us confidence that there will be no
"surprises" on long-duration missions outside the magnetosphere.
t"'7
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Figure 4-4. Dose Equivalent to Bone Marrow (5 cm Tissue Depth) as a Function of
Depth in Lunar Soil (Silberberg et al., 1985)
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4.6 THERMAL PROTECTION
The thermal protection requirements for EVA are well-established in NASA-STD-3000. The
performance of in-suit thermal protective systems being planned for LEO EVA on Space
Station are adequate and satisfactory. The sharp thermal gradients that will be encountered
on the moon should be accommodated by the current thermal systems.
The requirements of the thermal environment protection system are as follows:
Temperature
• Maintain crewmember's skin temperature between 33 "C and 34 "C (91.5 "F and
93.5 "F)
• Maintain all surfaces in contact with crewmember between 10 "C and 45 "C (50 "F
and 110 "F)
Cooling/Heating
• Automatic control to a manual setpoint that is operable by crewmember
• Range of control sufficient to maintain thermal comfort at metabolic rates up
to 500 watts (1700 Btu/hr or 430 kcal/hr) and as low as 100 watts (340 Btu/hr or
86 cal/hr)
Relative Humidity
• Maintain non-condensing atmosphere that will not fog visor
• Control relative humidity between 40% and 70%.
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It is recommended that feasibility studies be conducted on the design and development of
small endothermic packages for emergency cooling and small desiccant packages for emergency
removal of excess humidity.
4.7 LUNAR EVA SAFE HAVEN AND PORTABLE SHELTER
Solar energetic particles are a threat to the completion of any space mission outside the
magnetosphere. Protection from this radiation is an essential engineering requirement and
is unrelated to regulatory constraints. This fact should be well understood by all planners
of lunar base activities.
The required shielding from solar flares is the subject of some debate. The quantity of
shielding depends on the allowable risk, statistical models of the environment, energetic
particle spectra and composition, transport models and calculations, and procedures for
radiation risk assessment. Much additional study is required.
For purposes of this report, it is assumed that 5 cm of aluminum equivalent in lunar regolith
or other material is required to protect astronauts in the event of a flare. This is less than
the 6.7 cm shielding requirement at GEO and the 9 cm requirement referenced in paragraph
4.5 because of the additional protection offered by the moon. The 5 cm aluminum equivalent
shielding has a mass of 135 kg/m 2 of surface being shielded.
Because there are many uncertainties in characterizing the lunar radiation environment, any
solutions to the problem of crew protection against exposure are, at this point, suggestive and
subject to modification as conditions become better understood. The broad requirement is to
ensure a high probability of crew safety for the hazardous conditions that are currently
recognized.
Several emergency plans are possible and should be considered with this shielding mass in
mind (see Table 2-11). Flare protection strategies should be redundant, and trenching should
be one of the plans. A trenching plan is a direct solution to providing shielding material on
short notice (for a Martian analog, see Blacie et al., 1985). The complexities of safely handling
explosives and/or trenching equipment may be difficult to execute under emergency
conditions. A satisfactory shelter for a stay of 36 to 96 hours, produced on short notice, must
use the life support resources of a rover. Another plan should be the placement of safe havens
within 1 hour of all worksites. Pressurized safe havens could be of great importance in many
emergency situations. Walls and roof could easily be structured to hold regolith for solar flare
shielding. With safe havens in place, rovers could carry the few centimeters of shielding
needed to protect crewmembers during the first few hours of the flare. It is not inconceivable
that the rovers could carry all shielding necessary for solar flare protection, especially if
supplemental shielding is available for the head, neck, and hands of the EVA crewmembers.
The solar storm protection requirements may best be stated as follows:
"Sufficient shielding shall be provided on EVA missions to reduce the risk of mission-
threatening radiation exposure to allowable levels and to constrain astronaut radiation
dose to within legislated limits. This shielding should be provided in suit design,
vehicles, and safe havens. It should also be provided using locally-available geological
structures or materials. Shielding requirements must be defined in concert with an
appropriate solar-flare emergency plan." (Letaw, 1988)
In the event of medical, system, or solar flare emergencies, the range of movement from the
main lunar base will be restricted operationally by the placement and capacity of distributed
shelters and safe havens. Suggested requirements for safe haven and shelter are as follows:
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Safe haven should be a distributed network of facilities, each offering life support,
medical and environmental protection, and resources for a full EVA remote
expedition.
Distribution and location of safe havens should be determined by EVA requirements,
since concentrated EVAs (in one place and time) will require a safe haven. For EVA
that is not concentrated, portable shelters should be used to ensure the safety of the
EVA crew.
Safe havens should be brought into position, buried in the regolith while activity
takes place in the vicinity, and be removed and relocated as requirements on the lunar
surface change.
Portable safe havens should be part of the general configuration of the rover and
should provide a pressurized environment where crewmembers can seek protection
during system and medical emergencies.
Shelters and safe havens should have the capacity to support a full expedition of EVA
crewmembers for a period of 36 hours, plus time to effect rescue and removal, and a
contingency safety margin. This requirement is based on a solar flare event that could
keep the main base confined, preventing a rescue party from being sent.
Portable shelters can be used in the emergency trenching scenario to augment
protection of the crew during a solar flare emergency; however, portable shelters
must be covered with regolith to provide protection from solar particle events.
4.g PROPULSION SYSTEM ASSESSMENT
The principal propulsion system for remote lunar EVAs will be the surface rovers. Based on
past experience and demonstrated performance, it is likely that battery power will be
employed to propel the rovers across the lunar surface. The components of the battery system
(chemicals, connections, heat, and pressure) that could be a hazard to the crew should be
isolated or guarded.
Recharging and replacement of the rover batteries will take place at the servicing bay of the
main base. Recharging of the batteries is possible at a remote location if solar panels and a
charging system are built into the rover subsystems. Remote recharging can take place while
the crew is involved in scientific or exploratory activity that does not require propulsion
power.
Solar panels and radiators that are part of the propulsion system must be kept free of lunar
dust for proper operation.
4.9 COMMUNICATIONS INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS
4.9.1 Internal Interfaces
This section identifies those requirements for the communication, instrumentation, and
position-measuring hardware and software contained within the EVA system. All of these
subsystems are closely related operationally and technically. Signals and data flow extensively
among the elements, which should be closely integrated both electrically and mechanically.
A number of the elements also may be used in other systems and are well-suited for modular
configuration. A standardized data base should interconnect the elements. An "intelligent
system" should, at appropriate intervals, feed nondisruptive test signals through the subsystems
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and analyze the elements' performance as a response to these stimuli. Status information
should be presented aurally or visually along with recommended corrective action.
Outlined below are the subsystems and their functional elements which are required to provide
the mission objectives of the EVA system.
Electric Power:
The energy source may be common with that of the life support system but should
be well-regulated and filtered to preclude EMI being introduced into the complex
digital systems. This is particularly important when a relatively high-power pump
or blower malfunctions and introduces large periodic loads on the system.
• Backup or emergency power should be designed into the system.
• Batteries should be easily changed, even while the suit is operating, to extend
operating time and shorten down time for recharge.
Voice Communication:
Service requests should be able to be made verbally or through an input keypad-type
device located on the suit's exterior. Code generating circuits should link this device
with the command subsystem. Groups of codes should be available for transmission
as "macros" which activate preselected combinations of services.
• Redundant non-noise-cancelling microphones should be mounted within the helmet
at locations allowing free head movement with minimum loss of speech.
• Redundant small speakers should be mounted within the helmet to provide near-
uniform sound distribution.
Specialized electronic equipment and acoustic treatment should be incorporated to
prevent interaction of the incoming and outgoing full duplex signals. This will
eliminate feedback and crosstalk.
Aural signals from the suit caution and warning system and safety related C&W
signals from the incoming radio signal should be connected to the speakers within
the helmet in such a way that they may not be turned below a clearly audible sound
level.
Outgoing Data:
Subsystems contained within the overall EVA suit system should provide several types
of outgoing data. These include telemetry from the suit, life support systems, and
biomedical sensors; coded messages requesting communication services; data from
task-specific tools or exterior systems; and outgoing commands of data retrieval,
display inputs, and remotely controlled and teleoperator/robotic devices.
Incoming data:
Incoming commands should be able to activate suit systems, such as emergency oxygen,
from a remote location or assist the EVA by remotely controlling operational devices,
such as the suit-mounted TV camera. Incoming data may be graphic or alphanumeric
display inputs (typically procedures, position, or C&W information) or initializing
parameters for task-specific tools.
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TV Interface:
Video output signals and control inputs associated with television and various smart
sensors shall be interfaced into the suit signal complex for interaction through the RF
link.
In-Helmet Display:
This subsystem should allow a crewmember to display information around or on the
inside of the faceplate so as to appear to be at visual infinity. Appropriate control
of brightness, contrast, and other variables should be accessible to the crewmember
within. Control of the light attenuation of the faceplate should also be accessible.
This subsystem must interface extensively with the other suit subsystems.
Voice Privacy:
The crewmember should be able to switch this decryption/encryption function.
Compatibility shall be maintained with other network users.
Signal Processing and RF Transmission:
These functions shall be transparent to the EVA user. They shall be controlled by
•automation and by the central station of the network in response to communication
service requests. Redundant processing or channeling should be automatically
activated.
4.9.2 External Interfaces
This section identifies the requirements that govern the communication and position
measurement systems with which the EVA equipment must interface.
Scope of Surface Operations:
It is assumed that the systems must support the establishment and operation of a principal
lunar base having a central facility, several outlying facilities, manned mobile equipment,
surface vehicles, robotic or teleoperated equipment, and outside work/exploration areas. It
also is assumed that EVA functions will be required at all sites. Most sites are clustered in
one general area on the Earth side of the moon; however, operations must be fully supported
anywhere on that hemisphere. By the addition of similar equipment, operations should be
expandable to the far side of the moon. User equipment for the Earth and far sides should
be identical and the transition from side to side should not be evident in operation. System
configuration should allow suited EVA operation behind intervening terrain and structural
features and within RF-shielded enclosures.
Communication Routing:
The ideal system should be very transparent, requiring a minimum of user insight into its
mechanization. Several redundant signal paths should be inherently available for safety
critical transmissions such as voice, life support telemetry/commands, and location
information. Sortie or mission success communications should have some redundancy while
enhanced capability functions may be single string. Design should minimize the opportunity
for users to misconfigure their equipment, causing loss of communication, degraded data, or
feedback through unintended paths.
Expected improvements in coding, bandwidth compression, beam switching antennas,
microwave integrated circuits, RF component efficiency, etc., may allow transmission, at
reasonable power levels, of the specified signals through a multiple access-discrete address
system containing a central station plus a number of functionally similar user remote units.
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User units would normally communicate with each other through the central station, not
directly, except in an emergency backup mode where a direct EVA to EVA link is activated.
The preferred RF transmission path between a remote and the central station should be a
direct line of sight. If satisfactory performance is not achievable through direct transmission,
then the system should automatically relay the signal through a satellite orbiting overhead at
libration point LI. This concept is depicted in Figure 4-5. Surface position measurement
would be made in conjunction with satellites at LI, and later L2, and should be integrated
with communication, using common carriers to the maximum extent possible.
If the achieved improvements are insufficient to support this configuration, then alternate
signal paths should be used to provide adequate signal margins at reasonably low power. For
this configuration, shown in Figure 4-6, an additional node is added at the rover or a portable
relay unit. In this scenario, the EVA communicates directly through the reasonably high
antenna of the base station if nearby or through the rover/portable relay if further out. If
possible, the rover/relay will communicate directly with the base station. If this link is
blocked by intervening terrain, then the signal will be relayed through a satellite orbiting
overhead at LI and back down to the base station. The EVAs can communicate directly with
each other in a backup mode.
This configuration still allows discrete addressing and enables the EVA to operate at the
lowest power level but may add complexity to the relay nodes and base station to maintain
full flexibility of access, routing, combining, data distribution, etc. In this case, position
measurements now identify the location of the mobile/portable node and not the EVA.
Relays:
Above the Earth side of the moon, the most likely location for an overhead satellite is at the
librationpointLl. Located on the 384,400 km line between Earth and the moon, Ll offersa
stable point 58,000 km above the lunar surface. Very little stationkeeping and attitude control
energy is required to maintain a relay at LI. Two small satellites on opposite sides of a halo
orbit, in a plane perpendicular to the Earth-moon line and at the LI point, provide maximum
communication coverage of the lunar hemisphere and provide essential platforms for elements
of a lunar surface position measuring system. This scheme is depicted in Figure 4-7.
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Fil_ure 4-5. Ideal Lunar Communication Links
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Figure 4-7. Relay Satellite Locations
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Earth Links:
Transmissions to and from Earth should be routed through either the orbiting relay point or
the lunar base central station, both of which are in continuous sight of Earth. Future
hardware capabilities and system engineering analysis will establish the optimum choice.
Future resources and technology will influence the choice between several sites for the Earth
end of the moon-Earth transmissions. Presently known candidates include:
• a network of stations on Earth
• the Space Station
• the TDRSS network
• a geosynchronous space communications center (platform)
• the Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS).
Each of these, as well as those yet unannounced, offers identifiable advantages and
limitations. Some of the factors to be considered when a selection is made include:
• frequency and duration of interruptions to the line of sight transmission path
• intervening signal losses, such as Earth's atmosphere for millimeter wavelength and
laser transmissions
• in-place capability, such as NASA's network to TDRSS and access of multiple small
users to the ACTS network
international considerations to accommodate foreign participants
bandwidth and traffic volume requirements
available technology base
cost
ownership
security needs - commercial, functional, national.
Access:
Users should access the system by making a service request by voice or by using a keypad.
Requests may be entered during or prior to a sortie. They may be designated to commence
and end at specific times, keyed to events or activated and terminated upon request. The
elements of a request may be standardized and addressed as a "macro" or may be specified
individually. Alteration may be requested during a sortie. Such requests specify required
destination(s), types of services (voice, TV, telemetry, data, or other), and special features
(multiple users, video recording, or teleoperator interface).
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Unless deliberately inhibited, access should be available to any other system elements.
Elements typically included should be:
• EVAs
_- surface vehicles
_" base consoles/individuals
* teleoperated equipment
• surface vehicles
• remote stations
• en route space vehicles
• Earth stations
• Earth-orbiting networks
• users/support on Earth.
The number of system users or elements has not been specified for two reasons. First, the
features and capability of this system are provided in support of mission objectives that will
change and be refined over the years to come, necessitating support requirement changes.
Second, major changes in technology will drastically reduce the degree of difficulty in
implementing progressively larger numbers of units. In any case, the system design must allow
progressive expansion without restructuring/replacement.
Frequencies:
Emerging technology and its hardware capability implications are expected to have a profound
impact on the selection of frequencies. There are, however, some invariable considerations
that provide guidelines for proper choices:
It is known that terrestrial VHF and UHF transmissions are readily received on the
moon and are a potential threat to reliable network operation.
Astronomical observations made from the moon open important portions of the
spectrum in the microwave, HF, and LF (30 mHz down) bands. Earth's atmosphere
and ionosphere prevent essential observations at each extreme. Lunar-based EMI in
these bands is unacceptable.
* The same atmospheric losses inhibit reliable, efficient Earth-space communication at
millimeter and optical wavelengths.
• The lack of atmosphere on the moon allows pathloss-free microwave and optical
transmissions, as does the moon to low-Earth-orbit path.
_" Operation in the optical spectrum and in progressively higher microwave bands
reduces limitations on modulation bandwidths.
_. Lunar dust presents a serious threat to optical transmission equipment.
• As operating frequencies increase, the size of components and hardware assemblies
decreases.
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Operation with switched narrow beam microwave antennas greatly reduces
transmitted power requirements.
_, Progress in microwave, electronically steerable, array antennas indicates that beam
forming and hemispheric scanning will be a reality in the lunar base time frame.
• Use of microwave, electronically steerable, array antennas on a relay satellite greatly
reduces the attitude stability requirements and improves fuel economy.
Modulation/Multiplexing:
The use of Ku, Ka, W, and higher bands offers significant increases in available bandwidth
and enables precise timing. Nevertheless, bandwidth compression algorithms will remain
essential as data rates increase dramatically. Many modulation schemes should be evaluated
as coding algorithms, multiplex techniques, and hardware capability continue to change and
improve. Several new choices probably will be added to present selections of basic
multiplexing schemes, which now include Frequency, Time, Code, and Space Division.
Schemes like Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (QPSK) are revised to add Staggered QPSK.
Nonlinear techniques offer different prospects.
Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) schemes are of particular interest since they might
be integrated with the position measuring function to utilize the minimum hardware for the
maximum number of tasks.
Position Measurement:
An accurate, user friendly position measurement system should provide location data
throughout the lunar hemisphere without concern for terrain features that block the line of
sight and make most systems useless. Three or more levels of resolution should be readily
available, providing appropriate accuracy and complexity for varied tasks.
Long wave systems are not usable because of high galactic noise and use of that spectrum by
radio astronomy. Microwaves, however, are acceptable because the two orbiting satellites
described at LI are high over head and offer equipment sites for a number of suitable position
measuring systems. Operating in conjunction with the base central station and transponders
at truth sites, excellent accuracy should be achievable with only moderate complexity and
great utility. The lowest level of resolution suitable for routine position indication of nominal
accuracy should be made using only a portion of the system capability. Shorter codes or other
techniques will simplify the hardware and provide rapid data output. Full satellite system
capability will provide the second level of resolution. The third level will be used on those
limited occasions when very high resolution and accuracy are required. For this application,
an independent system utilizing an adaptation of laser surveying equipment should be used.
A standardized position-data system element should be incorporated into the EVA suit
communication equipment, or mobile first node, with data displayed in coordinate and graphic
form by the HUD. A similar modular element should form the nucleus of the surface vehicle
navigation system. This system should provide position, velocity, direction, control, range, and
energy requirements related to defined or pre-established waypoints as well as topography
information. Graphics from mass storage, controlled by position data, should be provided to
the vehicle or EVA HUD.
Future Expansion Capabilities:
Systems based on the outlined requirements offer services to an inherently large number of
users. Several methods are available to further expand the capabilities for more ambitious
missions. A likely direction of expansion is toward operations on the side of the moon turned
constantly away from Earth. Fortunately, this expansion fits perfectly into the concept
already evolved.
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Addition of two more halo orbit satellites, like those at LI, into a similar but larger diameter
orbit at L2 provides the same service over the back side of the moon with coverage at the limb
and relay capability between the front and back sides through LI and L2 (see Figure 4-7). L2
is located 64,500 km above the lunar surface, directly away from Earth. The relay time
through LI-L2 for Earth side to far side is about one second, while relay time for Earth side
to far side through Earth and L2 is about five seconds. Teleoperations and remote control
of activities on the far side are much more feasible when controlled through LI from the
Earth side of the moon rather than from Earth or through an Earth relay.
4.10 CREWMEMBER AUTONOMY
The issue of crew autonomy for remote lunar EVA is necessarily restricted to local operational
autonomy. The crew are dependent upon lunar base or possibly Earth base for significant
support, but the local area operations should be well understood and rehearsed so that both
lunar base personnel and EVA personnel know what to expect during nominal operations.
The extent of autonomy will be highly dependent upon the types of support - communication,
safe havens, caution and warning - that are in place during the EVA missions. To the extent
that other requirements found in this study are met, such as a distributed safe haven network
or local real-time warning of solar flares, the lunar EVA crew should be able to function with
a high degree of autonomy and flexibility during the conduct of science, mining, and sampling
operations. With appropriate training and experience, lunar EVA operations can be carried
out by the EVA crew without the same level of watchfulness required during the Apollo
missions.
The appropriate level of autonomy for the EVA crew will be dependent upon the maturity
of the base operations, the levels of experience we will gain from successive lunar EVA
operations, and the increasing maturity of major support systems such as crew rescue vehicles,
lunar satellite systems, local area science stations, and portable habitats.
Remote EVA expeditions should be able to conduct a complete mission exercise under nominal
conditions with the resources that they take to the remote site. Primary decision making
concerning nominal operations should take place at the EVA site, with the capability to
request additional information from lunar base or Earth base in support of nominal
operations. Normal operations should be carried out under local executive authority, with the
capability to request lunar base assistance as required.
The extent of crew autonomy during contingencies and emergencies is less well defined. The
following requirements pertaining to crew autonomy are suggested:
• The EVA crew should be capable of being precisely located by the lunar base and a
redundant locator system without any action on the part of the EVA crew.
• The EVA crew and the lunar base should be able to engage in two-way communication
at any time during an EVA mission.
The EVA crew should have the responsibility for pacing tasks at the remote sites and
reporting back any significant deviation from the timelines established during
training.
• The EVA crew should be able to announce targets of opportunity and execute a plan
to take advantage of them.
• The lunar base must have solar flare detection instrumentation and a warning system
that can be used to alert the EVA crew without help from Earth.
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4.11 DEDICATED EVA HARDWARE SERVICING AREA
From an operational standpoint, hardware servicing should be conducted at the main lunar
base. The requirement to support remote, local hardware servicing should be restricted to
contingency mode operations.
Provisions at the remote site to service hardware at the LURU level should be made in a
dedicated space on the rover. Requirements include a work surface that is free of soil and
other contamination. The workstation should provide lighting, tools and tool storage, visual
and manipulative aids such as magnifiers and holding aids, access to procedures for servicing,
and diagnostic and verification equipment.
On lunar expeditions, it may be required to dedicate a hardware servicing area removed from
the hardware assembly areas where bits and drill rods assembled for soil sampling are handled.
It may be necessary to make a distinction between normal assembly and handling and
hardware servicing.
For extensive servicing missions to a number of remote sites it may be desirable to have a
dedicated portable workbench that provides isolation and protection for the equipment being
serviced. Such a concept for a portable workbench and glove box appears in Figure 2-4. This
type of equipment would not be carried on every mission, but on missions that are dedicated
to servicing and repair or replacement it would reduce the down time and the inconvenience
of having to return the equipment to the rover and then to the main base for servicing. (See
also section 3.1.4, Hardware Servicing.)
4.12 AIRLOCK INTERFACES
The airlocks used to support remote lunar operations will function to pass people and material
from a clean or pressurized environment to the lunar surface and to return material and
personnel from the lunar surface to a pressurized, clean, or protective environment. The
overriding consideration in the design of any airlock will be the contamination posed by the
abrasive lunar soil. Airlocks should be designed to prevent any lunar soil from becoming
trapped in the airlock mechanisms and limiting their effectiveness. This applies to both
equipment and personnel airlocks.
4.12.1 Crew Airlocks
Crew airiocks at locations remote from the main base will be the exception rather than the
rule during the initial stages of lunar exploration. At most of the outposts, the crew will
remain in their LEMUs during operations. The solar storm shelters do not provide a
pressurized environment but rely on the LEMU for life support and protection.
As the technology and requirements mature, there may be cases where remote operations occur
in a pressurized environment and consequently there will be airlocks. The airlocks will have
to provide a means for controlling lunar dust, such as positive pressure, filters, and scrubbers.
They will have to be sized to accommodate at least two crewmembers for purposes of rescue
on the buddy system. They should accommodate the temporary storage of equipment and
outer garments in much the same way as the dustiock/airlock shown in Figure 2-16 does.
Crew airlocks attached to rovers might be the first use of remote airlocks. Several concepts
for enclosed touring cabs, ambulance modules, and portable hyperbaric chambers have been
considered in this study, and each would require a crew airlock capable of isolating the crew
from the lunar environment while providing life support. The requirements for such portable
airlocks in these concepts would still reflect the soil contamination problems and a means for
controlling the entry of abrasive lunar soil or filtering it from the airlock should it be
introduced.
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4.12.2 Equipment Airlocks
Passing equipment at a remote EVA site through an airlock is not deemed a likely event unless
there is also a crew airlock or a pressurized work area in which crew work in a shirtsleeve
environment. Equipment airlocks would have to meet the same contaminant control criteria
as the crew airlock so as not to introduce soil into the pressurized, habitable environment.
Equipment airlocks should be sized to accommodate the largest LURU that will be serviced
at a remote site. This may mean that the crew airlock serves both for equipment and crew
pass-through.
m
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5.0 Recommended Further Studies to Support EVA at Lunar Base
!
. °
=
=
=
In our consideration of these lunar EVA scenarios and the systems required to support them,
a number of candidate areas for further research and technology development have been
identified. Open issues for further study arc listed below by topics.
5.1 EXTENDED EVA
• g-hour work period, not to include "overhead" and travel
• Umbilical connection to rover consumables
• Life support system recharge at rover or shelter
• Quick don/doff suit
• Suit maintenance technicians and EVA support technicians for pre-/post-EVA
servicing
5.2 SUITS
Greatly improved gloves with better hand motion and finger dexterity than Apollo
gloves (taking into account Shuttle-era glove improvements) under pressure
conditions in a "no prebreathe" suit (6 to 8.3 psia)
Use of umbilicals to extend EVA time on-site or during rover excursions
Seals for protection of rotating joints against long-term abrasive effects of lunar dust
Effective lubricants for moving and rotating parts
Cleaning and drying station for suits
Impregnated "fabric" patches for colorimetric determination of exposure to toxic
contaminants (e.g., propellants at a launch site)
Helmet-mounted Heads Up Display for text, graphics, and video with sufficient
range of brightness and/or contrast for operation under wide range of EVA lighting
conditions (currently under development)
Voice activation/control of displays and suit parameters
Endothermic packages for localized emergency cooling and hygroscopic or desiccant
packages for emergency removal of excess humidity
Emergency packages of a supplemental scrubber material (e,g., activated charcoal)
that might be used for rapid removal of inhalation toxicants within the suit
Analysis of the utility and feasibility of an injection patch on the suit or the
application of dermal patches during EVA
Real-time internal fit adjustment for comfort and support
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., Improved in-suit food/drink dispensing
• Suit "hardpoint" for lifting/hoisting in 1/6 g
• Contamination resistance (toxic chemicals, lunar dust)
• Abrasion/wear resistance (reinforced areas of outer suit. replaceable patches)
• Unassisted rapid donning/doffing
., Lightweight IVA suit with integral life support - rapid unassisted donning (30
seconds), rechargeable 0 2 supply (1 hour purge flow)
5.3 ROVERS
A basic power train and chassis to support a wide range of missions, payloads, and
configurations
System design concept in rover development; use of functional, modular subsystems
to customize for different missions
It,
Broadband RF detector for detection and display of real-time electromagnetic field
intensity as crewmembers move around various communications antennas
Portable locating, pinpointing, and ranging devices for exploration efficiency,
scientific data, and emergency rescue
• Design of rover as a source of power and consumables for EVA resupply
• Depots for rover recharge of power and consumables
5.4 SHELTERS
• Active and passive radiation shields
• Solar flare detection and warning system with sufficient advanced warning and a
low false alarm rate
• Dust removal system (electrostatic precipitators, recyclable water shower, etc.)
,, Systems analysis of statistical and practical value of safe haven concepts to develop
an optimal mix of protective shelters
5.5 BIOMEDICAL CONCERNS AND TECHNOLOGIES
• Self-applying, unobtrusive medical sensors
• Non-invasive technique for monitoring blood electrolyte levels
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) Expected exposure to ionizing radiation on lunar surface: new calculations based on
most recent information and models
• Pharmaceutical countermeasures for radiation sickness
• Possible aggravation of health problems during EVA by presence of high-level
radiation background
• Radiation protection, detection, monitoring, and exposure record
• Effects of ionizing and non-ionizing radiation levels on the body's ability to
thermoregulate
• Physiological monitoring equipment containing algorithms for semi-automated alarm
decisions
• Critical access requirements, if any, for 6 ATA, two-person hyperbaric chamber
• Effects of long-term exposure to elevated CO 2 levels on calcium metabolism
• Long-term consequences of breathing lunar dust and chronic exposure to it (e.g.,
pneumoconioses)
• Pulse oximeter as a monitoring device during EVA
• Suit sizing accommodations for crewmembers entering lunar base from Earth or from
Space Station
• Possible use of "electronically tuned" (e.g., Piezo electric) eyeglasses which can be
adjusted by the crewmember to accommodate changes in vision due to extended stays
in space
Dietary factors and considerations of lunar-grown food and any dietary supplements
required for balance
• Plans for rotation of inventory of supplies to maintain shelf-life control on critical
medical supplies, consumables, and pharmaceuticals; disposability versus reusability
(and sterilization) of medical supplies and equipment; handling, storage, and resupply
of blood products
• Degree of continuing education required in order to maintain proficiency in medical
procedures, equipment repair procedures, emergency and contingency procedures, etc.
• Regenerable/recycling systems for life support consumables (e.g., O= and H20
reclamation)
• Physiology profiles for response/adaptation to lunar gravity and lunar day-night
cycle (circadian impacts)
• Physical conditioning protocols, facilities, equipment (time penalty, artificial gravity
(l-g), special equipment for 1/6 g)
• Condition assessment for EVA work capacity (daily kcal capability), EVA work
management (real-time budgeting/monitoring), and non-invasive biomedical
parameter sensors
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• EVA suited requirements for metabolic heat removal and food/drink
• Extent of reuse applicable to various human and/or process waste containment
devices
5.6 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT
• Voice control for suited and unsuited control of facilities, equipment, tools
• Emergency "come home" systems requiring minimal supplies and possibly self-
powered by the crewmember to allow return to lunar base (e.g., ski poles or other
simple accessories to speed EVA translation on the lunar surface and compete with
rover speeds)
• Lightweight portable pressurized enclosure with and without airlock
• Lightweight gas pressure pumps with long life and high reliability
• Rechargeable batteries immune to limits/problems experienced with current products
- accurate knowledge of state of charge and power delivering capability; automated
reconditioning (deep discharge/rejuvenation); increased number of recharge cycles;
insensitive to discharge depth points (% of discharge between recharges)
• "Smart" power tools and aids controllable by voice commands
• Post drivers (manual or power)
• Large-wheel cart for manual equipment transport at main base and remote worksites
(similar to Modular Equipment Transporter System (METS) used on Apollo 14)
I
5.7 COMMUNICATIONS
• Appropriate application of spccch synthesis and speech recognition tcchniques
)) Predicted extent of communications disturbances during solar storms
• International Signaling and Symbol System (ISSS) - similar to maritime, aeronautical,
and road traffic devices (signs, light signals, color standards, and graphic patterns)
lunar surface location (latitude/longitude) convention, position locator, EVA
personnel beacons, and communication configuration display
• Continuous voice/data capability, immunity to solar activity for effective voice
communication from safe haven shelters during solar storms
)) Elimination of suit airflow noise
• Duplex implementation
• Redundancy (RF-RF; RF-laser)
• Suited access to data systems (Earth and lunar)
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Laser, voice, and data communications (point-to-point lunar and Earth-lunar)
Effect of noisy and distorted voice communication on crew attention and
performance
Display features that present communication configuration to preclude
undesirable/unintended comm set-ups and to confirm selection of desired
configuration
5.8 CONTAMINATION CONTROL
• Dust removal system (e.g., electrostatic precipitators, recyclable water shower)
• Electromagnetic/electrostatic techniques for moving lunar soil and removing dust
contamination from suits and equipment
• Verification of contamination control (dust, toxic chemical, trace contaminant
detectors and indicators)
• Gas purge decontamination (use of gas to dcstroy, neutralize, or remove biological
and chemical contaminants)
• Absorbent patches
5.9 WORKSITE OPERATIONS
• Automated power up/power down
Equipment guards to protect crewmembers from operating envelopes of moving parts
of equipment
• Contamination guards/shields to protect suited crewmembers from debris and ejecta
Automated emergency/contingency operations deactivation (emergency "kill switch')
to permit rapid (immediate) termination of operations during crew emergency, solar
storm alert, or safety contingency
Task planning/sequencing aids for task
management, power optimization (power
status/progress/task modification assessment
priority/sequencing/monitoring and
profile management), and real-time
• Automated inventory management and control (e.g., RF responsive tags)
5.10 ENVIRONMENTAL PARAMETERS
• Updated radiation environment and exposure models for lunar EVA
• Classification of lunar soil mechanics/properties; definition of slope limits for
vehicles, equipment, and suited crewmembers, definition of adhesion/contamination
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5.11 LUNAR SURFACE EVA PLANNING DOCUMENT
Similar to flight planning documents prepared for specific missions on previous
programs
This generic document would serve as a comprehensive reference of standards and
requirements for a wide variety of lunar surface EVA planning issues. A
representative sample of topics from a lunar EVA planning document would include:
• Cartographic standards, requirements, and considerations
Topographic classification of the lunar surface operations areas for assessment
of slope, roughness, soil mechanics, regolith depth, etc. - a specialized lunar atlas
• Operational protocols and standards; for example,
Night operations support system - system of light poles on routes
(strobes and floods), remote operation (area flood), features (telescoping
height, spacing, installation/erection/removal, signaling applications)
Soil moving/stacking protocols (where to dump soil) - lighting/shadow
considerations, distance/position/geometry of dumps/piles, sampling
protocols applicable to soil mining operations where science is not the
primary objective
2_
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